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MORALITY AND IDEOLOGY AS FACTORS IN U.S. POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 3-15

[Article by Yu. A. Zamoshkin and A. Yu. Mel'vil']

[Text] Politics, morality and ideology, which are ultimately reflected in the objective tendencies, contradictions and problems of concrete history, the dynamics of socioeconomic structures and the interests of social classes and groups, are relatively independent in their development and interact with one another intensively. The actual practice of politics gives rise to certain changes in the sphere of ideology and morality. In turn, processes occurring in this sphere affect policy. The motivation and purpose of political actions cannot be comprehended unless the moral and ideological factor is taken into account. This factor also performs the functions of substantiating, rationalizing and justifying (or "legitimizing") political aims and methods.

Some aspects of the actual functioning of ideology and morality in the concrete system of political relations in the United States are examined in this article. These include the ideological and moral consciousness, which does not exist merely in the form of theoretical constructions, but is also embodied in contemporary U.S. politics, particularly in U.S. political activity in the international arena. The thorough examination of this aspect of analysis is directly in line with the objectives set forth in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrinational Work," which stresses the need to study "the characteristics and methods of the present ideological struggle in the international arena."¹ Morality and ideology affect domestic as well as foreign policy. Their influence is even felt in the very method used for distinguishing between external and internal aspects of government policy, foreign and domestic policy goals and the means of their attainment. In a certain sense, the distinctions drawn between domestic and foreign policy are relative. There is a deep-seated interrelationship, extremely complex and contradictory in nature, between foreign and domestic spheres of politics.²

The correlation and struggle between classes and social groups determine the essence of the political system and the principal aims of domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, social groups, organizations and institutes, representing the direct subjects of foreign and domestic policy, can constitute power systems with differing effects on various political spheres. The differences in the nature and level of the interests expressed by certain groups, social strata and organizations in the foreign and domestic spheres are revealed. Since these differences are acknowledged and expressed in ideological and moral forms, a look at ideology and morality is essential to an understanding of the interests of particular groups and organizations--in relation to all the spheres of their political activity.

It should also be noted that each specific nation conducting its own foreign policy must now interact with other countries representing different social, economic, political, ideological and moral systems. In the international arena, each particular nation must deal with a group of objective conditions that are sometimes profoundly different from the conditions of its domestic life. This indicates that the foreign and domestic policy spheres are not only connected by internal unity, but can also conflict sharply during certain stages in the development of the particular country.

These conflicts can be studied not only through the determination of the differences in domestic and foreign policy situations and actions, but also through an analysis of ongoing processes in the sphere of morality and ideology.

Historically, the moral and ideological factor has always played an extremely significant role in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Its influence has been felt in spite of the inherent national characteristic of pragmatism, in relation to which moral and ideological considerations often represented specific supplements and compensations. The concept of national ideals--regardless of their specific interpretation and the conclusions drawn from this--has always occupied an important position in American politics. Appeals for the observance of political ideals have been typical of all dominant U.S. political positions--from the radicals to the liberals and conservatives. Besides this, the traditional American way of thinking presupposes the universality and comprehensive significance of American national ideals and values and considers them to be everlasting and suitable for all countries and nationalities. American political forces often refer to common, "universal" ideals and values, although they propose different, and even contradictory, methods for their political implementation. They are used to justify isolationist views, demanding the protection of the American way of life against "destructive outside influences," and expansionist appeals to spread these "ideals" by any means--all the way to direct intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

Although the moral and ideological factor has always played a significant role in American politics, its influence in domestic and foreign politics is now even stronger. Much has been said in recent years about the process

of the "reideologization" of politics, and most of this attention has been focused on the need to reinforce the influence of morality and ideology, reflecting and personifying the peculiarities of the domestic political situation, on U.S. foreign policy. The admission made by American political scientist J. Osipov is indicative in this respect: "It would be absurd to hope that diplomacy could be conducted as if domestic ideology did not exist."³

The attitude toward stronger moral and ideological influence in U.S. politics, particularly foreign policy, is dual in nature. On the one hand, the intrusion of ideology and morality, reflecting the peculiarities of the domestic situation, into the foreign policy sphere is frequently regarded negatively. Ample proof of this can be found in H. Kissinger's work "American Foreign Policy," in which he speaks of the undesirability of injecting the ideological component, engendered by the internal conditions of society, into foreign policy. This is believed to have a deforming and distorting effect on foreign policy. Kissinger proposes the following: Domestic political relations are based on a particular ideology; in those cases when nations with different ideologies are encountered in the foreign political arena, ideological factors turn into a kind of "static" that disrupts the "normal" course of international relations.⁴ On the other hand, the significance of the ideological factor in foreign policy is now unconditionally acknowledged by several American authors. The forms of ideology that have become firmly entrenched in the United States are regarded as a "strategic weapon" that can be highly effective, particularly in the struggle between the two systems.⁵

Among the more characteristic features of the new situation that has taken shape in the United States in the 1970's is the stronger and more complex relationship between domestic and foreign politics and the much more important role of morality and ideology, which mediate this relationship. Foreign policy interests now include many issues that were regarded as aspects of domestic life a relatively short time ago. Energy difficulties, the exploitation of natural resources--these and other phenomena reminded the Americans of the close relationship between foreign and domestic politics. In the past, the Americans often believed that the United States was invulnerable to direct military threats and that it had priority in the area of strategic weapons. Questions of national security, they believe, were problems to be solved within the nation. Today, however, now that the socialist community has become more powerful, now that nuclear parity has been established, and now that the question of preventing nuclear war has taken on a global nature, it is clear that the problem of security is a foreign policy issue and that its resolution will necessitate negotiations and agreements with the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The appearance of a new group of problems, connected simultaneously with the domestic and foreign policy spheres, has been noted by many American authors. Prominent foreign policy theoretician B. Manning has even proposed that the new term "intermestic"--that is, literally "international-domestic"--be used to describe them. The United States is now facing

fundamentally new and difficult moral and ideological dilemmas, and nothing in its past history has prepared it to deal with them. They are the result of the sharply increased economic and political interdependence⁶ in the world community, which is made up of states with fundamentally different systems, not only in the spheres of economics and politics, but even in ideology and morality.

The United States must now deal with a world, which, as Z. Brzezinski has acknowledged, "does not correspond to the 19th-century beliefs of a single world system"--beliefs that he calls "unrealistic" and "absurd."⁷ The present world situation is distinguished by increased social dynamism and by rapid, profound and contradictory changes in all spheres of social life. In this world of interdependence, destabilizing tendencies are also gaining strength, while the stability of international relations is simultaneously more essential and more difficult to achieve. In this complex and contradictory situation, the status and role of the United States in the world arena are changing considerably. It is no coincidence that some American authors, who have grown accustomed to seeing the United States as the "dynamic center of the universe," are reluctantly acknowledging that this nation is turning into an "ordinary great power."⁸ It is difficult for the mind trained in the ideological traditions of the "American age" to accept this new situation and, in particular, to become reconciled to the relative decrease in American power. "We are no longer Gulliver surrounded by Lilliputians. As for tomorrow's international agenda, the United States will no longer be able to get what it wants simply by asking for it. In negotiations, it is often necessary to agree to difficult bargains, to be satisfied with the outcome and to even accept losses. History has taught the Americans nothing about this kind of foreign policy,"⁹ B. Manning writes.

The new situation in international relations is facing the United States, in a new way, with the need to work out a comprehensive view on the development, interdependence and contradictions of today's world and, consequently, to create a comprehensive system of ideology and morality in line with the demands of contemporary history. Today the pragmatic, purely situational approach to individual problems cannot be relied upon. Under these conditions, the role of theoretical work in the sphere of ideology and morality is gaining importance. The fundamental goals and long-range prospects of domestic and foreign policy must be reassessed. The United States must also take another important aspect of contemporary world development into account. Economic and military power still has influence even under present conditions, but opportunities for the use of force to ensure authority within the nation and to influence the course of world development and international relations are becoming increasingly limited. The increasing complexity and interdependence in contemporary world politics and the power system is substantially changing the role of the power factor in politics.¹⁰

The objective changes that are taking place in the world are giving rise to increasingly intense ideological struggle within the United States itself. The struggle is leading to the development of a variety of

viewpoints and ways of thinking, which often have their own internal logic that is far from always directly and obviously consistent with ongoing changes in world politics. The change in the United States' status in the world and its dependence on other countries in a number of significant economic and political areas are evoking a variety of ideological, moral and psychological reactions: from the realistic acceptance of these changes to the traditional desire to assert, at any cost, the American "political will" and return to foreign policy methods based on force. In the United States today, various ideological, moral and psychological attitudes either combine to make up externally similar but internally profoundly contradictory and unstable ways of thinking or come into acute and open conflict with one another.

The increasing importance of moral and ideological considerations, which are grounded in past history but have been preserved in traditional ways of thinking, often causes Americans to perceive a distorted picture of the actual situation in domestic and foreign policy and see it in internally and externally contradictory forms. This, in turn, gives rise to moral and ideological dilemmas that are difficult for the bourgeois mind to resolve. They reflect differences of opinion and crisis processes in ideology and morality as well as politics.

One of the United States' most prevalent--and it is typical of precisely this nation--methods of perceiving and interpreting new problems and crises in foreign and domestic policy is reflected in the unique moral and ideological dilemma of the present day: "Democracy" or "empire"? Let us examine this dilemma; this will aid in a discerning examination of the forms in which the prevailing way of thinking in the United States now perceives actual changes taking place in the internal life of the society and in international relations in the 1970's

In discussions of the conflict between "democracy" and "empire"--mutually exclusive ideological and political aims--many American authors who are disturbed by this difference focus primarily on a broad range of unsolved problems: In domestic policy they are connected with the increasingly acute crisis of faith in government and bureaucratic institutions, with the Watergate affair and with the growth of the repressive system in the nation; in foreign policy they are connected with the consequences of the aggression in Vietnam, the illegal activities of secret agencies abroad, the declining international prestige of the United States and so forth. In our day, Americans frequently express concern over the deep-seated, dangerous conflict between the demands, which have been persistently voiced for decades now, for the preservation and development of democracy and the direct opposite of these demands--the "empire" approach to other countries, nationalities and international relations as a whole, as well as conservative foreign policy, which is aimed at the establishment and preservation of an outside "empire."¹¹

This is a real conflict. It was not invented by American bourgeois ideologists, but is rooted in a fact repeatedly pointed out by V. I. Lenin, when he stressed that imperialism is essentially hostile toward democracy. Therefore, the growth of democratic demands is an objective tendency that is contrary to imperialism. The actual conflict, however, can take the form of ideological positions with different purposes and leading to different political conclusions. This is the reason for the differences of opinion revealed during the course of debates over the "democracy"- "empire" dilemma.

One of the formulas set forth during the course of these debates was proposed by D. Bell, in particular, in the book "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism." Bell had to admit the deep-seated contradiction between democratic and "imperial" aims. The "imperial" role, Bell says, was still appropriate for the United States during the cold war; because of this, it became a society that was internally "mobilized" for struggle against world socialism. This "mobilization" of society on the pretext of an imaginary global external threat and to the tune of ambitious foreign political slogans (such as, for example, the notorious appeal to "rid" the world of communism) creates, to some extent, internal moral and ideological unity. Naturally, internal differences unavoidably arise, but they are artificially assigned secondary status.

Bell feels that the United States' position after World War II, when the nation was attempting to create a world "empire" under its aegis, is comparable to the situation of Athenian democracy during a period of internal crisis (after the war with the Medes, when Athens was having problems with Sparta, which was equivalent to the United States' problems with the USSR in the context of Bell's arbitrary analogies). Bell goes on to say, however, that "the relation between democracy and empire is especially trying, and increasingly one can see that the imperial role is not one that is fitting, in political structure and national style, for the United States."¹²

Let us disregard the conditional and arbitrary nature of Bell's exercises in historical comparisons. The important thing is that although Bell is obviously idealizing the U.S. political structure and the prevailing style of American political and ideological thinking, he cannot deny that a genuine conflict arose between the "imperial" foreign policy and the democratic aims of many Americans--aims which were loudly expressed in the late 1960's and early 1970's, during the period of upsurge in democratic protest movements within the United States.

Many authors are now expressing doubts about the suitability of "imperial" foreign policy, based on "imperial" ideology and morality, for America, although they are acting on different motives. Some are disturbed by the crisis of "imperial" foreign policy and hypothesize that the political and ideological emphasis on democracy within the nation is poorly "adapted" for the attainment of "imperial" foreign policy goals.

Other American authors are primarily worried about the fate of democracy in their own nation. They correctly stress that "imperial," rabidly anti-communist and militarist foreign policy, which rests in other countries on overtly antidemocratic military dictatorships, can increase the strains of antidemocratic forces and tendencies in the internal life of society.

The origination of this debate also reflects the fact that "imperial" foreign policy, which is backed up by dictatorial regimes in other countries and actively resorts to the use of force, has come into decisive conflicts with the mass democratic and national liberation movements throughout the world and the increasing struggle of many millions of people in various parts of the world for genuine freedom and democracy.

There is also another important aspect of the matter that must be borne in mind. The focus in U.S. domestic life has been on questions of democracy interpreted primarily in the traditional liberal-individualistic tone: the violation of the constitutionally and legally established rights of the American individual by the authorities and secret agencies, and authoritarian bureaucratic methods of exercising power. Much less attention has been given in the United States to aspects of democracy that have been developed more fully in nations fighting for liberation from neocolonial orders, dictatorial regimes and exploitative systems in general. In these countries, primary significance is attached to the problems of the mass-scale, organized democratic movement, which unites millions of people and pursues the goal of profound social reform.

This unique view of democracy keeps many American authors from developing a moral and ideological outlook on the democratic struggle that would correspond to the socioeconomic aspirations of the American workers and would ensure the massive reorganization of foreign policy in the direction of respect for the democratic demands of popular masses in other countries. Nonetheless, even the Americans are now realizing that there are certain differences in the ideological interpretations of democracy within the United States and in other countries of the world. In connection with this, the dilemma of "democracy" vs. "empire" is once again being interpreted and expressed in different ways--with a view to its diverse foreign policy and domestic policy yardsticks. The most important interpretations of the issue are the following. Firstly, the thesis has been set forth that "empire" undermines democracy (even in its official, limited-liberal form) within the United States itself. Secondly, it has been suggested that "imperial" ambitions are impeding the increasingly demanded democratization of domestic political regimes in the countries that are objects of U.S. hegemonistic aims. Thirdly, it has been noted that the needs of "empire" are contrary to the development of truly democratic and egalitarian relations between different states, including those belonging to different social systems.

The gradual recognition of the contradiction between "democracy" and "empire" is undermining one of the postulates that has been stubbornly cherished for a long time in American political thought--the thesis of

the universality of the national ideals corresponding to American tradition (primarily the ideals of democracy) and their suitability for all countries and nationalities. Many Americans were surprised to learn that ideals other than those in the United States were developing and being defended in other countries. Besides this, the universality and realization of many traditional "American ideals" were even questioned in the United States itself. The sizable gap between the values and habits inherited from past stages of national development and the current domestic and foreign political situation became more evident.

The new situation, which resulted from the moral discrediting of American imperialism in the world arena and the characteristic bourgeois interpretation of the "way of life" in the United States, is being uniquely reflected in ideology. For example, warnings about, as Z. Brzezinski calls it, the "philosophical isolation" threatening America are being issued (S. Hoffman talks about a "breach of values" in this same connection). In this form, a real fact is being perceived: The basic tendencies of worldwide social, political and ideological development are not only inconsistent with traditional American values, but are often even contrary to them. In reference, in particular, to the values of individualism and free enterprise, Z. Brzezinski had to admit: "Today traditional American values... are being argued at home and, to an even greater degree, abroad, as a result of such phenomena as statism¹³ and the emphasis on collectivity (national and social), social equality and universal well-being."¹⁴ The idea of an isolated America is being set forth with increasing frequency in the press and in statements by many American authors; it is still hanging on to the old ideals of bourgeois individualism and free enterprise, the essence of which has already been excised by modern history.

In the ideological, moral and political debates now being conducted in the United States over the conflict between "democracy" and "empire," another important aspect is becoming apparent. Concern about the problems of democracy is also reflected in the desire of various segments of the American public to participate more directly in the making of foreign policy decisions, which are affecting their future to an increasing degree. Certain segments of the U.S. ruling class cannot afford to ignore these desires today. The current administration had good reason to partially build its 1976 campaign around the slogan of returning the foreign policy prerogative to the "American people." By tradition, the function of conducting foreign policy has been regarded as the responsibility of the executive branch in the United States. The increasing mistrust in the "imperial presidency," which took on clear outlines after Vietnam and Watergate, has caused the American public to want more influence in foreign policy-making, and this is leading away from the previous "automatic approval" of the majority of the administration's foreign policy initiatives.¹⁵

Naturally, the dual nature of new phenomena in the attitude of the American public toward foreign policy must be taken into consideration. On the one hand, there is no question that current problems in U.S. foreign policy,

in their interaction with domestic problems, are so complex and so vitally important that public opinion is afraid to entrust their resolution to a restricted foreign policy-making elite. On the other hand, however, it would be just as dangerous to pay attention to all fluctuations in U.S. public opinion: It is frequently extremely contradictory here, it is prey to various illusions and fears and it can be deliberately manipulated by various groups. This can introduce a significant element of instability into U.S. relations with other countries and into the processes of the conclusion and observance of agreements.

We will now take stock and summarize the basic ideological views of American authors who have investigated the contradiction between "democracy" and "empire." The following position is characteristic of liberal democratic circles: The resolution of the conflicts between "democracy" and "empire" will be made possible primarily through the substantial restriction of the second aspect--that is, the emphasis on "empire."¹⁶ This position is often limited by the traditional liberal interpretation of democracy and the exaggeration of the importance of democratic elements in domestic political life in the United States today. Nonetheless, it contains certain positive elements. Rightist groups in the United States, dreaming of a return to the cold war, now advocate the opposite solution to the problem of the contradiction between "democracy" and "empire": They insist on the need to seriously limit democracy within the nation so that it will not interfere with their "imperial" and militaristic projects. These forces are not only calling for the establishment of authoritarian "law and order" in the nation and the eradication of bourgeois democratic gains, but are also putting America in real danger of worldwide nuclear conflagration.

Along with the extreme viewpoints, various alternative eclectic, intermediary positions are now becoming widespread in U.S. ruling circles. They are having considerable influence on American politics and on the ideological climate in the nation. Their common feature is the recognition of the impossibility of resolving this conflict by means of attaching priority either to "democracy" or "empire." This is giving rise to attempts to make compromises, to take the edge off this conflict and to adapt to it. The forces defending these views are prone to fluctuation: In domestic policy--from the desire for further democratization, on the one hand, and the wish to strengthen the structures and institutions of authority that are characteristic of the United States today (including the authoritarian bureaucratic structures and institutions) on the other. In foreign policy, they fluctuate between realism, an outlook based on detente and the conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements with the socialist countries, on the one hand, and global anticommunism and "imperial" aims, which are still obvious even though they are limited and "cautious," on the other.

An analysis of popular approaches in the United States today to the resolution of foreign and domestic policy problems indicates two approaches that can conditionally be called "pragmatic" and "ideological."

It was the pragmatic approach to international relations that was taken by H. Kissinger in the 1970's when he proposed some limitation of previous "imperial" ambitions and the moralist rhetoric justifying them. "We can no longer hope that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will meet with widespread support,"¹⁷ he wrote, in reference to the new features of public opinion abroad. When Kissinger said this, he was motivated primarily by a realization of the limited nature of American resources in the international arena and opportunities for the use of force. Politicians like Kissinger had to take the internal situation, which was taking shape in the nation in connection with democratic protest movements, into account whether they wished to or not. In the fear that the ideology of these movements might influence foreign policy, they try to keep foreign policy considerably autonomous in relation to domestic policy, thereby insuring it against the influence of the intense ideological struggle in the United States and reconstructing it according to several purely practical parameters.

There are still influential supporters of this pragmatic position in the United States. But this position is losing ideological credit as the obvious interest in questions of morality and ideology grows in America. The other approach to politics, the supporters of which are striving to solve political problems not only on a purely pragmatic basis, but also with consideration for moral and ideological factors, is becoming more evident.

In this connection, consideration must be given to the influence of another factor that has already been mentioned--the unhealthy dissatisfaction of the American public with the moral bases of Washington policy, both domestic and foreign, and the search for ideological concepts that will provide a more convincing explanation of political crises, suggest new programs and moral principles and indicate ways of escaping the current situation. It is true that various groups have pointed out various ways--both realistic and extremely far from realistic. For example, certain circles have made an attempt to direct outbursts of moral and ideological dissatisfaction into channels convenient for them. They have tried to blame the objectively determined unfavorable domestic and foreign situation on the personal style of leadership of the Republican Administration (the anti-democratism of R. Nixon and the foreign policy pragmatism of H. Kissinger). Public attention has been artificially focused less on the actual deep-seated causes of changes within the nation and in the world arena, which resulted in the failure of U.S. "imperial" ambitions, than on specific conclusions drawn from them, particularly those drawn by Kissinger. In the mid-1970's, Kissinger was frequently accused of "pragmatizing" and "Europeanizing" American foreign policy and repudiating "American idealism." These accusations were made primarily by conservative and traditionalist groups. What alternative did they propose? It appears that the critics were inclined to take an "antipragmatic" stand. Later, however, it became clear that they felt the only cure was a return to the moral and "idealistic" heritage of American tradition, which supposedly was the only possible basis for the recovery of lost prestige in the international arena and alleviation of the "spiritual crisis."

Traditionalist foreign policy moralism tried to compensate in some way for the moral dissatisfaction that was brewing in the United States. Demands for the "recovery of lost influence" in the world arena, however, do not correspond well to the complexity and ambiguity of the problems in American and world politics. In those cases when speculation on the moral and ideological factor in U.S. foreign policy takes on obviously anticommunist features and is also directed against democratic and national liberation movements in other countries, it constitutes a real threat to the national interests of the United States and the entire world community. This was precisely the case when the tendentious and moralistic ideological campaign "in defense of human rights" began to interfere with the strategic arms limitation talks. People in the United States began to recognize this fact. Justifiable doubts arose in regard to the practical political significance of this kind of show of "morality." "It is not easy to define highly complex policy in terms of precise and comprehensive political categories, And it would be risky, just as it was in the past, to compress this complexity into a few simple moral slogans,"¹⁸ S. Hoffman warned. Another American author makes an even more definite statement: "We must not allow our moralizing to stand in the way of negotiations that are vitally important to the existence of all mankind."¹⁹

Nonetheless, there is still a strong temptation in some American political circles to gain domestic moral and ideological support for some foreign policy ambitions that have been externally modified but are still "imperial" in essence. It is precisely for this reason that the propaganda campaign "in defense of human rights" is still going on today. There is sufficient proof, however, that it cannot serve as a means of ideological unification. On the contrary, it is giving rise to differences of opinion and pointed criticism in some U.S. social and political circles, which--even if for different reasons--have objected to the subordination of foreign policy to moral and ideological slogans that conceal "imperial" ambitions.

We have defined some of the basic parameters of the current ideological and moral debates in the United States, which are directly related to policy problems, particularly the problem of the relationship between democratic and "imperial" trends in domestic and foreign policy. The moral and ideological pitch of the debates is quite pronounced. Even many American authors, however, have admitted that there is "agreement" (or a "consensus") in the nation in regard to the domestic policy and, what is of even greater interest, the foreign policy of the administration. The new international situation calls for responsible foreign policy decisions, the success of which will depend largely on their moral and ideological support within the nation. "The greatest problem for the United States consists in developing a policy that will be supported at home,"²⁰ S. Hoffman admits. Many American authors have commented that it is precisely in this area that great difficulties and obstacles now exist. After all, this support has been lost and must be recovered. This is the reason for the fairly pessimistic statements that are being made. For example,

J. Chase writes: "We should probably learn how to conduct foreign policy for long periods of time without a single unifying theme on which widespread national consensus can be based."²¹

During the two postwar decades, right up to the end of the 1960's, conditions existed in the United States for the artificial cultivation of an internal anticommunist "consensus." During the cold war, the strong "imperial" executive branch relied on this consensus in its foreign policy initiatives. But the actual price of this frame of mind and emotion was an excessively severe loss: The military-industrial complex became much more powerful, anticommunist hysteria was stirred up, antidemocratic tendencies spread, crises sprang up within the nation, and one foreign policy failure followed another. Besides this, the moral and ideological extremism of militant anticommunism--and its main "explanatory motive" in politics became the mythical evil intrigues of the "enemy" abroad--led to impotence in the face of the dynamic internal processes that were influencing American foreign policy attitudes. According to J. Rosenau, the moral and ideological staticity of the "cold war paradigm"²² impeded all attempts, even the most timid, to determine the interaction of U.S. foreign and domestic policy factors for a long time.

The internal "consensus" in regard to Washington's foreign policy that took shape during the cold war gradually developed self-destructive elements. It is true that the "imperial" ideology and anticommunism (in the form of the notorious "domino theory") was still compelling American soldiers to die in the jungles of Southeast Asia, but, behind the scenes, they were already laying the foundations for profound schism within the nation. The failure of this aggression helped to reveal the fact that "imperial" anti-communist moral and ideological dogmas were prevailing over the genuine national interests of the United States. America's "Vietnam wound" marked the disintegration of the previous internal ideological "agreement" on foreign policy issues, which, in turn, led to the spread of mistrust and criticism of the administration. Was it these acute domestic crises that were reflected in the dilemma of "democracy" vs. "empire"? In connection with this, the exceedingly important question arises of the role of the moral and ideological factor in the establishment of internal foreign policy "consensus."

Apparently, it is a realistic assumption that temporary psychological "consensus" can continue to be achieved for a specific period of time and within strictly limited bounds. It can be based on more or less popular moods and feelings in the United States that have not taken the form of precise ideological and ethical systems. They can be quite diverse. They can take the form of the fear of worldwide nuclear catastrophe, the fear of an external "enemy," the desire to guarantee personal safety, etc. The amorphous, ideologically vague and vacillating nature of these moods and feelings can result in the support of opposing foreign policy aims. For example, a sense of fear can justify the escalation of military spending and, conversely, lead to the search for realistic compromises and mutually beneficial agreements in the area of strategic arms limitation.

It is understandable that psychological "consensus" that is based purely on emotions could become the object and result of political rhetoric, demagoguery and manipulation by the mass media. Some American authors speak of the danger of spontaneous feelings and emotions that are based on the traditional stereotypes of bourgeois thinking (for example, on nationalism, or even chauvinism). They are attempting to limit their scales and introduce elements of restraint and realism. In particular, with respect to foreign policy, appeals are now being made for the recognition and acceptance of existing obstacles standing in the way of ambitious political plans and projects. George Kennan, for example, points out the need for "restraint" in highly complex and potentially dangerous world affairs.²³

Naturally, the question of moral and ideological public support for the U.S. administration's foreign policy is primarily a question of the nature and purpose of the policy itself and of the content of political practices. Under present conditions, despite the perceptible activation of conservative forces, it would obviously be difficult to say that the majority of Americans are displaying any kind of solid "consensus" with those who are attracted by undisguised "imperial" policy or cold war. On the contrary, the facts indicate that the public supports detente, the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitation and the development of mutually beneficial trade. If public opinion, however, does not rest on a solid moral and ideological basis, on ideology and morality corresponding to the demands of realism, as we have already pointed out, it can vacillate and be contradictory. Spontaneous mass thinking can demonstrate a failure to keep up with reality, a preference for past illusions and habits and a tendency to become bound up with the traditions of utopianism that are so characteristic of the United States. The situation can also be affected by the failure of processes of theoretical and ideological interpretation to keep up with the actual highly dynamic developmental tendencies in U.S. domestic life and in the international arena. America today is distinguished by the absence of solid and developed traditions of in-depth scientific and theoretical inquiries into ideology and ethics. Prevailing ways of thinking fluctuate between pragmatism and abstract-moralistic utopianism.

The implementation of important political decisions such as, for example, SALT II is difficult to guarantee in the United States if only the spontaneous processes of the development of public opinion are relied upon. The implementation of these decisions depends largely on precisely defined new imperatives that are formulated in terms of ideological and ethical categories. Paramount among these are the recognition of the vital need for peaceful coexistence, the de-escalation of the arms race and respect for the sovereignty of other states, for democratic movements and for the desires of workers and the people of the world. Attempts to solve today's global problems constructively must also be taken into consideration. This is why it is so important to overcome the utopianism inherent in the cultivation of the idea of "America's mission," to overcome the illusion that it is possible to return to the past, to past stages of American history, when there was no parity in the sphere of armaments and the nation

was apparently militarily invulnerable. Ideological differences and confrontations still exist in the international arena. The need for detente, however, is underscoring the importance of overcoming the habit of "psychological warfare" and the mentality that justifies interference in the lives of other people.

Therefore, a lasting and mass-scale orientation of American public thinking toward realism in foreign policy will only be made possible by the considerable renovation of the prevailing ideology and moral code in the United States. This will promote recognition and reinforcement of the irreversibility of the process of international detente. The agreements reached in connection with SALT II will play a tremendous--ideological and educative as well as political--role in this process. And the more consistently this practice is employed in politics, the more the Americans will realize the significance of positive foreign policy measures for domestic policy, and the more substantial and profound the positive renovation of the general moral and ideological climate in the United States will be.

FOOTNOTES

1. KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1979, p 18.
2. Many American authors have recently displayed considerable interest in the interconnections between domestic and foreign policy. Nonetheless, they have not been able to propose any satisfactory positive solutions to the problem. As early as 1967, J. Rosenau, one of the most prestigious experts on these matters in the United States, was distressed by the fact that the domestic sources of foreign policy had not been systematically analyzed in the West ("Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy," edited by J. Rosenau, New York, 1967, p 3). But more than a decade later, American political scientist M. Trachtenberg had every reason to complain that the topic had still not been investigated sufficiently (M. Trachtenberg, "The Social Interpretation of Foreign Policy," THE REVIEW OF POLITICS, July 1978, p 328).
3. COMMENTARY, July 1975, p 18.
4. H. Kissinger, "American Foreign Policy," New York, 1969, pp 11-50.
5. W. Thompson, "The Projection of Soviet Power," in: "Defending America: Toward a New Role in the Post-Detente World," New York - San Francisco, 1977, p 24.
6. A. A. Kokoshin, "'Interdependence': Realities, Concepts and Politics," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 1, 1977; A. V. Nikiforov, "'Interdependence' and Global Problems," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1979.

7. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 31 December 1978, p 11.
8. A. Buchan, "Tomorrow's America," ORBIS, Spring 1976, p 39.
9. B. Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1977, p 308.
10. V. F. Petrovskiy, "The Power Factor in U.S. Global Strategy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1979.
11. R. Issak, "American Democracy and World Power," New York, 1977.
12. D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," New York, 1976, p 201.
13. In the United States, the term "statism" is used to signify recognition of the dominant role of the state in economics and politics.
14. Z. Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1976, p 73.
15. D. Jankelovich, "Farewell to 'President Knows Best,'" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No 3, 1979.
16. The "Foreign Policy and the American Democratic System," edited by F. Neal, Santa Barbara, 1976.
17. H. Kissinger, "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy," THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1975, p 274.
18. S. Hoffman, "Primacy or World Order," New York, 1978, p 227.
19. H. Rabasseire, "Ghosts of the Cold War," DISSENT, Fall 1978, p 382.
20. S. Hoffman, "No Choice, No Illusions," FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1976/77, p 107.
21. J. Chase, "Is a Foreign Policy Consensus Possible," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1978, p 16.
22. J. Rosenau, "Paradigm Lost: Five Actors in Search of the Interactive Effects of Domestic and Foreign Policy," POLICY SCIENCE, December 1973.
23. G. Kennan, "A Current Assessment of Soviet-American Relations," ENCOUNTER, March 1978, p 3.

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THE UNITED STATES, THE DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE PROCESS OF DETENTE

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pp 16-26

[Article by V. P. Lukin]

[Text] Since the time of the conclusive victories in the struggle for political liberation, the young independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America have come a long way. The reinforcement of their political structure, their first, although extremely taxing, successes in economic development, and substantial social reforms have become the objective basis on which the developing countries have been able to considerably augment their role in world politics in the last decade. Countries with a socialist orientation--the vanguard of the struggle of all developing states for a new and more equitable world order--are making a particularly significant contribution to the achievement of these successes.

The "external environment"--the changing balance of power in the world in favor of socialism--has been of tremendous and ever-increasing significance in this historical process.

The dominant international tendency of the present day--the consistent development of socialism and the weakening of imperialism's positions--is reflected in the course of complex confrontation, which does not exclude the possibility of alternating "ebbs" and "flows," and various types of dramatic and complex collisions, which do not, at first glance, appear to have any direct connection to the main tendency. Nonetheless, the simultaneity of the processes by which socialism's positions are becoming stronger in the world, allowing it to progress and to make the idea of international detente a possibility throughout the world, and by which the developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in world affairs is indisputably natural. One of the most vivid reflections of these processes in the first half of the 1970's was the intensive development of the trend toward detente and the virtually simultaneous onslaught of the developing states on the positions of imperialism, taking the form of demands for a new world order and reinforced by an entire series of concrete measures: from an oil embargo to the nationalization of the property of international corporations.

The concrete historical experience of the 1970's was a convincing argument against various types of leftist radical theories, according to which international detente, accompanied by healthier relations between nations with different social structures, and decisive anti-imperialist struggle represent contradictory and mutually exclusive trends. Although the echoes of these arguments can still be heard from time to time in the noisy and complicated discussions of contemporary international politics, the voices of preachers of leftist radical views are being heard less frequently and their arguments have obviously lost their luster. Life has resolutely pushed these theories over to the sidelines of the worldwide discussion of present and future world politics. Experience--the test of the truth--has unequivocally demonstrated the real relationship between detente and the anti-imperialist struggle in general and the movement for national liberation in particular.

One of the most visible and graphic lessons was the defeat suffered by American imperialism in Indochina. The victory of patriotic national liberation forces in this part of the world was made possible by the close connection between socialist and national revolutionary goals and by the vigorous support rendered by the socialist and developing states. And it is a well-known fact that the conclusive successes of Indochinese revolutionary forces were achieved at a time when the most vigorous efforts were being made within the framework of the policy of international detente.

The course and outcome of the war in Indochina clearly demonstrated the possibilities and limits of direct military intervention by imperialism in the affairs of the developing countries under present conditions. It can be said that these possibilities are still sufficiently significant, but they no longer appear unlimited even to overt apologists of politics from a "position of strength." When imperialist circles now plan an interventionist action, they must give more consideration than ever before to not only such factors as the specific internal political situation in the potential object of aggression, the extent of their own economic and strategic interests, geopolitical aspects, their own military capabilities and the expected effect of the action on the domestic political situation in their own country, but also several other considerations. The most important of these is the possible reaction of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states to a venture of this kind. It should be noted that this factor is not equivalent to the automatic refusal of the imperialist states to undertake military expansion in the developing countries. But their observance of the socialist world to judge its reaction and their fear of the possible consequences of the latest expansionist operation means that imperialist circles dare to embark upon such ventures less often.

In 1978, the Brookings Institution, one of the most influential centers of semi-official American political and strategic thought, published a voluminous study of almost 600 pages and gave it the extremely descriptive title "Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument."¹

The main authors of the book--prominent American political scientist B. Blechman (now assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and S. Kaplan--pedantically analyze all of the major incidents involving the "demonstrative" use of armed forces by Washington in the postwar period. Most often, as the analysis indicates, these actions were conducted for the purpose of threatening and blackmailing states that had recently rid themselves of colonial oppression or were still fighting for liberation. The conclusions of these authors sound quite pessimistic. In the future, "decisionmakers," they write, "should not resort to the frequent or quick use of armed forces for political objectives abroad; these forces should be used only in special circumstances.... Moreover, there are specific dangers in using the armed forces as a political instrument."²

As evidence, the authors cite such well-known crisis situations as the invasion of Cuba by mercenaries, the intervention in Vietnam and the show of naval strength at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971. After listing more than 200 cases involving the use of U.S. military strength as a means of exerting political pressure, the authors admit that the effect of these actions was negative for the United States in the majority of cases.

If we continue this analysis by B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, which is written on a fairly trivial level with little concern for the time factor, it turns out that this negative effect becomes increasingly perceptible with the passage of time, although it would appear, from the standpoint of military technology, that the possibilities and spectrum of the use of military strength by Washington as an instrument of pressure are constantly being augmented.

Does this mean that the United States is reassessing the very principle of the use of military strength in relations with the developing countries? The authors unequivocally deny this. They even assert that an increase in the number of such incidents "should be expected" in the future. Moreover, they mention specific regions in which the United States should be prepared to "show its strength." These regions, arranged in order of the probability of a "force reaction," are the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Arab-Israeli conflict, various inter-Arab confrontations, the Cyprus situation and the related difficulties in relations between Greece and Turkey have been singled out as spheres of potential intervention; East Asia, where the Korean peninsula is still the central object of U.S. concern; the Caribbean, where growing tendencies toward national independence and social reforms are making Washington increasingly anxious.

Therefore, the potential use of military pressure by the United States is largely confined to the developing countries.

It is evident, however, that the list of regions in which the United States deems it possible to use its armed forces openly and directly is much shorter now than at the time of the practice of global military intervention, which was declared (and not only declared) in the "pre-Vietnam" era.

This is indirect, but fairly definite, proof of Washington's realization that there are factors opposing attempts at direct military intervention in the affairs of the developing countries during the current stage of international development. The risk of intervention is regarded as justifiable only in those cases involving what the United States regards as its most important and immediate strategic interests. In all other cases, Washington strategists advise the use of other, indirect and camouflaged methods.

The expansionist activity of the United States in the developing countries is being accomplished in the following ways under the conditions of detente.

On the purely military level, the United States is striving to reinforce (and, sometimes, to even replace) "gunboat diplomacy" with the use of so-called "comprehensive forces" in its own interest. The tendency to use "local" armed forces to further imperialist policy, which made itself apparent at the time when the "Nixon Doctrine" was set forth and implemented, is now becoming a favorite tactical means of achieving local objectives in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. The possibility of relatively less (in comparison to direct military intervention) "operational efficiency" on a short-term basis is consciously foreseen. This, according to Washington strategists, is compensated for by the fact that the developing states are less likely to display a dramatically negative reaction and less likely to appeal to socialist countries for assistance. In this way, the contemporary international political situation is increasingly restricting the expansionist appetites of U.S. ruling circles and forcing them to choose more cautious, indirect tactics in relations with the developing states, even in those cases when their "instinct for military intervention" is aroused, in spite of all past lessons and present difficulties. (And this instinct is aroused primarily and mainly in those situations when a particular developing country turns toward socialism during the course of its internal sociopolitical evolution.)

Under present conditions, American imperialism (and imperialism in general) also has much less opportunity to use extra-economic, "power" levers to resolve its own economic difficulties and problems at the expense of the developing states. This tendency is closely connected with the evolution in the use of direct military intervention and is a consequence of this evolution. Washington's initial reaction to the oil embargo of the Arab countries in 1973 is well known: H. Kissinger, then secretary of state, threatened to "guarantee deliveries of cheap oil to the West" by means of military occupation of the Persian Gulf. Soon afterward, however, American ruling circles realized that it would not be so simple to take such actions, neither from the military nor from the political standpoint.

The economic aspects of U.S. strategy in relations with the young independent states do not enter into the subject matter of this article. We must at least stress, however, that it is precisely the close cooperation between the socialist world and the national liberation movement that forced imperialism to seek means of resolving the economic and financial

conflict with the developing countries in negotiations, the purpose of which, in the view of the developing countries, is to radically reorganize the existing system of international economic ties. It was for this reason that the United States took part in the so-called "North-South" dialog, after resolutely repudiating even the idea of this kind of dialog a few months prior to its commencement. It is for these same reasons that Washington is now making a few--and, incidentally, quite limited--concessions to the developing countries and is striving for some convergence of views with the United States' weaker and more vulnerable partners, which realized the need for compromise even earlier (this tendency became particularly apparent at the time of the fifth UNCTAD session in Manila in May 1979).

This tactic, however, soon proved to be weak and vulnerable. Rightist pro-American regimes interpreted the slight alleviation of the military aspects of U.S. expansionist activity in the developing countries as a reduction in Washington's ability to guarantee their survival. These feelings became particularly pronounced after the fall of the shah's regime in Iran.

Under these conditions, Washington quickly took actions to demonstrate its "power" and vigor. These included, above all, the public announcement of the intention to create a "rapid response" corps of 110,000 soldiers for use in the event of crises (especially in the Middle East and in East Asia), measures to build up the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the reluctance of the United States to resume the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of military activities in this region (in spite of the fact that an agreement on their immediate resumption was concluded at the time of the summit-level meeting in Vienna in June 1979), as well as the refusal to consider even the partial withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the steps taken to strengthen the American Navy and Air Force in the West Pacific.

All of these moves are externally reminiscent of the old, openly interventionist policy. But their main purpose was to lift the moral and spirits of the United States' partners and allies in the Asian, African and Latin American countries and encourage them to act more decisively with less hesitation. Therefore, this is a kind of "tactic within a tactic," the creation of the best possible conditions for the formation of "comprehensive forces" of local U.S. allies in times of need and for their effective use.

On the political level, the relaxation of international tension is creating an atmosphere in which the imperialist states, especially the United States, must seek new, more effective and, consequently, more "constructive" ways and means of increasing their influence in the developing countries. In the past, in the absence of an alternative, or a "strategically equivalent" alternative, to American influence in the developing countries, Washington was not overly concerned with the elaboration and implementation of better methods of establishing and reinforcing its supremacy. Now American strategists are realizing more and more that only an extremely

careful selection of means of strengthening U.S. positions can produce the desired effect. Moreover, the prevailing means in this selection must be ones that will "appeal" to the developing countries and create the illusion of "U.S. predisposition to honest cooperation." It is only under this "soft" cover that the use of effective means of pressure and infiltration is recommended.

At the time of the cold war, the United States was much less concerned than now about the appeal of its political and social "image" to the developing countries and limited itself to general rhetoric concerning the advantages of "free enterprise." Despite the warnings of far-sighted politicians, such as, for example, former Undersecretary of State and Ambassador to India C. Bowles,³ the United States remained convinced of the positive emotional effects of great-power strength as such. "The weak respect only power"--this kind of statement could be found quite frequently in American scientific and propaganda publications. After the defeat in Indochina, after the events of 1973-1974, when the "weak" revealed the previously unforeseen sources of their power, and the "powerful" revealed many of their weaknesses, statements of this kind were made less often. On the contrary, more attention is now being given to the achievement of effective results in the developing countries, through the use of non-military means, particularly through the cultivation of a "positive American image" in the minds of the people of these countries.

This tendency became particularly noticeable after the present administration took office in Washington. Whereas U.S. relations with the developing states (just as many other important aspects of world politics) under the Republican Administration were interpreted primarily from the geopolitical standpoint, the Democrats decided to modify this approach (but not by any means to reject it) by paying considerable attention to several other aspects, and the ideological aspect in particular.⁴

This "supplementation" of Kissinger's geopolitics--or, more precisely, its "dilution"--guaranteed the continuity of American policy in the developing countries with the proper adjustments. At the basis of this policy lay the pervasive desire to seize the initiative in the young independent states, with consideration for the peculiarities of contemporary international relations and with the aid of methods designed specifically for this purpose.

In Africa, for example, these attempts by the United States were particularly obvious. A series of measures--from the promotion of black A. Young to the foreground of U.S. African policy to the engineering of an Anglo-American plan for settlement in South Rhodesia, from the ostentatious cooling of relations with South Africa to the equally ostentatious "courting" of Nigeria--were taken for the purpose of accumulating "antiracist baggage," which could be used as an effective counterbalance to the socialist states' concrete assistance of African countries in the crucial stage of the struggle against colonialism or its internal proteges. An effort

was made to depict the United States as a supporter of the resolution of urgent African problems by peaceful means and to depict its opponents as capable of solving the same problems by armed means in their own interests, and not in the "African" interests. In other words, the basic concepts of international detente are being used to artificially contrast the fundamental and vitally important resolution of the concrete problems of national liberation with the equally important and vital tendency toward the inclusion of this region in the process of improvement in the global situation.

Tendencies with similar intentions (although, naturally, with no similarity in the specific content) can also be discerned in American policy in the Near and Middle East. As we know, in the 1960's Washington unilaterally took repressive measures against the national liberation movement in this region, using Israel as its own armed "fist" and turning the shah's regime in Iran into something like a second, spare "fist." Everyone knows that the United States' attempts to improve relations with countries in this region and renovate its "image" in the Arab states (and not only in those with reactionary monarchic regimes) were closely related to the energy problems that arose at the beginning of the 1970's. But the close relationship between the "counterattack" of the developing countries on the positions of imperialism at this time and the worldwide tendency toward detente is equally obvious and has been officially recorded more than once.

For many reasons (the main one being the considerable increased opportunities for many Arab states to conduct an active and independent policy and the consistent support they have been given by the socialist countries), it is now much more difficult for the United States to openly exert pressure on the Middle East by means of force than it was 12 or even 6 years ago. This is why the United States is seeking political means of solving regional problems in its own favor. A fierce struggle is going on in the United States, however, over the specific means of implementing this policy. Groups inclined, under specific circumstances, to include the Middle East in the "detente zone" are apparently still active in American ruling circles. This is attested to by the signing of a joint Soviet-American declaration on ways of achieving peace in the Middle East on 1 October 1977. But the dominant aim is still a kind of "mock detente" and the attainment of traditional goals by slightly modernized means. Without resorting to the use of armed forces (but constantly holding them in readiness and publicly demonstrating this readiness from time to time), Washington is trying to settle the Middle Eastern problem by "crowding" the socialist states out of this region. It is precisely this that is the purpose of the Camp David agreement and all subsequent "peaceful maneuvers" aimed at the creation of an Israeli-Egyptian alliance. One of the goals of the line of "peaceful diplomacy" consists in reversing the process of the national liberation movement in this region and nullifying achievements in the sociopolitical sphere. There is no question that the real interests of the independent states in this area will only be served by a fair and comprehensive settlement. Only this, over the long range, can make this region part of the dominant trends in world politics.

The reconstruction of geopolitical motives and the strengthening of ideological features can also be seen in U.S. policy toward Latin America--a region that has "traditionally" represented a permanent sphere of U.S. expansionist "concerns." When it became obvious at the end of the 1960's that the latest attempt to conduct a policy of direct patronage, which was theoretically set forth in the so-called "Mann Doctrine," was losing its impact, and when signs of Latin American convergence with other sub-regions of the developing state zone were simultaneously discerned, Washington tried to modify the outlines of its approach to its neighbors south of the Rio Grande. The tactic of using local sub-imperialism, primarily and mainly Brazilian, in the U.S. interest was set in motion.

In the new international situation, however, characterized in particular by the strengthening of the national liberation movement's positions, the attempt to set up, as an ideal and a guardian, the regime of "top choice" Brazilian reactionary generals (whose creed is economic growth and social conservatism under the conditions of political reaction and police authoritarianism) turned out to be not only unappealing to the people of the Latin American continent, but also compromising to Washington, which had armed itself with its own version of the "human rights" issue as its main ideological motto. This forced the Carter Administration to "move away from" the Brazilian regime (at least on the levels of propaganda and diplomacy) and assign the role of the United States' closest partner and, simultaneously, best example, to Venezuela, with its bourgeois democratic variation of social modernization and its extremely close ties with the "power nucleus" of the developing state zone, largely due to its active role in OPEC. For similar reasons, energetic (although unsuccessful as yet) attempts were made to improve U.S.-Mexican relations. American political and diplomatic maneuvers in relations with the victorious Nicaraguan revolution also belong to this category. Since the fall of the Somoza regime, Washington has been trying to influence political evolution in Nicaragua by means that are not completely typical of the traditional U.S. approach to the Central American subregion.

These changes have been closely connected with the overall crisis in U.S. interventionist strategy in general and the failure of the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba in particular. At a time of improvement in intergovernmental relations in the mainstream of world politics, the political and economic blockade of revolutionary Cuba has begun to resemble an anachronism, even to a sizable segment of the American ruling class. The defense of U.S. positions in the developing countries, particularly in Latin America, with the aid of methods corresponding to the international political realities of the present day, presupposing, in particular, concern for a "positive American image," will be impossible under the conditions of the overt pressuring, by means of force, of Cuba--a state whose great prestige among the developing countries was once again clearly demonstrated at the conference of the heads of the non-aligned states in Havana this September.

The processes of global detente are having extremely complex and contradictory effects on U.S. policy toward the Asian developing states. The "Vietnam syndrome," or, in other words, the fear of U.S. ruling circles to become involved in a situation similar to the one that led them to defeat in Vietnam, is most apparent in this region. It is precisely this fear that was one of the main factors giving rise to the "Guam Doctrine" and the series of measures related to this doctrine, which were aimed at the avoidance of direct military involvement in this part of the world. Above all, this presupposed the withdrawal of a sizable portion of American military contingents from continental Asia. Furthermore, this was a new policy in relation to the states belonging to ASEAN. The previous, flagrant and unconcealed methods of creating military coalitions aimed against socialism and the national liberation movement (the failure of which was most vividly demonstrated by the self-dissolution of the SEATO bloc) were replaced by considerably more subtle methods, mediated by the "encouragement of local regionalism." It was precisely in this region, however, that a tendency, characteristic of the U.S. approach to the developing countries as a whole, was most pronounced. This was the strategy of using the so-called "Chinese factor," intensively and on a long-range basis, contrary to the interests of the national liberation movement.

A few years ago, some researchers of Beijing's foreign policy doctrine could already see that there were no defenders of the interests of "poor" states that were more zealous, and no opponents of imperialism and neo-colonialism that were more radical than the leaders of the PRC.⁵ Successive foreign policy theories in Beijing (such as the theory of "buffer zones" and the doctrine of the "three worlds") invariably assigned the role of chief revolutionary force to the zone of young developing states. It was this force--led, naturally, by the PRC--that would, according to Beijing doctrine, deal the deciding blow to world imperialism and, above all, to its leader--American imperialism. The main condition for the successful development of events, the Maoists maintained, consisted in opposition to the socialist states and their joint foreign policy strategy--the strategy of international detente.

The experience of the last decade has provided us with a clear and unambiguous judgment on the relationship between this doctrine and the truth.

Now the Beijing theoreticians and practitioners, who are still addressing ritual lies to the developing countries from time to time, are actually completely ignoring their true interests and are focusing all of their attention and energy on a political and ideological--and, just recently, military and strategic--alliance with imperialism.

Whereas in the past Beijing explained its fierce opposition to the processes of international detente by the need to deal a "decisive blow to imperialism," primarily through the efforts of the people in the developing countries, and accused the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of a reluctance to engage in decisive struggle, its present, even more rabid

attacks on detente are accompanied by open conspiracy with imperialism and the encouragement of imperialism to take increasingly extremist measures against socialist forces and the national liberation movement.

This objective result of the PRC leaders' foreign policy maneuvers has discredited them in the eyes of the people of the developing states and has also affected the United States' opportunity to use the "Chinese factor" in relations with these states.

It cannot be said that American bourgeois political thought completely ignores the connection between detente and the problems of the developing countries. But this connection is often misinterpreted and distorted to the extreme. For example, in his fundamental work entitled "Diplomacy for a Crowded World," former U.S. Undersecretary of State G. Ball, just recently the head of a special State Department task force for organized resistance to the Iranian revolution, states that there are two principal dangers inherent in the policy of international detente.

The first is the existence of local conflicts (such as, for example, the conflict in the Middle East) that might lead to worldwide conflict ("the second--and equally important--area in which detente has not been tested," Ball writes, "relates to the common dangers that civilization faces unless the developed nations mobilize a vast common effort. Without such an effort, we can never master the problems created by the play of forces affecting the relations of man to nature in areas such as population, food, raw materials and ecology."⁶

In itself, this reminder of the spheres in which detente processes could be expanded cannot arouse any particular objections, but the list Ball presents is not complete. Immediately after this, however, the author tried to categorically impose on his readers a subjective (in the U.S. interest) interpretation of the ways and means of accomplishing this truly important task, supplementing this with threats addressed to the supposed opponent. "If, therefore, there is any substantial leverage in detente," Ball writes, "we would be foolish not to insist that the Soviets cease undercutting American initiatives designed to deal with urgent world problems. If they are not willing to do so, we should rigorously re-examine all aspects of Soviet-American relations."⁷

What is of interest in this line of reasoning is not the classic comparison drawn between the "responsible," "constructive," "global-minded" and so forth United States and its opponent with all of the opposite characteristics. This is nothing other than a current propaganda cliché. The important aspect is the attempt to theoretically substantiate the "association" of the aspects of detente that are directly connected with Soviet-American relations with absolutely different aspects, particularly those which pertain to the developing states.

It is a well-known fact that theoretical investigations of this type lay at the basis of the attempt to "associate" major aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations (for example, SALT II) with various political events in Asia and Africa.

There is no question that the process of international detente is a unified, comprehensive process, the various functional aspects of which, just as its geographic outlines, are closely interrelated. The world is indivisible, and in this broad sense the various forms and centers of world politics ultimately constitute a single entity. This is why the policy of detente is also comprehensive.

But this does not mean that specific political and diplomatic results in the area of detente should be achieved simultaneously in all or the majority of main directions or be closely interrelated. This kind of "working" relationship, particularly if it is accompanied by attempts to exert pressure in one area for the purpose of achieving compromise in another, leads, as experience has shown, to negative results. The attempt to "associate" aspects of detente that are completely different in terms of internal content and incomparable in terms of immediate significance is absurd from the standpoint of logic and unproductive, at the very least, from the standpoint of politics and diplomacy.

In all probability, worldwide and "integral" detente will be achieved not with the aid of the "association" principle, but by means of persistent parallel progress in the resolution of various problems creating international tension.

This kind of parallel development (although as yet extremely limited and insufficient) has been going on for the entire decade. Along with the strategic arms limitation talks, the second phase of which concluded successfully with the meeting in Vienna between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter, other important initiatives were taken up in the field of arms race de-escalation, and if these initiatives should progress successfully, they will considerably alleviate the tension in the Asian, African and Latin American countries and further reduce imperialism's ability to impose its will in these parts of the world through the use of the armed forces of its proteges. These initiatives include talks on the universal and total nuclear test ban, on the limitation of sales and shipments of conventional weapons (particularly to the developing countries), on the limitation of military activities in the Indian Ocean and so forth.⁸

Unfortunately, there has been no consistent progress in all of these areas as yet. One of the main reasons for this is the reluctance of some influential circles in the United States to accept the imperatives of contemporary political reality.

One recent piece of evidence of this belated and inappropriate reaction to the realities of the present day was the unhealthy U.S. reaction to the revolutionary events in Afghanistan and Iran. In the latter days, Washington used every means, with the exception of direct military intervention (including political pressure, the dispatch of numerous military "advisers" to this country, headed by General Heiser, NATO's supreme ally commander of European forces, and a show of naval strength), to promote the development of the internal political situation in Iran in a direction acceptable to the United States. This latest failure in the attempts to "control" revolutionary events, which were engendered by profound internal social processes and had their own specific internal dynamic, gave rise to a new alarmist wave with distinctly anti-Soviet overtones in American ruling circles. Z. Brzezinski made his famous statement about the "arc of crisis that stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean." True to his idea about "diabolical world," in which a global game is being played with no stakes, the President's national security adviser asserted: "The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries."⁹

This idea has recently been supported by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown. "It could be," he said to a WASHINGTON POST correspondent, "that we will find it extremely difficult to avoid choosing between active involvement in any conflict (although not necessarily with the aid of ground forces) in the developing countries and serious harm to our national interests and resources."¹⁰

This interpretation of current changes is an obvious echo of the cold war and testifies that American ruling circles have still not drawn constructive conclusions from their many years of difficult and sometimes painful contacts with the young developing countries.

Washington still has to draw concrete political conclusions from the decisive fact that the young independent states, despite all of the complications and contradictions in their economic and sociopolitical development, are no longer a passive object of imperialist policy. On the contrary, they have occupied a solid position of their own in international politics today. Their energetic struggle for economic independence has yielded its first fruits and their political importance in the world is increasing with each year (this was vividly demonstrated at the meeting of the heads of non-aligned states in Havana this September).

The consideration given to prevailing global foreign political tendencies in U.S. policy toward the young independent states is still of a superficial and largely "cosmetic" nature. But a change in imperialist tactics cannot camouflage a reluctance to renounce imperialist policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Force Without War; U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1978.

2. Ibid., p 532.
3. Ibid.
4. "I would agree that we have not done well enough in developing a North-South economic program," Z. Brzezinski admitted in a TIME magazine interview. "But we have improved the nature of the political relationship with the Third World and the way the Third World perceives us. I think it is very important that the United States not be identified with the status quo, which, in general, is the way it used to be identified. President Carter has identified the United States with change in world affairs, thereby giving us the opportunity to shape the nature of change" (TIME, 29 May 1978, p 18).
5. "The Cultural Revolution in China," edited by T. Robinson, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971; K. Karol, "La deuxieme Revolution Chinoise," Paris, 1973.
6. G. Ball, "Diplomacy for a Crowded World," Boston-Toronto, 1976, pp 121-123.
7. Ibid.
8. "These steps in the field of arms control take in the attitude of the United States toward conflicts in the Third World and our strategic competition in the field of arms with the Soviet Union" ("Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control," edited by F. A. Long and G. W. Rathjens, New York, 1976, p 47).
9. TIME, 15 January 1979, p 6.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 January 1979.

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THE ENERGY SITUATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW PROGRAM

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[Article by Yu. I. Rigin]

[Text] In July of this year, President J. Carter submitted a new government energy program to Congress. A complex and intense political struggle immediately erupted over this. This was primarily due to the further sharp intensification of the energy problem in the United States this summer. Intermittent deliveries of liquid fuel and the intrigues of the oil monopolies (the underloading of capacities at existing oil refineries) led to a gas shortage so severe that it had no parallel even during the time when the energy crisis broke out in 1973-1974. Lines of cars, stretching several kilometers, began to form at the gas pumps. The shortage of diesel fuel disrupted freight operations. There was even some difficulty with supplies of fuel for household needs.

The energy situation is being complicated by the fact that, as the President officially acknowledged, another economic crisis has begun in the nation. In the second quarter of this year, industrial production growth slowed down, and the gross national product decreased considerably (by 3.3 percent). Retail trade volume also decreased (4.5 percent). These phenomena have been accompanied by a further inflationary rise in prices (13 percent in the first half of the year, calculated on the annual basis), as well as a new rise in unemployment, which, according to the administration's estimates, should reach an exceptionally high level soon--approximately 8 million, which is not much lower than the maximum scales of unemployment during the last crisis (1973-1975). The American dollar is still unstable, and its position is still being undermined by the further increase in the negative balance of U.S. payments.

The accumulation of economic difficulties was, in all probability, one of the main factors motivating the President to reassign many officials in the upper echelon of the executive branch--a reassignment unprecedented in terms of speed and dimensions. The victims of the cabinet shakeup were the heads of several major federal departments (the departments of Energy, the Treasury, Transportation and others). In this way, they were

assigned much of the blame for the economic difficulties now being experienced by the United States. American observers are justifiably associating the cabinet reorganization with another political factor that is taking on increasing importance--the coming 1980 presidential election. In their opinion, it is already completely obvious that economic problems, particularly the energy crisis, will be the prime consideration in the election campaign. This is why the President has essentially already begun timely preparations for the anticipated battles by attempting to seize the initiative at an opportune time.¹ This is also corroborated by the fact that he already made a series of trips around the nation this summer, making speeches in which energy difficulties and the administration's plans for overcoming them were the dominant theme.

Strictly speaking, energy difficulties are no longer regarded as something extraordinary in America. In the 1970's they actually became chronic. Their real causes have been analyzed in sufficient detail in Soviet scientific literature.² A more serious feature of the energy crisis in the United States, which is arousing particular anxiety in American ruling circles, is the growing dependence on foreign oil shipments, which is making the nation's economy extremely vulnerable to any kind of significant reduction--under any circumstances--of oil imports. The proportion accounted for by imports in total liquid fuel consumption is almost 1.5 times as high as in the "pre-crisis" year of 1972. As a result, the United States is already covering approximately half of its oil needs with imports.³ Furthermore, by increasing its dependence on fuel shipments from outside, the United States has also made its economy increasingly vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world petroleum market.

At the same time, the influence of these factors on economic conditions in the United States as a whole is being exaggerated, and not without an ulterior motive. For example, American officials did not miss the opportunity to assign much of the blame for their current fuel difficulties to the new government of Iran, making references to the temporary reduction in Iranian oil exports at the end of 1978 in connection with events in that country. The percentage accounted for by Iranian oil in total liquid fuel consumption in the United States, however, has never been great and has not exceeded 5 percent in recent years.⁴

A genuine Bacchanalia broke out in the American press after the OPEC countries announced that the price of oil would rise again on 1 July 1979, and the emotional outbursts were totally inconsistent with the scales of the measures taken by the oil-producing countries. They raised the price of oil to 18 or 23.5 dollars, depending on the grade, per barrel (a barrel is equivalent to 159 liters), in comparison to 14.5 dollars (on the average) in the first half of the year. This rise, as representatives of the OPEC countries noted at their June meeting, completely reflects the dynamics of the inflationary price of recent years in the prices of industrial commodities and foodstuffs purchased by these countries from the West, and mainly from the United States. But none of this kept Washington from accusing OPEC of all the deadly sins and actually instigating

a hostile campaign against OPEC in the American press. The matter is being presented in such a way as to imply that the nations exporting the "black gold," primarily OPEC members, are deliberately undermining the economy in the capitalist states importing oil, including the United States, by adhering to a line of liquid fuel price escalation in the world market. "Dependence on OPEC," J. Carter said in a nationally televised speech on 15 July of this year, "is already inflicting tremendous losses on our economy and our people.... This kind of intolerable dependence on foreign oil shipments is threatening the economic independence and the very security of our nation." In what looks like a rebuttal to the President's statement, the 23 July issue of BUSINESS WEEK stated: "The Carter Administration, confronted by the deterioration of the political and economic situation, is trying to find a scapegoat.... However, it will be impossible for Carter to solve economic problems by putting the blame for them on the OPEC countries."⁵

This entire propaganda campaign in the United States actually conceals nothing other than the stubborn refusal of American ruling circles to face reality. They do not wish to reconcile themselves to the fact that the United States, in view of the dramatic changes in the global balance of power, can no longer get rich at the expense of the developing countries as brazenly as in the past. After all, there is no question that the United States was robbing the Middle East of its fuel and energy resources for most of the postwar period. The use of cheap imported fuel allowed American corporations to save huge sums of capital expenditures and, above all, to considerably reduce their labor expenses. For this reason, industries requiring high power input and other types of production based on imported raw materials turned out to be one of the most profitable types of business. In this way, the oil-exporting countries, which were dependent on American oil monopolies and had an urgent need for financial resources for capital investments in their own economy, were simultaneously essentially subsidizing U.S. economic development. These developing states were being openly robbed.

Certain circles in the United States are still trying to reverse the course of history. This is the only interpretation that can be given to the latest threats to use armed force against the oil-producing states in the Middle East; several American officials have recently resorted to these methods more than once. This policy of blackmail and intimidation has been resolutely condemned by the Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, with which Washington, taking its important role in U.S. oil supplies into account, is striving to maintain a "special relationship."

These U.S. actions have not been particularly successful. They have only intensified confrontations between the United States and the oil-producing countries: OPEC is still conducting a common fuel price policy in an attempt to bring these prices in line with the prices of industrial commodities in the world capitalist market. The United States' latest attempts to break up this organization in order to dictate its own will to the oil-producing countries were also unsuccessful.

Under these conditions, the American Administration has had to give more attention than ever before to the possibility of reducing foreign oil shipments. This is also being made necessary by the fact that expenditures on oil imports are a constant strain on the already huge and chronic deficit in the U.S. balance of trade (-34 billion dollars in 1978). This year, according to official calculations, these expenditures will rise to a new record high--50 billion dollars.⁶ Besides this, such huge purchases of oil by the United States are justifiably regarded by Washington's leading trade partners as a disrupting factor in world trade. Giving in to their pressure, the United States promised to reduce its oil imports last July at a meeting of the "big seven" in Bonn.⁷ But this promise was not kept, and this was noted with unconcealed indignation at the next meeting of the representatives of the seven countries in Tokyo (28-29 June 1979). This time the American President made a more cautious promise--to merely stabilize imports of oil until the mid-1980's, but this stabilization would be based on the record level of 1977.⁸

The increase in American oil imports and the growing dependence on the United States in this area were just recently being explained as the results of the allegedly progressive depletion of national energy resources. Now this argument has already lost its former value. In the abovementioned televised speech, J. Carter admitted that although the United States is purchasing huge quantities of liquid fuel abroad, it definitely has its own fair share of energy resources. Furthermore, in terms of quantity, they practically exceed the resources of any other capitalist state. The United States, he said, has 24 percent of all known energy resources in the capitalist world, while the share of, for example, the oil-producing countries in the Middle East is 5 percent. "The petroleum in our oil-bearing shales," the President confirmed, "exceeds the Saudi Arabian supply several times over, and we have more coal than any other country in the world." It must be added, however, that the United States is deliberately trying to conserve its own oil resources for strategic reasons. This is completely consistent with an earlier congressional decision (1975) concerning the creation of a large-scale strategic reserve of liquid fuel in the nation, primarily by means of overseas purchases. This has also stimulated the growth of American oil imports in recent years.

The complexity of the energy situation in the United States is also connected, in the final analysis, with the fact that operations with foreign oil are more profitable for the oil monopolies, which control most of the fuel and energy resources in the nation (not only oil, but also natural gas, coal and nuclear raw materials), than the organization of investigative prospecting work and the exploitation of oil deposits in the United States itself. This goes a long way toward explaining the American energy situation, not only in recent years, but throughout the last decade, as well as the failure of the administration's repeated attempts to promote the development of national power engineering and ultimately achieve energy self-sufficiency for the nation.⁹

Even after the energy crisis became more acute in 1973-1974, leading to a dramatic rise in the price of fuel, oil production in the United States displayed a fairly steady tendency toward decline. Between 1973 and 1978, total petroleum output decreased by almost 36 million tons. During the same period, imports of petroleum and petroleum products increased by 100 million tons--to 420 million in 1977. As a result, even now the proportion accounted for by petroleum in national energy reserves is, just as it was a decade ago, around 49 percent.¹⁰ In this context, it is just as indicative that oil consumption in the United States increased more rapidly in the 1970's than the use of other energy sources, particularly natural gas and coal, although known reserves of gas in the nation, according to official data, are quite sizable, and U.S. coal reserves are absolutely unparalleled in the capitalist world. The proportion accounted for by petroleum in the fuel balance of American industrial companies even rose between 1971 and 1977 (almost 10 percent), while the proportion accounted for by natural gas decreased dramatically.¹¹

The rapid compilation and submission to Congress of a new national program, the third of its kind, constitutes sufficient evidence that measures previously proposed by the administration did not have the anticipated impact. The White House, in no position to deny this fact, makes constant references to congressional opposition or "lack of understanding," which, according to White House estimates, almost cut in half and, consequently, weakened, the original energy program ("National Energy Plan") submitted by President Carter in April 1977¹² and passed by Congress in a severely modified form in October 1978.¹³ Arguments of this kind, however, are only half-truths at best. The essence of the matter is that the levers that were, according to the administration's plan, supposed to fundamentally change the situation, did not work.

In the first place, the considerable rise in domestic oil and gas prices sanctioned by the Carter Administration did not result in any kind of noticeable increase in their production. The United States, as has already been noted, is producing less liquid fuel than it did prior to 1973-1974. In the second place, in spite of the variety of tax and financial benefits extended to private companies producing and consuming coal, no fundamental changes took place in the development of the coal industry either; this has already made even previous government forecasts of coal production up to the mid-1980's absolutely unrealistic.¹⁴ In the third place, even greater difficulties arose in connection with the development of nuclear power engineering. For example, due to dramatically increased public criticism of the condition of safety equipment in nuclear power stations, federal regulatory agencies did not approve a single plan for the construction of nuclear power plants last year.¹⁵ In the fourth place, in the original energy program of the Carter Administration, special hopes were placed on the officially declared rigid regulations governing energy conservation. But these were mainly limited to requests. The administration preferred, as a rule, not to resort to punitive measures against enterprises that deliberately continued to squander energy (the production of gas-gobbling multicylinder automobiles

and so forth). This ultimately made the conservation campaign unproductive, and contrary to all of the administration's expectations, imports of petroleum continued their unbridled growth in recent years.

In addition to all this, the oil corporations that had convinced the administration to grant them various types of new financial and other privileges used them exclusively for their own enrichment. The manipulations and abuses committed by these companies in connection with the energy crisis have already become common knowledge throughout America. The administration has had to publicly admit, for example, that the actual state of affairs in the area of national oil supplies is being concealed from it. "I have a great deal of authority in dealing with the oil companies, but not enough," the President said when he spoke in Detroit this July. "We now have the right to demand accurate information from the oil companies in regard to import volumes, volumes of petroleum on hand, and sales volumes. This is a new right, which we acquired just recently." This information became necessary to federal agencies because the oil companies, as more and more new facts are testified, resort to stratagems, restricting shipments of raw materials to oil refineries and thereby artificially creating a shortage of gas and other petroleum products.¹⁶ The goal they are pursuing is completely obvious: the acquisition of speculative profits through the escalation of prices. The chairman of the board of directors of Standard Oil of Indiana, for example, cynically announced, just before the new energy program was published, that the oil corporations do not want to increase production volumes until the price of gas in the nation is twice as high as it is now.

Since 1 June 1979, in accordance with a congressional resolution, the administration has sharply relaxed domestic oil price controls, while natural gas price controls were relaxed even earlier, in the fall of last year. This alone is permitting oil and gas corporations to earn superprofits, running into billions of dollars. In just the second quarter of this year, according to data provided by the oil companies themselves, profits were 70 percent higher for Standard Oil of Ohio than they had been in the same period of last year, 65 percent higher for Gulf Oil, 36 percent higher for Standard Oil of Indiana and 20 percent higher for Exxon. But even this does not satisfy the oil monopolies now. They are pushing for the total and immediate lifting of controls, primarily on the price of oil, although these controls will officially still be in effect until 1981. If this happens, their new "gain" will immediately run into tens of billions of dollars, and without any need for additional financial expenditures on their part. Furthermore, they are demanding that the superprofits they have earned and will earn in the future in connection with the relaxation, and later the total lifting, of federal price controls, be deposited in full in their accounts. It is only on this condition that the oil business will verbally declare its willingness to increase fuel production in the nation, primarily by means of expanded petroleum and gas investigative and prospecting work, particularly in the coastal regions of the continental shelf, and the exploitation of new oil wells. But these statements are no longer believed by anyone, even the government. Meanwhile, profits continue to rise astronomically at a time when the nation

cannot seem to overcome its chronic and constantly increasing energy difficulties, particularly due to the acute shortage of financial resources at the disposal of government.

The new government program, which represents the administration's latest response to the growing severity of the energy crisis and which must be approved by Congress, is expected to eventually accomplish a dual task: the reduction of oil imports by means of the accelerated development of individual branches of power engineering and restrictions on the growth of energy consumption.

The emphasis in this program is placed on the reduction of oil imports, and the measures planned for this are of a completely specific nature. By the end of the coming decade, overseas oil purchases are to be reduced to approximately half of their current level.¹⁷ The President reserves the right to establish import quotas for 1979 and 1980 in the event that the shipment volume begins to surpass the level of past years. American experts believe, however, that he would not have to resort to this. In the first place, state-monopolistic conservation measures, which have been taken for several reasons, particularly the pressure being exerted by Western Europe and Japan, which are insisting on sizable cuts in U.S. oil imports, should take effect soon. In the second place, the U.S. economy has essentially already entered the next cyclical crisis, and this, in all probability, will reduce energy consumption in the nation in the next year and a half and, consequently, the demand for imported oil.

In view of the increasingly frequent interruptions in shipment of fuel for motor transport and the appearance of symptoms of "gas hunger," J. Carter has proposed, in addition to the import quotas, that Congress grant him the necessary authority to institute gas consumption standards and the compulsory redistribution of available reserves among individual states in the event of an emergency. This is not the first attempt to gain this authority from Congress, but given the present energy situation in the United States, informed American circles believe that there is now much more chance of its acquisition. This is corroborated by the fact that the administration's gas rationing bill was approved in principle by the House of Representatives in August, although with an amendment reserving Congress the right to veto any presidential action of this kind. Taking the new accelerated rise in national prices and the extremely probable negative response of the American public into account, Carter felt it was wise to stop any further rise in gas prices at that time, although this measure had been persistently supported by such influential speakers as then Secretary of Energy Schlesinger and Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal.¹⁸

In order to compensate for the projected reduction in oil purchases in the international market, the new program, just as the last one, proposes several conservation measures, but, on the whole, this factor is not assigned as important a role as in the past. Government expenditures to

guarantee this conservation in the next decade have been set at approximately 13.5 billion dollars. This sum includes 2 billion which is intended to mainly take the form of loans to private firms, which will work on improving the insulation of residences, trade enterprises and government buildings. Compulsory heating and air conditioning standards have already been set for the latter. Another 5 billion is to be used to subsidize public utilities converting from liquid fuel to coal or gas. They must reduce their consumption of heating oil (fuel oil) by at least half in the 1980's. The administration has also announced its willingness to give financial "aid" of up to 6.5 billion dollars to automobile firms which have already begun conversion to the production of automobiles with economical engines.¹⁹

The main emphasis in the new program, however, is not on energy conservation, but on the production of additional fuel in the nation by means of the broad-scale development of various energy sources which can be used as substitutes for imported oil. This is a fundamentally important feature of the administration's approach to the fuel problem.

The increase is supposed to result primarily from the production of synthetic oil and the working of coal and fuel shale deposits, as well as the extraction of heavy petroleum from bituminous gravel. These resources are abundant in the United States. Suffice it to say that the United States has almost one-fifth of all known coal reserves in the capitalist world.

According to estimates, the production of synthetic fuel (as yet, the nation has only a few experimental stations) is expected to reach 100-125 million tons a year by 1990, so that oil imports will be reduced by at least one-third in this way. The administration hopes to create a special joint private-government company, the Energy Security Corporation, which will be responsible for planning and building around 20 enterprises for the production of synthetic fuel. They are expected to be turned over to private firms for operation in the future. Besides this, the corporation will have the power to grant loans to these firms and purchase their products at a guaranteed price.

The completion of these measures aimed at the production of synthetic fuel is expected to take 10-15 years; that is, the plan is of a long-range nature and will involve huge financial expenditures. According to preliminary official estimates, these should amount to around 88 billion dollars in just the next 10 years. American experts estimate (and these estimates are hardly exaggerations) that it will cost from 1 billion to 3 billion dollars to equip just one modern enterprise for the production of petroleum from coal and bituminous gravel with an annual capacity of 2.5 million tons, and 1.5 billion to equip a plant for the gasification of coal.²⁰

The large-scale production of synthetic fuel from coal and the conversion of public utilities from liquid to solid fuel presuppose the substantial growth of coal mining. These measures are expected to make the achievement

of the level of coal mining (around 1.2 billion tons by 1985) which was already stipulated in the Carter Administration's original energy plan, and which is almost twice as high as the current level, completely realistic. This objective is still being impeded, however, by the substantial obstacle presented by existing federal pollution standards. This is why coal mining companies are now exerting strong pressure on the government and Congress in the hope that these restrictions will be considerably relaxed, if not abolished.²¹

It is also striking that the new program says almost nothing about the fate of American nuclear power engineering. And this is apparently far from coincidental. On the one hand, many American experts believe that nuclear power is extremely promising, as it would provide more economically effective means of satisfying the increasing demand for energy under present conditions in the United States. On the other hand, the recent major accident at a nuclear power plant in Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) put the government in a fairly difficult position. It became obvious that the problem of safety equipment in nuclear power plants, contrary to a number of official announcements, has not been completely solved. It turned out that there were so many opponents of the further accelerated development of the nuclear power industry in the nation and in Congress that the administration even decided not to resume the discussion of this topic. Apparently, it would rather wait and see what happens before resuming the discussion at a later date. This is how the White House's tactic has been interpreted by prominent American political figure, Governor E. Brown of California. This opinion was essentially confirmed in a statement by the new secretary of energy, C. Duncan: He particularly stressed that "a vitally important part of the energy program is nuclear energy, which is playing and will continue to play an extremely important role."²²

The administration plans to spend around 5.5 billion dollars on the development of energy sources other than synthetic fuel (mainly solar energy). Around 3.5 billion will be used for solar heating and other purposes. This figure includes special tax deductions for solar energy consumers. The long-range objective is to satisfy 20 percent of all energy requirements in the United States by means of solar power by the year 2000. But this objective has already aroused far from groundless skepticism in many American experts.

The national energy program also envisages--for the purpose of reducing gas consumption by individual drivers--stimulation of the development of municipal public transportation, particularly buses and subways. An additional sum of around 10 billion dollars will be allocated for these needs.²³

The administration also hoped to influence energy research more actively and purposefully. In connection with this, an important role will be assigned to a new federal agency--the Energy Mobilization Board--which will be invested with powers as sweeping as those of the defense production

agency during World War II. One of the chief responsibilities of this projected agency will be to stimulate research and development and aid in the "completion of key energy projects" for the purpose of solving energy problems more quickly.

All of this testifies that the new federal program as a whole is quite broad and comprehensive. Its total cost over the 1980-1990 period has been officially estimated at 140 billion dollars. This sum in itself is grand enough, but according to American experts, actual expenditures on the variety of measures envisaged will probably far exceed this sum and will be at least 2-2.5 times as high. Moreover, this estimate only takes in federal budget expenditures. If the expenditures of private companies are included, total expenditures on the development of power engineering in the next decade, according to the estimate of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, could constitute an astronomical sum--1 trillion dollars.

It is completely obvious that the mobilization of resources on such a huge scale will be an extremely difficult matter for the U.S. Government. The American leaders feel that resorting to a significant rise in taxes, which are already extremely high, would be too risky, particularly in view of the impending cyclical crisis. And economic considerations are not the only ones involved. The White House must also act with a view to the 1980 election, which is not so far off. Under these conditions, a rise in taxes would be an extremely unpopular measure, and the President's political opponents would waste no time in using this to their own advantage.

Apparently, it was for all these reasons that the President finally decided to resort to another move, which is, in general, also not very pleasant for him. As a way of mobilizing the financial resources needed for the energy program, he proposed a tax on the surplus profits of the oil corporations (the same speculative profits they have been earning and will continue to earn in even larger quantities in the future when federal price controls are gradually lifted). This measure would naturally infringe upon the interests of the big oil business, which, as we know, plays an extremely important and active role in national politics as well as economics. If the White House had any other, more acceptable alternative, it would probably do anything to avoid confrontation with the oil companies.

To impose a tax on the surplus profits of oil corporations, the administration must obtain the consent of Congress. But this will not be all that simple. Last year the administration made a similar proposal, but it was blocked by the legislators. There is no one who can guarantee that this new discussion will have a different outcome. At a press conference at the end of July, the President issued a warning: "There will be a fierce struggle in the Senate over the windfall profits tax bill. If this bill is voted down, we will not be able to attain our objectives in the field

of energy." This constitutes an absolutely real threat to the prospect of mobilizing the resources needed to finance the entire federal energy program.

There are also some other obstacles. According to some reactions that have already been given press coverage, the measures to stimulate synthetic fuel production are arousing the most criticism in Congress. No one is questioning the need to develop this new field of the American energy industry in principle. But the actual attainment of the goals set by the administration is seriously doubted. This is not only due to the billions of dollars involved. Difficulties of another nature also exist. Even with the tremendous financial assistance offered by the government, high overhead costs will make synthetic fuel production enterprises unable to compete with traditional producers of petroleum for a long time, according to American experts, given the current level of prices in the world capitalist market. Besides this, the extraction of heavy petroleum--for example, from bituminous sand--will involve colossal expenditures of water, and the very regions where this sand exists (Colorado, Utah and Wyoming) are experiencing a water shortage. The planned volume of engineering and construction work will also be a restricting factor. The completion of all planned construction will essentially necessitate, as American experts believe--and not without good reason, the creation of a new branch of the energy industry, equal in capacity to the U.S. coal industry. In addition to everything else, this will call for huge quantities of construction materials, equipment and, what is particularly important, skilled manpower. Finally, the organization of synthetic fuel production on such a grand scale will take a long time. This means that synthetic fuel will not be used as a substitute for traditional liquid fuel until at least the mid-1980's, if not the end of that decade. "The overwhelming majority of energy experts," BUSINESS WEEK stated, "feel that the production of synthetic fuel cannot cure all ills, even if it is supported by the government."

If the energy program is carried out, and this is highly improbable, it could have a significant but contradictory, dual effect on the U.S. economy. Companies engaged in the production of synthetic fuel, in the opinion of American experts, will gain the most. The program also holds the promise of great rewards for car manufacturers, in the form of sizable government subsidies to finance the production of economical engines for automobiles, as well as the production of buses for municipal public transport. Other promising features are the development of the production of equipment using solar energy and the further development of railway transport in connection with increasing coal shipments. Besides this, growth is expected in the production of equipment for converting enterprises from liquid fuel to coal and gas, as well as equipment for the insulation of residential buildings.

For the general American public, however, government subsidization of energy companies will unavoidably turn into a new financial burden. It is completely obvious that these companies will not miss any opportunity

to escalate the price of energy once again in connection with the increasing demand for it. There is also no doubt that the oil monopolies, even if their surplus profits are taxed, will regain this money by raising the price of petroleum products. "Almost every American," the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT writes, "will feel the effects of President Carter's new offensive in the area of national energy problems.... Carter's program will raise the price of gasoline, heating oil, electricity and natural gas. The tax (on the oil companies' windfall profits--Yu. R.) will ultimately be paid by consumers, because the companies will transfer the cost to them by raising the price of gasoline and other types of fuel." Finally, the expected rise in fuel prices will certainly increase inflationary pressure on the economy, and this will make it extremely difficult to overcome the new economic crisis.

The current energy situation in the United States provides more evidence of the severity of the conflicts in the capitalist system today. It is impossible to fundamentally solve even local economic problems through the channels of private capitalist enterprise. And private capital has had to resort once again to massive financial support from the bourgeois government. One item on today's agenda is a new, large-scale redistribution of federal budget funds in favor of influential monopolistic groups, primarily those operating in the sphere of power engineering. These monopolies are once again trying to escape the energy crisis, which is now being exacerbated by the maturation of a general economic crisis, at the expense of the taxpayers--the main source of additional funds for the federal budget, which is being inflated by the administration for the benefit of private business. Under these conditions, the American communist demand for the nationalization of the energy complex, as one of the main essential conditions for the fundamental resolution of fuel problems, sounds especially timely. American ruling circles, however, are guarding the class interests of monopolistic capital and would therefore rather resort to palliatives and never, under any circumstances, disturb the economic basis of bourgeois society--private capitalist ownership. This means that any kind of radical resolution of the energy problem in the United States is highly unlikely.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 July 1979, pp 15-16.
2. See, in particular, the collective work "Energeticheskiy krizis v kapitalisticheskoy mire" [The Energy Crisis in the Capitalist World], edited by Ye. M. Primakov, Moscow, 1975; the article by V. I. Pavlyuchenko, "The Energy Crisis: Causes, Content, Consequences" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1977).
3. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 23 October 1978, p 30; TIME, 2 July 1979, p 8.

4. TIME, 5 February 1979, p 41.
5. BUSINESS WEEK, 23 July 1979, pp 58, 59.
6. FORTUNE, 21 May 1979, p 49.
7. NEWSWEEK, 31 July 1978, p 28.
8. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 23 July 1979, p 18.
9. For more detail, see Yu. I. Rigin, "State-Monopolistic Regulation of the Energy Industry: Problems and Prospects," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1977--Editor's note.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 23 October 1978, p 29; 22 September 1975, p 31.
11. Ibid., 29 January 1979, p 62.
12. "National Energy Plan," Washington, Government Printing Office, 1977.
13. V. A. Nazarevskiy, "The Results of the Energy Debates," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1979--Editor's note.
14. BUSINESS WEEK, 30 July 1979, p 7.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 26 March 1979, p 26.
16. THE ECONOMIST, 19 May 1979, p 46; THE NATION, 6-13 January 1979, pp 9-11.
17. TIME, 30 July 1979, p 40.
18. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 23 July 1979, p 18; THE ECONOMIST, 19 May 1979, p 42.
19. For more detail, see the survey by N. I. Kistanov and R. A. Mishukova, "Trends in the U.S. Auto Industry," in this issue--Editor's note.
20. BUSINESS WEEK, 30 July 1979, p 53; TIME, 30 July 1979, pp 40, 45.
21. THE ECONOMIST, 2 June 1979, p 61.
22. TIME, 30 July 1979, p 11.
23. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 July 1979, p 20.

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THE OLYMPICS AND U.S. ATHLETES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
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[Article by R. M. Kiselev]

[Text] Professional sports play an important part in American exports in general and are noticeably influencing the development of amateur sports in the nation. In view of the fact that this article pertains to U.S. participation in the Olympics, its contents will deal only with amateur sports, the representatives of which are authorized to participate in the games. Professional sports were examined in detail in an article entitled "The Structure of Professional Sports" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1972).

"We are sending a team of 500-600 athletes to Moscow. This will be one of the most impressive delegations at the Olympic Games of 1980." Robert Cain, president of the U.S. Olympic Committee, who visited Moscow at the end of last year, said this to a crowd of journalists in the press conference room of the 1980 Olympics Organizational Committee.

Extensive participation by American athletes in the Olympic Games in Moscow will indisputably make them particularly exciting, not only because competition between Soviet and American athletes in the Olympic arena is a tradition of long standing, but also because American athletes, who have invariably participated in all Olympic Games of our era, have an excellent and well-deserved reputation in world sports. The United States has traveled a long Olympic path and has done this successfully.

There are many famous names among the hundreds of names of Olympic Gold Medal winners, immortalized in bronze in the headquarters of the U.S. Olympic Committee:

James Connolly, who won the first gold medal for America at the first Olympic Games of 1896 in Athens.

Benjamin Spock, "doctor, writer and radical," as he is called in a special issue of OLYMPIC REVIEW. Dr Spock won a gold medal for America in 1924 as a member of the Yale University Rowing Team at the Olympic Games in Paris.

Johnny Weissmuller, who was victorious in the aquatic lanes of Paris (1924) and Amsterdam (1928), where he won five gold medals. He probably achieved even greater fame playing the fearless Tarzan on the Hollywood screen. It is true that his earnings from the movies were not as great as those of another Olympic star--Sonja Henie. Johnny Weissmuller is now in a hospital and has no income; according to the press, he would probably have to move to a welfare rest home. A tragic way to end a life....

John Kelly, Olympic Games champion academic rower in 1920 and 1924, is the father of the Princess of Monaco, former movie star Grace Kelly.

Jesse Owen, winner of four gold medals, who shattered Hitler's myth about the racial superiority of the Aryans in 1936 in Berlin, in the main stadium of the "Third Reich."

Bill Russell, Jerry Lucas, Jerry West and many other stars of Olympic and professional basketball.

Cassius Clay, who later took the name Muhammad Ali, threw his Olympic Gold Medal away when he returned home from Rome in 1960 and was not allowed to enter a restaurant displaying the sign "We do not serve dogs and negroes." Now it would be difficult to say where Muhammad Ali won greater glory: in the boxing ring or in the fight for social justice. One thing is clear: This is a real fighter, both in the ring and in public life, personifying the best features of his race. He is still vigorously protesting racial discrimination. In April 1979, Ali said the following at a session of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid: "I am still fighting for human rights. I was already doing this during the Vietnam war. I refused to fight in Vietnam. I was even ready to go to jail rather than kill innocent people.... I was invited to perform in South Africa three times. The last time they offered me 12 million dollars. I refused." Chairman Leslie Harriman of the UN Special Committee called Ali the successor to two of his outstanding countrymen--Paul Robeson and Martin Luther King--and remarked that Ali's speech in the United Nations was the beginning of a campaign to mobilize athletes throughout the world for a fight against apartheid. Recently, the president of the Olympic Committee of Italy ceremoniously awarded Ali a copy of the gold medal he had demonstratively thrown away after winning it in Rome 19 years ago.

Other renowned Olympic champions are Tommie Smith and John Carlos, winners of the 200-meter run in Mexico in 1968, who ascended the winner's platform and listened to the American national anthem, played in their honor, with their heads bowed in sorrow and their hands raised, clothed in black gloves and clenched into fists. This was a protest by the outstanding

black athletes against racial discrimination in the United States. At a press conference held afterwards, Tommie Smith said: "We do not forget for one minute that there are two Americas in the world. One of them is for whites and the other is for blacks." John Carlos added: "We are tired of living in a society where we are treated like animals. We want to be treated like human beings instead of being humiliated."

The list of Olympic champions also includes the name of an Indian, Jim Thorpe, who won gold medals in Stockholm in 1912. When he returned home, he was accused of violating the amateur standards and lost not only his medals, but also a gift awarded to him personally by King Gustaf V of Sweden, although Thorpe had never concealed the fact that he sometimes made a few dollars by playing baseball. In 1953 Jim Thorpe died, poverty-stricken and forgotten. Incidentally, a movie about Thorpe was filmed in the United States; the leading role was played by renowned actor Burt Lancaster (the lead in the new series known to Soviet viewers under the title "Great Patriotics"). Giving in to public demand, the U.S. Olympic Committee later decided to vindicate Jim Thorpe.

There are also many record-setters among the American Olympic champions: swimmer Mark Spitz (nine medals), gymnast Ray Ewry (eight medals), Patricia McCormick (four gold medals for diving) and others.

The United States and Russia were among the 12 nations whose representatives, headed by Pierre de Coubertin, revived the Olympic Games and laid the foundations for the international Olympic movement. Princeton University Professor William Sloan and Russian General Butovskiy were among the founding members of the International Olympic Committee. Inspired by the high ideals of human self-improvement and by the boundless energy of historian and pedagog Coubertin, the founding members of the International Olympic Committee decided to revive the Olympic Games and hold them in 1897 in Greece, where they were first held in ancient times.

Coubertin based the international Olympic movement on two main principles--democracy and internationalism. In 1895 he wrote: "Healthy democracy and wise and peaceful internationalism will penetrate into a new stadium.... Every 4 years, the revived Olympic Games must give youths throughout the world the chance to take part in a happy and fraternal meeting, which will result in the gradual disappearance of the mutual ignorance in which people live, the ignorance that supports hatred, compounds misunderstandings and accelerates events in the direction of merciless and barbarous struggle."

After a great deal of effort, Coubertin, on the strength of his outstanding talent for organization and diplomacy, was able to convince the Greek Government to give its blessing to the first Olympic Games in Athens and to encourage the prominent merchant Averov to revive the Hellenistic spirit that had disappeared in the ruins of Ancient Greece. King George I

of Greece was the honorary patron of the games and Averov was their sponsor. A white marble stadium was quickly erected, where 60,000 Greeks and foreign guests enthusiastically saluted the hero of the games, marathon runner Spyros Loues, who was the first to complete the historic trip from Marathon to Athens.

American athletes also stepped up to the starting line at the first Olympic Games. Since that time, they have not missed a single Olympics and have always returned home with a substantial amount of Olympic gold. Suffice it to say that during the period between the games of 1896 and the games of 1948 in London, American athletes were in first place six times in the unofficial team results and in second place five times. As for subsequent Olympic Games, in which Soviet athletes have participated since 1952, the Americans were in first place only twice, and in 1952 they shared first and second place with the Olympic debutants--the Soviet athletes. They were in second place four times, and in 1976 in Montreal they were in third place for the first time, surpassed by the athletes of the USSR and the GDR.

The United States has not only sent its athletes overseas to participate in Olympic Games, but has also organized them. The Olympics had already arrived on the North American continent by 1904. That year, the United States was commemorating the centennial of the Louisiana Purchase and was holding a world fair in St. Louis. This city did not want to be upstaged by Paris, where the second Olympic Games were made part of the 1900 World Fair. Athletes from 11 countries gathered at the games in St. Louis.

The triumph of the hosts was total. There was, however, a scandal. The first to run the marathon was Fred Lortz. Accompanied by the shouts of the joyful crowd, he climbed onto the stand for honored guests, where American President Theodore Roosevelt's daughter, Alice, was prepared to crown him with the laurel wreath of a victor. At that solemn moment, Lortz could not contain himself, started to laugh and admitted that he had won with the help of a car. It turned out that he had lost consciousness during the race and a physician, following in an automobile, picked him up for treatment. But the car broke down a few miles from the finish line, and Lortz, who had regained consciousness, was the first to cover the rest of the distance.... The enraged organizers sternly punish the joker: He was disqualified "for life." But the next year, when everyone had calmed down, Lortz was forgiven and even won the still-renowned Boston marathon. This time he did without the help of a car.

Unfortunately, another event cast a serious cloud over the first Olympic Games to be held in the United States. To amuse the world fair spectators, the organizers of the games decided to hold a competition between individuals who had been selected in advance in the city--representatives of the "uncivilized tribes": Pygmies, South American and North American Indians. These carnival attractions with their racist overtones entered

the history of the Olympic Games as the "anthropological days." Pierre de Coubertin bitterly wrote that "nowhere but in America would they dare to include competitions of this kind in the program."

The Americans reaped an abundant harvest of medals at the games in St. Louis: 70 gold, 75 silver and 64 bronze. But one important fact should be borne in mind: The United States was the only country represented in many competitions. The six European countries participating in the games were represented by only 39 individuals in the competitions. This is why the struggle for the medals took place between Americans in many cases. For the first time, one of the members of the U.S. team was a black athlete, J. Poidge. He won two bronze medals in the gymnastic competitions.

In 1932 the United States held, as it were, an Olympic double-feature--both the summer and the winter Olympic Games. The winter games of 1932 were held in Lake Placid (New York), a winter sports resort that is now world famous. The beginning of the games was solemnly announced by the governor of the state, Franklin Roosevelt, who was elected President the same year. Another winter Olympiad was held in the United States in 1960, in Squaw Valley.

Incidentally, the winter Olympics of 1980 will be held again in Lake Placid, which has become, in a way, Moscow's Olympic blood-brother.

But let us return to the summer Olympics of 1932, held in Los Angeles, where athletes from 37 countries gathered. On the whole, the games were quite successful. The Los Angeles games were attended by more than 1 million spectators, which was a record number at that time. The main events took place in the Coliseum, seating around 100,000. The Olympic Games had never been held in a stadium of this kind. An Olympic village for the athletes was built for the first time. And it was a village: It consisted of tiny cottages. High-spirited cowboys, armed with lassoes, pranced alongside the wire fence around the village. One of the organizers of the games recalls that the Europeans watched with great pleasure when the cowboys skillfully threw a lasso over "any son of a bitch who tried to climb the fence."

When the games were over, all of the cottages were sold. As it was laughingly said at the time, they sold everything but the roads.

The games in Los Angeles were also extremely successful from the standpoint of sports results: 40 Olympic records were set, and 16 of them surpassed world records. American sprinters R. Metcalfe and E. Tolan ran the 100-meter track in 10.3 seconds. This record held for more than a quarter of a century, right up to the Olympic Games in Rome.

Over the years, many American cities competed for the honor of hosting the games: Chicago, Detroit, New York, San Francisco, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, Cleveland and others. As we know, in 1984

the Olympic Games will be held in Los Angeles again. All of this confirms the substantial part the United States has played and continues to play in the international Olympic movement.

The success or failure of performances by athletes from a particular country in a huge international forum like today's Olympic Games depends primarily on the developmental level of sports in the country, its place in the life of society and the social and other functions assigned to sports by this society. Here is what American sports experts have to say about this.

"If we were to say that sports in the 20th century have become a cultural phenomenon of tremendous variety and complexity, we would be stating the obvious. Sports is rapidly becoming a social institution, entering into the spheres of education, economics, art, the law, the mass media and international diplomacy. Their variety is unlimited and they affect each individual in one way or another.... Sports are becoming a strong social force, capable of creating demand, the framework of which stretches all the way from stadium season tickets to ski pants in pastel shades,"² sociologists John Loy and Gerald Kenyon write.

Prominent journalist Robert Boyle remarks: "Sports are penetrating all levels of society today, profoundly influencing such incomparable concepts as social status, racial relations, business life, car models, fashion... and ethical standards. Whether we like or not, sports are dictating the form and content of much in American life."³

In the total complex of interaction between sports and numerous spheres of American life, the connection between sports and the educational system should be, in our opinion, discussed in greater detail. It is precisely this connection that reveals the sources of new strength for amateur and professional sports in the United States.

So-called interschool sports, representing a system of competition in various sports between teams representing different schools, are a widespread practice in American high schools. The head organization, under the auspices of which interschool sports programs are carried out on the national scale, is the National Federation of State High School Associations. It unites more than 20,000 high schools with a total of 3 million male and female participants.

The schools belonging to the federation have a quite solid material and technical base: 20,000 sports auditoriums, 17,000 gymnastic complexes, 4,000 swimming pools and so forth. Table 1 presents average annual data on the number of schools and participants taking part in interschool competitions in various sports.

The athletic season in the high schools is quite full. For example, in 1976 there were more than 500,000 basketball games, 250,000 each of track and field, football and soccer meets and matches and 70,000 swim and diving meets.

Table 1

School Sports

Sports	Number of Schools	Number of Male Participants	Number of Schools	Number of Female Participants
Baseball	14,680	409,510	16	423
Basketball	20,011	688,690	11,654	307,808
Football	14,281	1,011,809	--	--
Track and field	17,102	667,974	10,387	299,215
Wrestling	9,130	319,048	--	--
Swimming	4,062	114,645	2,785	73,946
Soccer	3,356	98,482	--	--
Volleyball	2,583	43,050	8,610	198,313
Gymnastics	1,697	36,834	2,835	81,424
Water polo	385	10,644	--	--
Fencing	91	1,394	64	671
Weight lifting	36	951	--	--
Archery	8	128	253	548

Average annual data for 1975-1977 (calculated according to "The Final Report," vol II, p 370).

Table 1 shows that the traditionally popular sports of basketball, baseball, football and track and field are still preferred above all other sports. This kind of one-sided development with the emphasis on these four sports is the result of several factors, the most important of which are, firstly, the influence of universities and colleges interested in recruiting high school athletes in primarily these sports (this will be discussed in more detail below) for their teams, and, secondly, the need for the schools to finance their own athletic programs with the receipts from profitable competition.

This gives rise to a paradoxical situation which has attracted the attention of the public and educators, who are quite justifiably worried about the physical education of students. Interschool sports, emphasizing just a few team sports, are impeding the development of physical education and mass sports for all students. State departments of public education, whose prerogatives formally include physical education as a whole, cannot correct the situation because the high school sports associations in most states are not under their jurisdiction and would rather have promising contacts with universities and colleges in their own and other states.

It is obvious, however, that the developmental level and scales of interschool sports in the United States allow for the training of athletes who are highly skilled in several sports.

The largest and most influential sports organization of American universities and colleges is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), with around 730 member colleges and universities. It holds team competitions (only for men) in 18 sports, including ten Olympic sports.

The colleges belonging to the association have 2,571 basketball courts, 790 sports auditoriums, 744 soccer stadiums, 682 track and field complexes, 603 swimming pools, 442 wrestling rings, 146 hockey rinks, 44 skiing bases and so forth. In all, sports facilities of the colleges and universities belonging to the NCAA are valued at more than 1.5 billion dollars.

Around 5,400 coaches and 2,800 assistant coaches are employed within the NCAA. Many of them coach students in two or three sports.

The total annual budget of the athletic departments (or schools) of the colleges belonging to the association is 535 million dollars a year. This is the budget for intercollegiate sports; it does not include the cost of physical education for the entire student body.

Average annual data on the number of VUZ's and participants in intercollegiate sports competitions are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

College Sports

Sport	Number of Colleges	Number of Participants
Baseball	616	19,487
Basketball	658	16,760
Football	465	42,187
Track and field	535	19,190
Tennis	608	7,445
Golf	604	6,795
Soccer	351	12,024
Wrestling	393	9,437
Swimming	382	8,667

Average annual data for 1975-1977 (calculated according to "The Final Report," vol II, p 354).

All of these data testify that sports within the higher educational system have all that is necessary for the training of high-class athletes, capable of properly representing the United States in the world Olympic arena. It should be borne in mind that, in addition to the NCAA, other large organizations are also engaged in the development of intercollegiate sports, such as the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (537 member colleges) and the National Junior College Athletic Association (586 in the men's group and 296 in the women's).

Here it is necessary to make several stipulations of considerable significance for the correct assessment of the role of colleges and universities in the training of athletes for Olympic Games and other international competitions.

As we know, higher education in the United States is not free, and government funding of universities is negligible. This means that intercollegiate sports programs must be financed through the colleges' own sources of income. These sources are the box office receipts from competitions in the more popular fields of sports, and income from the sale of game broadcasting rights to television companies. The most profitable sports for colleges and universities are primarily football and basketball, and college budgets envisage the highest sums for the financing of these sports. All other sports, including Olympic athletics, are arbitrarily pushed into the background. This lopsided development of intercollegiate sports is also being reflected in interschool sports.

The association between intercollegiate and interschool sports is established by extremely traditional means--the dollar--and cemented by the offer of athletic scholarships to graduating high school athletes. The fact is that the high cost of colleges makes it difficult for the offspring of limited-income families to acquire a higher education. For this reason, a scholarship offers many the only chance they would have to attend college. Moreover, many talented athletes who have graduated from high school, particularly blacks and Latin Americans, go to college exclusively in the hope of gaining 4 years of experience on college football or basketball teams and then sign a contract with a professional team, thereby gaining a career as a professional football or basketball player. The acquisition of a higher education is only a secondary consideration.

The report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports cites average annual data attesting to the scales of some sports programs in the colleges in comparison to professional sports (the data indicate the number of spectators, in thousands; and the figures in parentheses indicate total box office receipts, in thousands of dollars)--(Table 3). The report notes that football, basketball and hockey attract 99 percent of all spectators and provide for 95 percent of total box office receipts for the entire intercollegiate sports program.

By spending 154 million dollars annually on athletic scholarships, the NCAA colleges are providing sufficiently for the development of Olympic sports as well (track and field, swimming, diving and others). Successful performances by NCAA athletes in the Olympic Games and other major international competitions have always been a matter of honor and prestige for collegiate sports. For example, 330 of the 452 members of the U.S. Olympic team at the 1972 games in Munich were attending NCAA colleges. But the participation of student athletes from the NCAA in international competitions involving Olympic sports in the 1970's was impeded by serious difficulties of an organizational nature, which will be discussed below.

Table 3

College and Professional Sports

Sport	Intercollegiate Sports	Professional Sports
Football	32,388 (218,761)	13,994 (115,243)
Basketball	20,785 (76,137)	11,595 (90,744)
Hockey	6,349 (22,769)	11,009 (72,701)
Baseball	94.9 (180.1)	37,651 (97,036)
Soccer	52.8 (79.7)	1,808 (7,000)
Track and field	24.8 (142.2)	---
Gymnastics	10.3 (35.5)	---
Volleyball	5.5 (24.7)	137.7 (395.2)
Wrestling	128.4 (452.7)	3,500.0 (24,500)

Average annual data for 1975-1977 (calculated according to "The Final Report," vol II, p 456).

A special place in the U.S. Olympic movement is occupied by the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), founded in 1888. All of its activity is financed by means of contributions from the public. The main concerns of this oldest athletic union in the United States consist in organizing competitions in accordance with standard rules, guaranteeing the accessibility of sports facilities and the opportunity to take part in competitions to all interested parties, and providing agencies representing the United States in the international arena with the strongest athletes.

The AAU is an association of sports clubs with no membership restrictions connected with age or sex. The 7,000 clubs which make up this union constitute 58 associations (with the jurisdiction of most associations coinciding with state administrative orders), divided into 15 districts on a geographical basis. This structure is supposed to guarantee more efficient conditions for the organization of competitions on various levels. More than 3,000 volunteer coaches, referees, organizers of competitive events, administrators and others work within the union.

The union organizes competitions for its members in the following Olympic sports: basketball, bobsledding, water polo, volleyball, handball, gymnastics, judo, track and field, swimming, sledding and weight lifting. Besides this, other sports are being popularized (karate, horseshoe-casting, athletic juggling and others).

As a member of the international athletic federations for track and field, swimming (water polo and diving), bobsledding, boxing, judo, sledding and weight lifting, the AAU, in accordance with the rules of international federations, has the exclusive right to represent the United States in all international competitions. It maintains contact with other

countries in regard to these sports. All other national athletic organizations can only enter the international arena through the AAU. The large and powerful NCAA could not accept this condition, the struggle for the right to represent the United States in world sports resulted in an intense conflict between them, which largely reflects the critical state of American amateur sports.

Taking advantage of the fact that the international federations recognize only one national organization from each nation as the representative of this nation, the NCAA tried to establish national federations, independent of the AAU, in sports under its jurisdiction. This tactic was successful to a certain degree. For example, the gymnastics and basketball federations created with NCAA assistance were recognized by the corresponding international federations in 1971 and 1974.

The conflict between the two leading sports organizations is also reflected in the membership of U.S. teams participating in large international competitions and, consequently, in the nation's ability to compete in world sports. The failures of American athletes competing with athletes from other countries, particularly the socialist states, naturally focused government and public attention on the prolonged conflict.

In 1962, President J. Kennedy and Attorney General R. Kennedy created a commission, headed by General D. MacArthur, to resolve the conflict and guarantee the success of the United States in the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo. After American track and field athletes were defeated in a U.S.-USSR match in Kiev in the summer of 1965, the U.S. Congress demanded an explanation. The conflict in amateur sports became the subject of hearings before a Senate subcommittee and a special arbitration committee. Nonetheless, these and other measures to settle the conflict did not produce any noticeable results.

The unsuccessful performance of the American athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the subsequent angry reaction in the press and in the broadest social circles led to a situation in which the NCAA ostentatiously severed its connections with the Olympic movement and withdrew from the U.S. Olympic Committee. This threatened the athletic prestige of the United States in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal at a time when the nation was preparing to celebrate its bicentennial. The question of the Olympic capabilities of the United States went far beyond the bounds of sports. One bill after another on amateur sports began to be introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Just before his inauguration as the President of the United States, Gerald Ford wrote a long article for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, in which he stated: "Not only the Russians, but many other nationalities are growing stronger and challenging us.... I cannot imagine a better way of advertising national health than healthy representation in international sports. Sports represent an exceptionally lively channel of communications. The greater these achievements are, the stronger their influence will be."⁵

In September 1975, on the personal recommendation of President Ford, a commission was formed, with its members including Senators Glenn Beall, John Culver, Ted Stevens and Richard Stone, Congressmen Jack Kemp, Ralph Metcalfe (recently deceased Olympic medal winner in 1932 and 1936), Robert Michel and Norman Mineta, Olympic medal winners Donna de Verona (swimming, 1964), Micki King (diving, 1972), Rafer Johnson (track and field, 1956 and 1960), William Toomey (track and field, 1968), millionaire professional club owner Lamar Hunt and others. The head of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports--this was its official name--was Chairman Gerald Zornow of the board of directors of the large Eastman-Kodak corporation. The commission started operating with a budget of 540 million dollars.

As a result of the painstaking and thorough work performed by the President's Commission for a year and a half, a 613-page "Final Report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports" was submitted in January 1977 to President G. Ford and President-elect J. Carter. The NEW YORK TIMES published a brief summary of the report and commented that "the report is the most thorough and costly study ever undertaken to investigate the 'deterioration' of amateur sports in the United States and the attempts of American athletes to retain their competitive potential on the international level."⁶

What are the main reasons, according to the President's Commission, for the "deterioration" of U.S. Olympic sports?

Here is what the report says in this connection: "America's weaknesses in sports are not due to a lack of talent, as it has an abundance of talent, which has kept American participation in the Olympic Games on a suitable level. And it is certainly not due to a lack of resources, although it is clear to the commission that potential sources of financing have not been put to work and that sports facilities and structures are not being used to maximum advantage. The very thing that constitutes America's strongest feature in space exploration is its weak feature in sports--organization. American athletic organizations are isolated from one another and are not united by a common goal or an effective coordinating system.... Endless organizational battles waste time and talent and threaten the fundamental right of athletes to participate in tense competitions in line with their athletic skills. Need and abundance coexist side by side. Opportunities for men to participate in sports in universities and colleges are extensive and beneficial, but the opportunities for women and for men outside academic institutions are limited and disillusioning.... Separatism and rivalry between American athletic organizations should not exist. They are not in our tradition and they do not serve the interests of athletes and the American public."⁷

However, the commission preferred not to disclose the deep-seated causes of the decentralization of American amateur athletics, which was reflected in the chronic divergence of the leading national organizations. This is a suitable time to note that, in accordance with Article 10 of the

Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791 as a list of amendments to the American Constitution, questions of public education, among others, came under the jurisdiction of state and local governments and private organizations. In this way, physical education and sports within the system of public education were also made directly dependent on local socioeconomic and political conditions, which were characterized by sharp contrasts and contradictions.

The decentralization of American amateur sports was the direct result of a lack of nationwide (federal) management of physical education and sports--these important ways of heightening the physical fitness of the population--and the lack of centralized financing of the activities of various national athletic organizations, which was based on the bourgeois principle of "free enterprise" and competition. All of this led to the peculiar situation in which, using the words of the President's Commission, "need and abundance coexist side by side" in this field.

According to the commission, the main current objective is the fundamental reorganization of the entire structure of the national Olympic movement (athletic sports), a departure from the principle of decentralization and the creation of a "vertically integrated system," headed by a central sports agency. The proposal to create a central sports agency within the framework of a "vertically integrated system" is a compromise between the present complete autonomy of leading athletic organizations and the management of amateur sports by government agencies.

The recommendations of the President's Commission direct special attention to the need for more active participation by federal agencies of the executive and legislative branches in the further development of amateur athletics. In particular, the following recommendations are made in the report:

The President of the nation should support amateur athletics by issuing the appropriate statements on problems in sports, supporting legislative in this area and requesting the business community to promote amateur athletics;

Congress should pass joint resolutions in support of sports, plan for the financing of sports and abolish customs duties on imported sporting goods and equipment;

The administration and Congress should jointly expand the role of the armed forces and various government agencies in amateur sports, revise the federal budget with a view to the guaranteed promotion of sports and so forth.

The report of the President's Commission served as the basis for a bill on amateur sports, which was examined first by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. After the addition of various amendments and changes, the bill was examined and passed in October 1978 by

the Senate and the House of Representatives, and was then ratified by the President. The law essentially reflects the fundamental recommendations of the President's Commission.

The functions of a central sports agency were assigned in the new law to the National Olympic Committee of the United States (NOC), which was charged with the following responsibilities:

To set nationwide objectives for amateur sports and encourage the attainment of these objectives;

To coordinate and develop amateur sports in the United States for the purpose of maintaining a constructive working relationship between organizations connected with sports;

To develop and support amateur sports involving the United States and foreign countries.

In accordance with this law, the NOC has the right to designate specific national organizations as the leading bodies in specific sports included in the program of the Olympic and American games. In this way, the NOC became the final authority in the nation on U.S. representation in international sports federations.

In addition, the NOC was invested with the authority to settle all conflicts arising between amateur athletic organizations. The NOC does not, however, have administrative authority over the activities of athletic organizations, which will retain autonomy in their internal affairs.

The law gave the NOC the right to request U.S. federal agencies for financial assistance. Up to the present time, federal financial support of amateur sports in the United States has been limited to tax exemptions for some athletic organizations. Now the government will be able to use federal budget funds to finance amateur sports directly. For example, plans have already been made to increase the NOC budget for Olympic team training to 40 million dollars. Besides this, in accordance with current practice and tradition in the United States, amateur sports will receive sizable sums from the business community. There is no question that the enactment of the amateur sports act will promote broader participation by private business in the financing of national Olympic potential.

The measures taken in recent years by the federal government to strengthen U.S. competitive potential in sports testify to the significance attached by ruling circles in the nation to the development of amateur athletics as "the best advertisement of national health" in the international arena.

The Americans are now engaged in the most serious and painstaking preparations for the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Ample proof of this was provided in the sports festival, which was held last year in the United

States for the first time in the history of American sports. "The Soviet version of these competitions is known as the 'Spartan Games,'"⁸ SPORTS ILLUSTRATED remarked at that time. When he was in Moscow, President Robert Cain of the NOC said: "We have studied your Spartan Games and have begun to hold similar contests. They are called sports festivals.... In 1979 we will hold our second festival, with a program including the final knock-out competitions for the Pan American Games."⁹

An Olympic center, equipped with modern electronic computers and medical and science laboratories, was recently opened in Colorado Springs (Colorado). Facilities at the center provide for the training of 500 athletes at the same time, in virtually all Olympic sports. The NOC and many national federations are also presently located in Colorado Springs. As we can see, the tendency toward the centralization of American sports has also taken the form of the concentration of the headquarters of various national organizations in one spot.

The Olympic Games in Moscow will be the first test of the effectiveness of the reorganization of American sports.

As the Moscow Olympics draw nearer, the American public's interest in them grows. An exhibit, "Sports in the USSR," opened in San Francisco on 18 June. It has been viewed by many people and will later be shown in several other American cities.

In his welcome message to the viewers of the exhibit, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev remarked: "The exhibit will give American citizens a better understanding of life in the Soviet nation and of Soviet achievements in the development of mass physical culture and sports, which represent an organic part of the total culture of socialist society and an important condition for securing the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the workers to recreation and health protection.

"A look at the pages of the Soviet nation's sports biography will vividly illustrate the way in which the ideals of mutual understanding and friendship among peoples in the name of peace and a better future for mankind, proclaimed in the Olympic Charter, are implemented in the Soviet Union."¹⁰

The Olympic roads are now leading to the capital of the Soviet Union, where an engrossing struggle will unfold this summer, with its participants representing the pick of the athletic crop, including the best American athletes.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. M. Kiselev, "Desyatyy Olimpiyskiy kongress" [The Tenth Olympic Congress], Moscow, 1975, pp 21-22.

2. "Sports, Culture and Society," London, 1969, p 3.
3. R. Boyle, "Sport--Mirror of American Life," Boston, 1963, pp 36-37.
4. "The Final Report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports 1975-1977," vol II, Washington, 1977, p 370.
5. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 15 June 1974.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 January 1977.
7. "The Final Report," vol I, p 1.
8. Quoted in: SOVETSKIY SPORT, 19 October 1978.
9. SPORT ZA RUBEZHOM, No 7, 1979.
10. PRAVDA, 18 June 1979.

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THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT AND THE UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 51-56

[Article by V. A. Sokolov]

[Text] The Sixth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Nations, held in Havana on 3-8 September, was attended by a record number of delegations--the representatives of 94 states and liberation movements, or more than 100 delegations if observers and guests are included. It became a significant milestone in the history of the movement for non-alignment, which General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev has called an "influential factor in world politics." "From forum to forum, the non-aligned states make their tremendous contribution to the consolidation of peace and international security, to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, to the recognition of the right of people to decide their own fate and to the reinforcement of the political and economic independence of the liberated countries," L. I. Brezhnev said in a telegram sent to the chairman of the conference, Fidel Castro Ruz.

The agenda of the Havana conference was made up of topical issues concerning millions of people. These were methods and means of consolidating peace and security in various parts of the world, the role of the non-aligned states in the struggle against the imperialist policy of oppression and exploitation, and the rendering of assistance to fighters for freedom and national independence.

For the first time in the 18-year history of the movement, one of its regular summit-level meetings was held in Latin America, on the soil of freedom-loving Cuba, which was one of the founding states of the movement for non-alignment.

The conference in Havana was held in spite of intrigues and maneuvers on the part of the United States and its old and new allies, including China, in an attempt to wreck the conference. These maneuvers reflected the traditional anti-Cuban U.S. policy line and the U.S. desire to interfere in

the affairs of the movement for non-alignment, break up the movement and sow dissent between the developing and socialist countries.

"We are a socialist country," said First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Council of States and of the Council of Ministers Fidel Castro in his speech at the opening of the conference, "but we are not trying to impose our ideology and our system on anyone inside or outside the movement.... We are confirmed anti-imperialists, anticolonialists, antineocolonialists, antiracists, anti-Zionists and antifascists, because these principles are an integral part of our beliefs and essentially represent the sources and history of the movement for non-alignment from the time of its founding....

"We are deeply grateful to the Soviet people, whose generous cooperation has helped us to survive and triumph in extremely difficult and decisive moments for our people.... And this is not only true of Cuba, Vietnam, the Arab countries that have become the victims of aggression, the people of the former Portuguese colonies, the revolutionary processes in many countries of the world and the liberation movement against oppression, racism, fascism and Zionism in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Palestine and other regions of the globe owe a great deal to the solidarity of the socialist community. I wonder if the United States or any other nation belonging to NATO has ever, even once, assisted a single liberation movement in the world."

After a detailed discussion of the main current objectives of the movement for non-alignment, the Cuban leader stressed that there are none more important than the struggle for peace, international detente, peaceful co-existence and disarmament.

Yugoslavian President J. Broz Tito, after noting in his speech that the relaxation of international tension is in the vital interest of the non-aligned nations, advocated the extension of detente to all parts of the world, the curbing of the arms race, and universal and total disarmament. In connection with this, he welcomed the signing of the SALT II treaty. The Yugoslavian president also said he was concerned about the situation in the Middle East.

The problem of combating Israeli aggression, safeguarding the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arabs and achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict was discussed by virtually all of the speakers. A group of Arab countries distributed a draft resolution to the heads of the delegations, appealing for vigorous measures to force Israel to comply with the UN resolution on the Middle East and the Palestinian problem and to suspend Egypt from the movement for non-alignment, since Egypt, by ratifying the Camp David agreements, violated the principles of the movement for non-alignment, the resolutions of previous conferences of heads of state and government in the non-aligned nations and the UN resolution. They proposed that a special session of the UN General Assembly be convened to discuss the Palestinian Arab question.

The work of the Havana forum was permeated with the desire to unite all anti-imperialist forces in a struggle for the most fundamental interests of people. "The unity of movement members is needed more today than ever before," said Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and of the Council of Ministers of Socialist Ethiopia Mengistu Haile-Mariam. "As a result of the victories of the people of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, democratic Yemen, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Grenada, Nicaragua and some other countries, the positions of imperialism have been seriously undermined. But it is making every effort to retain its dominant position in various parts of the world."

No matter how contradictory the development of relations between countries subscribing to the movement for non-alignment may sometimes seem, this development is closely connected, by its very nature, with the national liberation movement, and imperialism uses the same tactic in dealing with any national liberation movement: It tries to set up one group of forces against another and to retain its economic positions in the liberated countries. This thought was clearly expressed in speeches by representatives of the people of southern, southwestern and West Africa and the Palestinian Arabs, all of whom are now fighting for freedom, independence and the exercise of their legal right of self-determination.

At present, the movement for non-alignment unites two-thirds of the states in the world. They are extremely diverse in terms of sociopolitical orientation: from feudal-monarchic to socialist. In spite of all differences, however, most of them have in common their formation and development on an anti-imperialist basis. Moreover, for many of them, struggle against imperialism is associated primarily with an attempt to counteract the intrigues of the United States as the leading capitalist power of the postwar period.

The first American postwar administrations did not conceal their negative feelings about the ideas of non-alignment,¹ which not only kept the United States from conducting its bloc policy, but were already directed against neocolonialism even at that time. As early as the 1950's, U.S. Secretary of State J. F. Dulles was describing the refusal to adhere to bloc policy as an "amoral" position. In the last decade, under the conditions of the considerably increased role of the movement for non-alignment in world politics, the need to adjust attitudes toward the movement has become more and more evident to Washington.

In July 1976, then Secretary of State H. Kissinger, on a short visit in Santo Domingo, said: "I also came here to say that in a world in which non-alignment is respected and in which we are prepared to cooperate with non-aligned countries, we will nonetheless place an extremely high value

1. It should be noted that the term "non-alignment" itself is still rarely used in American political terminology; it is called the movement of the "developing countries," the "Afro-Asian bloc" or, in line with Beijing terminology, the "Third World."

on the countries that have invariably remained our friends." This statement probably reflects the U.S. position now as well, despite the change of administrations in the White House. Washington is striving to preserve its previous relations with its "friends," but it would also like to "co-operate" with other countries, including those belonging to the movement for non-alignment, considering its increasing influence in international affairs.

Regular conferences, once every 3 years, of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned nations have become one of the major rules governing the activities of this movement. Besides this, the conferences have turned into a prestigious international forum, where aspects of the inter-relations between the developing states and the Western nations are discussed from every angle. The four conferences of this type (in Lusaka in 1970, in Algiers in 1973, in Colombo in 1976 and in Havana in 1979) not only recorded the rising number of movement members (from 54 in Lusaka to 94 in Havana), but also definitely confirmed its anti-imperialist aims; conference resolutions have condemned U.S. policy toward Puerto Rico and the Republic of Cuba, the countries of Indochina and Panama, southern Africa and Chile. The content of conference documents clearly demonstrates the determination of the majority of non-aligned countries to reinforce the general condemnation of the policy of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and Zionism with concrete concerted efforts to limit the once arbitrary dictates of the imperialist powers, including the United States.

In the United Nations, in place of the Western or pro-Western majority of the cold war era, there is now a new majority—the liberated nations which take an anti-imperialist stand. After encountering this, the United States had to begin a "dialog" with the movement, generally using the UN rostrum for this purpose. At the same time, it tried to discredit the movement by categorizing the coordinated policy of the non-aligned countries as the appearance of a new "automatic majority." Speaking at a session of the UN General Assembly on 23 September 1973, the U.S. secretary of state described the joint statements of these countries as "the alignment of the non-aligned." The U.S. representative declared: "We do not approve of the creation of a new bloc, distinguished only by the fact that it calls itself non-aligned."

Later, when the countries of this movement began to resort to concerted action in the economic sphere as well, Washington took more vigorous steps to undermine the movement. For example, almost a year before the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Nations in Colombo, the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (of 16 August 1976) informed its readers that the State Department had "begun a campaign among America's friends in the group of non-aligned nations to stave off the anticipated influx of anti-American resolutions." Washington was actively assisted in this by Beijing, which persistently recommended that the organizers of the highest forum of the movement "muffle anti-American feelings." At this same time, U.S. ideologists began to advocate "genuine non-alignment as a correct and truly necessary concept in today's world."

The decision to convene the latest, sixth summit-level conference in Havana was interpreted in Washington as a sign of the radicalization of the movement. Nonetheless, in an attempt to regain the political initiative in relations with the developing countries, J. Carter and his advisers chose an essentially conciliatory style of communication with the movement for non-alignment, constantly stressing the alleged common objectives of the United States and the majority of non-aligned countries. Along with the other NATO countries, the Americans began to seek opportunities for cooperation with some groups of non-aligned countries in various international forums.

During the first months of the current administration, Z. Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, was already expressing the view, in an article in SURVEY magazine, that an extremely important U.S. foreign policy objective would be the involvement of as many new nations as possible in North-South cooperation and the separation of "moderate" states from "more radical" ones. Another of Brzezinski's recommendations essentially advocated stronger ties with the "new influential" countries. This advice applied primarily to U.S. relations with the movement for non-alignment.

Naturally, this change in tactics (the move from attack to dialog) does not signify a change in the actual attitude toward the movement, but, rather, attests to recognition of its strength. The United States is much more attentive and lavish with compliments in its dealings with countries that fit the American description of "genuine non-alignment," or, in other words, countries that are friendly to the West. The plan here is to gradually, on the pretext of developing stronger ties with them, spread U.S. influence to the entire movement and deprive it of its anti-imperialist and anticolonial bases. The United States is gambling on the social and ideological dissimilarities of the countries in the movement, in which the process of social and political differentiation, the demarcation of class forces and the intensification of class struggle is still going on.

Up to the present time, the policy of non-alignment has helped greatly in consolidating the political independence of the majority of liberated countries. Some of the countries that have stayed within the world capitalist economic system, however, are being influenced each day by imperialism, which is trying to create a dependent type of "second-class" imperialism in these countries and simultaneously dictate their foreign policy. It is these countries that are being relied upon most by Washington as possible allies within the movement for non-alignment.

The new climate in international relations in the 1970's has been classified by some experts in the United States as a favorable atmosphere for breaking up the movement. In their opinion, it is more difficult for the non-aligned countries to make collective decisions under the conditions of detente, as imperialism's opponents allegedly have less arguments to corroborate its aggressiveness. The idea of the "de-imperialization" of the

large Western powers is being spread around to stimulate schism within the movement. This thesis, in camouflaged form, is being cultivated in the movement by some members close to the United States: They maintain that the days of imperialism are over. The theory of "rich" and "poor" nations, which is supposed to conceal the predatory nature of imperialism, is actually undergoing further elaboration. American strategists hope to use another factor for the same purpose--the increasing number of members in the movement, which, in their opinion, will complicate the collective decision-making process.

American imperialism has accumulated an extremely broad variety of means of influencing the movement for non-alignment and is constantly perfecting and renewing them. One of the most popular methods consists in setting the non-aligned countries against the socialist countries, their natural allies. It is being suggested that the socialist countries are just as responsible as the developed capitalist countries for the backwardness of the young states.

It is interesting that the United States has reacted with absolute calm to the theory of the "two superpowers," cultivated by Beijing within the movement for non-alignment. In fact, these ideas serve both the interests of Maoist reaction and those of imperialism because they conceal the indisputable fact that it is precisely the imperialist West that is to blame for the disastrous state of many developing countries.

This practice of "working over" the non-aligned countries did not, however, earn the United States the dividends for which this policy was designed. The first obvious disappointment for the United States included the reaction of most of the non-aligned countries to Washington's new campaign "in defense of human rights," which they described as hypocritical, calling it an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. As for the Havana forum, American diplomacy, as TIME magazine reported on 17 September, "feverishly worked on the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries for 2 months. The failure of these efforts is particularly unwelcome news."

Most of the questions discussed at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries pertained directly to U.S. policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Although this was not the first time these questions had been on the agenda of the summit-level conferences of the non-aligned countries, the fact that the forum in Havana not only could not be undermined, but was even successful and, what is more, that the Cuban representative was elected chairman of the coordinating committee for the next 3 years, made U.S. ruling circles highly irritable. A report in NEWSWEEK (17 September) said: "The conference in Havana has upset attentive observers in Washington.... American officials saw the conference of leaders of the movement for non-alignment as a kind of judgment by default." In Washington--for the nth time--an unruly hostile campaign was launched against Cuba.

All of these intrigues were properly repudiated in conference resolutions. The political declaration, which is part of the final document of the conference, expresses satisfaction with the positive advances in the process of international detente and stresses that the principles of peaceful coexistence must become the cornerstone of international relations. In addition, it mentions the need to extend the process of detente to other regions.

The document resolutely condemns the military support given by the United States, England and other Western powers to racist regimes in Africa and the maneuvers aimed at preventing the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the native African population of South Africa from exercising their right to self-determination and independence. These powers, the document states, are abetting the system of apartheid and the acts of armed aggression committed by racists against Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and other independent African states. The non-aligned countries declared that the Muzorewa puppet regime in Southern Rhodesia was illegal.

The conference condemned the Camp David agreements and the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel as documents infringing upon the inalienable rights of all Arabs, including the Palestinian Arabs, and aiding in the continued occupation of Arab territories. A decision was made to establish a special committee as part of the coordination bureau to investigate the suspension of Egypt from the movement for non-alignment as a result of its violation of the principles and decisions of this movement.

The document demanded that the United States dismantle its military bases in Cuba and Puerto Rico, which constitute a threat to peace and security in Latin America, and that the United States not prevent the Puerto Rican people from exercising their right to self-determination.

After the Havana conference of the leaders of the non-aligned states and liberation movements, where the most urgent and pressing problems of the day were discussed, the movement for non-alignment became even stronger and united in defense of the interests of the millions of people it represents.

Washington's policy toward the movement for non-alignment reflects, in concentrated form, its current policy in the developing countries. At the same time, U.S. relations with the non-aligned countries have some distinctive features. The United States, as we have pointed out, still has many ways of influencing some of these countries.

The United States can still force some members of the movement for non-alignment to diverge from the path of anti-imperialist struggle (Egypt is an example of this). The attempt to establish contacts with circles of the same class within the movement and, with their assistance, to influence movement policy would seem to be one of the more obvious elements of the U.S. line intended to change the nature and orientation of the movement

for non-alignment. The tactic of breeding strife within the movement, however, is complicating Washington's attempts to engage in a "dialog" with the developing countries, which is essential to the United States as a means of solving urgent economic problems and of conducting its global strategy.

Judging by a few of the latest reports in the American press, a more realistic position in regard to the non-alignment movement is taking shape, although very slowly, in the United States. A WASHINGTON POST editorial of 12 September 1979, for example, stated: "We must listen to the protests in Havana.... This summit meeting has spoken its mind to the United States, and the United States must pay attention."

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WASHINGTON INTERFERENCE IN ITALIAN AFFAIRS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 57-60

[Article by P. A. Vares]

[Text] When he spoke in Baltimore in August 1979 and commented on the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Italy, U.S. President J. Carter expressed "pleasure" with the slight reduction in the number of votes cast for the ICP [Italian Communist Party] and said that the United States had an "interest" in the "undermining of communist influence in Italy." This declaration has been interpreted by political observers as the latest U.S. attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of an allied country. The only thing new about this particular case was that the intervention, as observers noted, had not been undertaken by the American Embassy or the CIA, but by the President personally.

The entire course of the latest political crisis in Italy, the most drawn-out crisis of postwar history, attests to direct or indirect intervention by Washington in its internal affairs. As we know, this crisis began in December 1978, after the fall of the five-party parliamentary majority and the resignation of the one-party Christian Democratic Government that had rested on this majority. The ICP had to withdraw from this majority when the largest Italian bourgeois party--the CDP [Christian Democratic Party]--did not keep its promises. All subsequent attempts to establish a new parliamentary majority without communist participation failed. Italian President A. Pertini called a special election in the certainty that it would be impossible to settle the crisis by other means.

Immediately after this, U.S. Ambassador R. Gardner quickly flew to Washington "for consultations." When he returned to Rome, he made public announcements, unequivocally reminding the Italian voters that the United States was "against communist participation in the government of any NATO state." A few days before the election, Secretary of State C. Vance arrived in Rome, and this was also seen by political observers as intervention in Italian affairs.

The American ambassador's consultations in Washington at times of political tension in Italy have long been regarded by the Italian public as a sign of attempts to work out and implement a policy line that would direct Italian politics into a convenient channel for Washington. In the beginning of 1978, for example, R. Gardner held emergency consultations in the White House, which culminated in the State Department's well-known anti-communist declaration. This declaration said, in particular, that the United States "does not approve of communist participation in European governments" and would prefer that "communist influence in all the nations of Western Europe decrease."

This line was reaffirmed by Washington on the eve of the special parliamentary elections of 1979.

As a matter of fact, the entire second half of the 1970's in Italy was marked by increasing U.S. intervention in Italian domestic politics. The growing influence of the communist parties in the capitalist world, which was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress as one of the noteworthy phenomena of the 1970's, and the increase in leftist attitudes in large segments of the Western European population became a significant factor influencing U.S. relations with several Western European states, especially Italy. The real prospect of ICP participation in the Italian Government, which became quite apparent in the mid-1970's, confused and upset U.S. ruling circles. According to the prevailing opinion in these circles, this kind of government would inflict tremendous moral damage on capitalism as a system and would give rise to substantial changes within the "Atlantic structure."

In order to prevent this, both houses of Congress adopted a resolution on 9 and 10 June 1976--that is, just before the special parliamentary elections to be held that same month--which expressed "concern for the fate of democracy and democratic institutions in Italy."

At the same time, Washington began something like a flirtation with the communist parties in the Western European countries by launching debates over so-called "Eurocommunism." In particular, American bourgeois ideologists were trying to create the impression that the United States was willing to establish contacts with "respectable Eurocommunists." The Italian communists immediately saw through this maneuver, realizing that its real purpose was to create discord between the ICP and the other communist parties of Western Europe, as well as between the ICP and the communist parties of the socialist countries. In an interview in *CORRIERE DELLA SERA* on 3 December 1977, ICP President Luigi Longo made the following reply when the correspondent asked him about his views on "Eurocommunism": "'Eurocommunism' does not exist and has never existed as an organized entity.... If it did exist, it would restrict the independence of individual parties. This is just a term with nothing behind it."

Special NATO military maneuvers were conducted in northern Italy to influence the outcome of the 1976 parliamentary elections; the American troops participating in these maneuvers remained in Italy afterward.

The American military presence in Italy was always assigned little importance in Washington's plans. In October 1978, the Italian magazine EUROPEO published the text of a document entitled "Guide FM 30-31." This document was a set of instructions for U.S. armed forces to follow in the event of "distabilization of the situation" in the nations categorized as "friendly" by the men who compiled the document, General W. Westmoreland; by "friendly," he meant nations within the NATO orbit with American troops stationed on their territory. The "guide" explained how various U.S. services were to act in a "friendly" nation (including Italy) when the threat of radical political change arose, and particularly in the event of an apparent "communist threat." The document contains directives for various types of intervention--from the infiltration of the "adversary's" organizations to the use of violence and the infiltration of extreme leftist groups for the purpose of instigating chaos, riots and murder.

At the present time, the largest U.S. and NATO military facilities in Italy (they total 58) are the naval base on the island of Maddalena, Signionella Base in Sicily and the naval complex in Naples, where the NATO command in Southern Europe and the command of the American Mediterranean fleet are located. An important support point of the Sixth Fleet is located in Gaeta. The command of NATO's southern European allied ground forces is located in Verona. The American Air Force has the Aviano Air Force Base in the Trieste region and the San-Vito dei-Normanni Base near Brindisi. The Americans also use bases just outside Livorno and in Vincenzo. Ten air defense warning stations are located along the Italian coastline. American nuclear weapons are also located in Italy.

In February 1976, it became common knowledge that the U.S. military-industrial complex was also directly intervening in Italian affairs. The Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations found documents which testified that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had distributed around 1 billion lira in bribes to some prominent Italian political figures in 1970-1971 to promote the sale of 14 Hercules S-130 planes to the Italian Air Force. As a result of the ensuing scandal, Italian President G. Leone had to resign.

Despite the pressure exerted by Washington and Italy's other NATO allies for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the 1976 elections, they resulted in the promotion, as we know, of the ICP to second place among the political parties in Italy. Political and academic circles in the United States and other allied countries debated the question of the proper stand to take in the event of communist participation in the Italian Government.

In June 1976, when the leaders of the largest Western nations met at a conference in San Juan (Puerto Rico), the American President discussed the need to take special measures in the event of an "undesirable turn of events." The individuals who attended this meeting worked out a plan for stronger contacts with the right wing and bourgeois-moderate segment of the Italian political spectrum, for the use of NATO as leverage and for the use of loans from West German banks as a means of "stabilizing the situation" in Italy.

Totally evil forces also wasted no time in playing their part. On 16 March 1978, the date of a major event in Italian politics--a vote of confidence was given to the newly formed government, supported by a parliamentary majority that included communists for the first time in the last 30 years--A. Moro, leader of the CDP, former prime minister of Italy and one of the realistic-minded politicians who realized the need for constructive dialog with the ICP and other democratic forces in the nation and who objected to U.S. intervention in national affairs, was kidnapped in Rome.

The Italian public was of the firm opinion that extremely influential Italian and foreign reactionary forces stood behind the actions of the terrorists from the Red Brigades. For example, EUROPEO cited statements made by two American experts (N. Birnbaum and B. Jenkins) which indicated that the "handwriting" of the kidnappers who later murdered A. Moro was extremely similar to the "handwriting" of the NATO special services and the American CIA.

Appeals for resolute U.S. intervention for the purpose of "saving Italy from chaos and communists" simultaneously became louder in the United States, as the Italian weekly PANORAMA noted. The magazine reported that a prominent role in this campaign was being played by such organizations as the Washington group called "Americans for a Democratic Italy," the "Committee for Mediterranean Freedom," the American Business Institute of New York, the AFL-CIO and large segments of Congress. The magazine made special mention of such individuals as J. Connally, former secretary of the treasury and former member of the U.S. President's advisory council on overseas intelligence; W. Rostow, former national security adviser to the President; and two former American ambassadors to Rome--Clair Luce and R. Gardner's predecessor, J. Volpe. It is known that these individuals are in close contact with the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Washington's Georgetown University, which is becoming the most influential organization engaged in the dissemination of the ideas of American rightist forces. One of its administrators is R. Cline, once a prominent CIA official. With the aid of special seminars, television programs, books and articles, the center is convincing the Americans that there is a "communist threat" in Western Europe, particularly in Italy.

A month before the latest Italian parliamentary elections in 1979, the weekly EPOCA published a document drawn up by a group of experts on Italian affairs from the U.S. Congress. The document, which is entitled "The

Communist Parties of Western Countries: Analysis and Chronology of Events," has the code name "78-34 F." It states, in particular, that the United States can institute economic and political sanctions against Italy in the event of a communist victory in the elections, and take other measures to "drive the communists out of the government."

The published document aroused so much fierce indignation in Italy that a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Rome had to assert that this document "does not reflect the views of the American Government or Congress."

We know that documents of this kind are regularly prepared by groups of experts. At the beginning of 1979, another one came to light--the so-called "Project Italy." It was discovered by CDP Political Secretary B. Zaccagnini when he went to the the United States in January 1979 to assure Washington of his party's determination to prevent ICP participation in government in any form whatsoever. He felt that this trip was extremely important for raising the stock of his party in U.S. ruling circles. It turned out that Washington already had a complete plan, drawn up by American experts, to solve the "Italian problem."

The Italian ruling class, which is just as interested as the U.S. ruling class in preserving the foundations of the bourgeois order in the nation, sometimes does nothing to prevent overt U.S. intervention in the affairs of its nation and consents to the restriction of its own sovereignty simply for the purpose of preventing progressive internal political change. But Italian dissatisfaction with Washington's attempts to "run" the domestic politics of the nation is constantly taking on greater dimensions.

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THE ADMINISTRATION'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 60-64

[Article by S. K. Geyvandov and G. S. Khozin]

[Text] Political leaders in the United States regard science and technology as a private business and the academic community as one of the main sources of economic growth and a means of resolving some of America's increasingly acute socioeconomic problems, the number of which is still rising at the present time.

It is precisely for these objective reasons that U.S. politicians, both those in power and those campaigning for the presidency, a spot in the administration or a seat in Congress, set forth their views on major aspects of scientific and technical development and criticize the current administration for using scientific and technical potential unwisely and for ignoring the universities' vital need for development. It is assumed that all of these problems can be positively solved if a thoughtful government policy is worked out and implemented in the area of science and technology.

During the postwar decades, it has been the Democrats who have initiated many measures to create the most effective centralized mechanism of scientific and technical policy-making--a mechanism controlled by government and intercoordinated as closely as possible not only with the internal needs of the state, but also with major foreign policy objectives. When the Republicans were in power, President R. Nixon abolished the positions of the President's adviser on science and technology and the director of the White House office of science and technology in January 1973, transferring these functions to the director of the National Science Foundation. When Carter was still only a candidate for the presidency, he said that the U.S. Government should have a unified and thoroughly considered scientific and technical policy, and that the absence of the proper policy-making machinery in recent years (after Nixon's decision) had led to the aimless squandering of resources and the disruption of coordinated efforts to implement national science policy. In spite of the fact that the law

on the organization of principles and priorities of scientific and technical policy of 1976 was signed by Republican President G. Ford, it reflected primarily the Democrats' views on government scientific and technical policy. The Democrats also played a much more substantial part in working out the concepts and text of the future law.

The "First Annual Report on Science and Technology," submitted to Congress in October 1978 in accordance with the abovementioned 1976 law, was one of the important documents of the current Democratic Administration. In a letter accompanying the document, President Carter pointed out, in pretentious terms, the significant part played by science and technology in satisfying the social needs of American society. The technological revolution is "promoting economic growth and productivity, the provision of the planet's population with food, the protection of the environment and the preservation of health and is also playing an important role in safeguarding national security." The report also contained a sober confession: "The experience of recent decades teaches us that we expect too much from scientific and technical 'breakthroughs.' Let us recall at least the following expectations: that antibiotics would wipe out disease, that the atom would give us unlimited sources of energy and that the green revolution would put an end to hunger on the planet. The failure of technical development to meet our expectations was largely due to the fact that a new discovery does not only satisfy existing demands, but also, and almost simultaneously, creates new ones."

It is noteworthy that R. Atkinson, director of the National Science Foundation (this organization co-authored the report along with the President's Scientific and Technical Policy Administration), admits that although science and technology can aid in solving social problems, they are rarely capable of their complete resolution, because "this also requires complex economic, organizational and political measures."¹

The Democratic Administration's main practical recommendations, set forth in the President's report, in regard to the funding and principal directions of scientific research and development in fiscal year 1979 were the following: an increase of 5 percent ("over and above the rate of inflation") in appropriations for fundamental research; the continued development of the space shuttle; the abandonment of the experimental breeder reactor project in Clinch River (Tennessee); the expansion of the scales of weather research through the combined efforts of many agencies and research organizations.

One new feature in the Democratic Administration's attitude toward the development of U.S. technological potential was the desire to guarantee long-range goals and priorities in the field of research and development

1. For a discussion of trends in U.S. research and development, see V. M. Kudrov, "Research and Development: American Problems," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 10, 1979.

more reliably and to communicate an awareness of the importance of this activity to all organizations and political groups. Besides this, considerable attention is being given, at least in official documents, to the enhancement of the profitability of research and development appropriations and their closer coordination with many urgent needs and crises in American society. In particular, the annual report on science and technology mentions a research project, begun with the authorization of President Carter, to study the very process by which technological innovations are developed and disseminated. This study is being conducted by many organizations under the general supervision of the Department of Commerce and should culminate in the submission of concrete recommendations to the President on federal government policy aimed at the intensification of industrial activity in the incorporation of innovations.

An important stage in the subsequent development of the Democratic Administration's scientific and technical policy was the President's message on science and technology, submitted to Congress on 27 March 1979. This message clarified the domestic research and development priorities of the United States and illustrated the connection between work on the development of technological potential and the possibility of attaining major political and economic objectives in the international arena.

In terms of structure and content, the President's message could be categorized not only as an annual document informing the legislative branch of the administration's precise views on the potential of science and technology and substantiating the highest priorities within the nation and in the international arena, which are to be attained through the use of the results of scientific and technical progress, but also as an attempt to announce the fundamentals of long-range government scientific and technical policy (which is in line with the Democrats' views on these important U.S. problems). The introductory portion of the message frankly states that the federal government has "rarely formulated its scientific and technical policy for the future. This message sets forth this kind of policy." Just as in other documents of this kind that have made their appearance since the time when the Democratic Administration arrived in the White House, the introductory part of the message mentions the opportunities provided to American society by the development of science and technology. But Carter discusses them in a more "utilitarian" fashion, relating them closely to daily experience. He believes, for example, that science and technology "were the main factors contributing to [economic] growth, guaranteed employment and higher productivity through the incorporation of innovations." According to the President, all of the American Government's plans will depend largely on the development of science and technology. In connection with this, he declared his intention to work with Congress in the coming months on the resolution of problems directly related to the development of American and world science and technology. These include, above all, strategic arms limitation, national health care, sufficient energy supplies, scientific and technical innovations in industry, and economic growth. The President appealed to all members of Congress, regardless of their party affiliation, to support the efforts of the Democratic Administration in the development of science and technology in the future.

The range of topics discussed in this message is broader than in the first report on science and technology that was issued a few months earlier. Pointing out the importance of fundamental scientific research and development, Carter mentions his previous proposal to increase appropriations for this purpose 26 percent in the first 2 years of his term in office, and reports that this item in the federal budget will rise to 4.6 billion dollars in fiscal year 1980.

Singling out six main aspects of scientific and technical policy (the more intensive incorporation of innovations in industry; the satisfaction of demands for energy, mineral and raw materials and food; the improvement of health; the improvement of forms and methods of government control of science and technology; the expanded practical use of outer space; the in-depth study of natural processes, natural calamities and anthropogenic changes in the world), President Carter focuses on the need for practical methods of attaining these objectives. The desire to ensure the economic profitability of as many projects as possible, and within a short period of time (this tendency is not only apparent in the abovementioned documents pertaining to the scientific and technical policy of the government as a whole, but also in several reports and speeches by Democratic Administration leaders on energy problems, outer space and environmental protection, as well as in the passage of a law to reduce earthquake damage in 1977 and a law on a national program of climate studies in 1978, the creation of the Federal Agency of Natural Disaster Control and so forth), aroused criticism from a certain segment of the political and scientific communities for the obvious features of "immediacy" and "excessive pragmatism" in the administration's scientific and technical policy. A particularly eloquent statement was made by American journalist N. Cousins in a debate in the American Institution of Aeronautics and Astronautics. In particular, he criticized the Democratic Administration's decision to heighten the economic profitability of the space program. "If the cost-effectiveness principle had been dominant throughout history, Socrates would have become a babysitter, Newton would have been a gardener, Galileo and Giordano Bruno would have been court jesters and Columbus would have had the gondola concession in Venice. Thomas Jefferson would have been a tax collector.... Edison would have invented Coca-Cola, and Einstein would have changed his name and stayed in Germany."

Cousins' words convey the nostalgia felt by many Americans for the first postwar decades, when the United States was building up its arsenal of nuclear missiles, preparing for a moon landing and so forth within the framework of "rush" national scientific and technical programs. This made many people in the United States, and in several other countries as well, believe that America's scientific and technical potential was virtually unlimited. Cousins is thinking along these very lines when he says that "great leaps are still the most reliable way of reaching high levels."

A sober assessment of the real potential of American science and technology, however, forced the Democratic Administration to realize that it was obviously not boundless, and that the control and regulation machinery

at the administration's disposal was far from perfect. It was no coincidence that Carter makes special mention in his report of the problems of government regulation of the development and practical use of new technology. He stresses that the increase in research and development appropriations should be accompanied by the improvement of the so-called "regulatory programs," which are being carried out mainly by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and a number of other agencies. The message proposes concrete measures, which the administration intends to institute in the near future. A council created in the fall of 1978 for the regulation of scientific and technical activity, for example, is supposed to submit proposals pertaining to the content of programs, the use of resources and the methods of improving the management of this activity by governments; a special interdepartmental group would be expected to coordinate the activities of organizations performing regulatory functions and research establishments; work will begin on a comprehensive national toxicological program, for testing and evaluating the properties of harmful chemicals.

A long section of the message was devoted to the role of science and technology in guaranteeing the national security of the United States. The following were singled out as priorities: the guarantee of "technological leadership" in weapons systems; the reduction of the cost of producing weapons systems through the use of scientific and technical achievements; the establishment of a research base for guaranteed national security in the future; the limitation of exports of technical achievements and technology with potential military value; the use of the latest scientific and technical achievements in the interest of concluding new arms limitation agreements.

Despite all of the contradictory statements in this section of the message, which clearly demonstrates a desire to grant certain concessions to the military-industrial complex, which has an interest in the further unlimited militarization of research and development, the section also indicates new attempts to find ways of limiting and curtailing the arms race. The following words from the President's message are obviously a rebuke addressed to the opponents of SALT II, who maintain that the loss of military facilities in Iran has made adequate control over the observance of present and future strategic arms limitation treaties and agreements impossible: "The technical means at our disposal for exercising control over the fulfillment of arms limitation agreements offer excellent possibilities."

The message concludes with the assertion that the United States has entered an "era of unprecedented growth in the volume of scientific information and its utilization by society." Many of the practical recommendations in the message are already being implemented by the Democratic Administration. The consistency with which science and technology in the United States will adhere to this course and the results of this long-range program will be revealed in the future.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 64-70

[Article by N. P. Popov]

[Text] In less than a year, the American voters will elect a President, a third of the senators and all members of the House of Representatives. A complex struggle between various political forces and powerful financial and industrial groups is going on behind the scenes over campaign preparations. This is the time when the study of public opinion becomes particularly important to prominent political leaders, particularly those running for an elected office. It is important for campaign strategists to know the voters' views on domestic and foreign policy problems and on the administration's attempts to solve these problems. There is still time to adjust campaign platforms and promises, and representatives of the administration still have time to take impressive actions, calculated to appeal to the voter.

In a nationally televised speech on the administration's energy program on 15 July, J. Carter complained about the "crisis of faith," a crisis, which, in his words, "strikes at the very heart, soul and spirit of our national will." "The symptoms of this crisis," the President said, "can now be seen all around us. Most of our people believe that the next 5 years will be worse than the last 5. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote. The productivity of American workers is decreasing. There is mounting disrespect for government, the church, the schools, the media and other institutions."

Numerous studies corroborate this description of the attitudes of large segments of the U.S. population at the end of the 1970's.

Public opinion polls illustrate how national priorities have changed in the American public mind over the last 30 years. The regularly conducted Gallup polls testify that in answer to the question--"What is the most important problem facing the nation today?"--an overwhelming number of respondents in the 1950's and most of the 1960's named foreign political problems, the fear of the atom bomb and the disturbances connected with

the American intervention in Southeast Asia. Social and, above all, racial problems were also assigned first place more than once in the 1960's.

After the failure of the United States' Vietnam adventure, the Americans lost most of their interest in foreign policy, and foreign policy problems were now being called the most important by no more than 10 percent of the population. In the last 6 years, the Americans were mainly worried about economic problems. First place among these was assigned to inflation, which reached its peak in 1974 (11 percent) and now exceeds 10 percent a year. In October 1974, it was regarded as the nation's most serious problem by 79 percent of all respondents, and even now more than 70 percent still call it the main problem. In the spring of 1979, 84 percent of the Americans believed that prices were rising more quickly than 1 year ago, and 78 percent expected them to rise at the same rate or even more quickly the next year--the election year.

Inflation is affecting all population strata. Around 69 percent of the Americans say that "it is more difficult to make ends meet"--that is, that their economic position is worse. The ones who suffer most from the rising prices are the people on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder--the poor, the unemployed, the semiskilled workers, the blacks and the Spanish-speaking population.

The administration's helplessness in the struggle against inflation is giving rise to increasing pessimism in the Americans in regard to the ability of the economic system to solve this problem. For example, whereas 62 percent of the individuals polled in 1975 believed that inflation could be lowered to 1.2 percent a year in the future, and 38 percent believed that prices would continue to rise, 88 percent of those polled in 1978 regarded high inflation as an inevitability in the future as well, and only 12 percent were expecting it to drop to 1-2 percent.

The uncontrolled rise in the cost of living even overshadowed the problem of unemployment for sizable segments of the population. Just before the last presidential election, when unemployment, at the height of the latest crisis, reached a record level for the postwar period--around 8.9 percent (and 13.7 percent among blacks)--the campaign promises made by J. Carter to reduce unemployment were extremely appealing. Although the level dropped to 5.7 percent in the next 6 months, the problem still exists, and it is as urgent as ever for non-whites, youth and women.

The energy problem has become a new cloud on the campaign horizon. There are kilometer-long lines at the gas pumps. For America, where the automobile is the chief means of transport, this is equivalent to a national disaster, and the administration's inability to correct the situation is having a substantial effect on public attitudes. According to the results of a Gallup poll of May 1979, 44 percent of the population regarded the energy crisis as an "extremely serious" problem, 36 percent said it was "quite serious" and only 16 percent did not believe it was serious. The

overwhelming majority (77 percent) believed that the gas shortage had been artificially created by the oil companies as a way of raising their already high prices.

The victory of the Democratic Administration in the last election was largely a result of dissatisfaction with 8 years of Republican rule, the failure of the Vietnam adventure and the Watergate scandal. The time has come to evaluate the performance of the new administration, particularly in the economic sphere. The hopes for economic progress, which were aroused by campaign promises, are now giving way to disillusionment. A spring (1979) Harris poll reflected the following public opinion of Carter Administration policy (in percentage values):

The Economic Policy of the Administration Will:	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
Reduce inflation	20	68	12
Stop the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar overseas	23	58	19
Increase unemployment	46	41	13
Create more difficulties for the elderly, the poor and the disabled with a fixed income	64	27	9

The widespread pessimism in regard to government programs led to a situation in which they were supported by only 44 percent of all respondents in March 1979 in comparison to 63 percent in November 1978.

It is extremely difficult for the average American to understand the real causes of inflation. He blames big business for escalating prices and large unions for their attempts to keep up with inflation in salary levels, but he assigns most of the guilt to the government. Whereas in 1959 this was the opinion of 20 percent of all Americans, in 1978, according to the data of the Harris service, 76 percent regarded "federal spending" as the main reason for rising prices, and 60 percent accused the administration of having "no federal policy" on price controls. The other "important causes" of inflation that were mentioned included the following: "The rising cost of medical treatment" (75 percent), "rising food prices" (74 percent), "the escalation of prices by big business" (60 percent), "the rising price of energy" (59 percent) and "union demands for higher wages" (57 percent).

According to American experts, the 1980 campaign will mainly be colored by "bread and meat" problems--questions connected with the economic conditions of the population. It is precisely here that the candidates for the presidency and for Congress will have to prove their ability to bring about real changes for the better. As yet, the current administration has been unable to do this. The mood of the public was also reflected in the results of a Harris poll in April 1979: 81 percent believed that until President J. Carter "proves that he can deal effectively with

inflation and the energy crisis, it would be difficult to say if he is a good President"; 16 percent did not agree with this opinion, and 3 percent were undecided.

The worry over economic problems has temporarily pushed other urgent national problems into the background. When the Harris service asked people to name the most urgent national problems of the day, inflation was named by 69 percent of the respondents, the need for cuts in government spending was named by 31 percent, the creation of jobs for the unemployed by 30 percent, medical cost control by 28 percent, crime prevention by 23 percent, social security reform by 20 percent, the fight against air and water pollution by 13 percent, the "fight against tax loopholes" by 10 percent, a new national legislative program to deal with energy problems by 8 percent, welfare reform by 7 percent, reduction of the federal bureaucracy by 7 percent, a guaranteed adequate income for senior citizens by 7 percent, the problems of the cities by 6 percent, consumer protection by 5 percent, the fight against "Medicaid" abuses by 5 percent, the creation of a national health plan by 5 percent, the fight against the abuse of power in big business by 5 percent, the funding of medical research by 3 percent and the restriction of the influence of large companies by 1 percent.

When the attitudes of black and white Americans toward government allocations for various social needs are analyzed, it turns out that they are strikingly different. The black population, which is still suffering from economic inequality, expresses particular interest in some specific spheres. For example, whereas the blacks and whites had similar views on the need for government assistance for the aged--94 and 81 percent respectively, the improvement of medical care was favored by 92 percent of the blacks and 67 percent of the whites, guaranteed housing was favored by 87 and 55 percent respectively, urban ghetto reconstruction was favored by 87 and 54 percent, social security for low-income families was favored by 80 and 39 percent and, finally, the improvement of conditions for the black population was favored by 90 and 44 percent respectively.

When we discuss general attitudes in regard to the racial problem at the end of the 1970's, we must note that the years of struggle by the blacks for their rights, with the support of progressive segments of the public, resulted in significant changes in the attitudes of the white population toward the blacks. In 1976, 84 percent of the whites were willing to vote for a black candidate for the presidency "if he displayed the necessary qualifications for this office"; in 1958, however, only 42 percent of all respondents were of this view. In 1977, 72 percent of the whites (in comparison to 49 percent in 1965) objected to the laws against miscegenation in some states. In 1978, 93 percent of the population (in comparison to 70 percent in 1956) felt that "blacks, just as whites, have the right to live where they want, and it is illegal to prevent them from moving into white neighborhoods." These data reflect changes in the white American mind, in which racial prejudices were cultivated for centuries.

Significant changes have also taken place in the views of the public, particularly the male half, on the status and role of women in society. In 1978, 81 percent of all respondents said they would vote for a woman for President if a suitable woman candidate were to run, in comparison to 32 percent in 1937 and 50 percent in 1949. A significant majority (72 percent in 1978) approved of the desire of women, even married women, to work (only 24 percent approved of this in 1945). But this approval has not yet taken the form of mass support for the Equal Rights Amendment to the national Constitution, which includes a stipulation concerning equal wages. Only 55 percent approve of this amendment at present. The support for this bill has even decreased in recent years--mainly as a result of high unemployment (66 percent were in favor of this amendment in 1976).

As the 1980 election approaches, politicians are wondering more about the political views of the voting public. After all, voters' attitudes must be taken into account when election slogans are invented. In political speeches and in bourgeois press articles, the opinion is frequently expressed that the nation is moving to the right, that a return to conservative ideals has succeeded the wave of antiwar protests, youth demonstrations and antiracist riots of the recent past. Consequently, politicians of rightist leanings are raising their heads and claiming voter support for their views.

In fact, however, there have been contradictory, far from simple or unequivocal, tendencies in the public mood. At the beginning of the 1970's, the antiwar movement declined after the end of the intervention in Vietnam. Black unrest also died down after the black population won some victories in the area of formal equality. The criticizing attitude of much of the population toward bourgeois society and its institutions, however, has not only failed to decline, but is even growing more pronounced. The only people who moved toward the right in America in these years were rightists to begin with. Frightened by the wave of social protest in past years, the rightists have become more active. And since it is precisely these people who own most of the media and channels of propaganda, their voices can now be heard above the rest. As a result, according to sociologist E. Ladd, "many observers of the American political scene began to believe that the nation was 'moving to the right,' and many politicians began to act as if this were really happening."

Another factor contributing to the arbitrary interpretation of the development of political attitudes in the nation is the difference in definitions of the very concepts "conservative" and "liberal," "right" and "left." In American politics, these concepts have never been clearly delineated, and their interpretation has changed repeatedly in recent decades. Many beliefs that were recently regarded as just short of sedition are now shared by the majority of the population. It is interesting, however, that according to the data of the Gallup Institute, 33 percent of all respondents call themselves conservatives in 1978, 24 percent said they were liberals and 43 percent described themselves as "moderates." The data of the Harris poll were 35, 21 and 45 percent respectively.

On the other hand, in spite of the typical conservative belief that the "free enterprise" system should "run itself," the majority of Americans are now in favor of government regulation of economic processes. Some 74 percent believe that the government should guarantee people jobs (62 percent in 1956); 81 percent feel that the government should finance medical assistance for the population (60 percent in 1956). A majority (57 percent as compared to 31 percent) even favors such an overt form of government intervention in the prerogatives of free enterprise as the institution of federal price and wage controls. But these views are inherently contradictory. When the question was phrased in more general terms—"Should the government regulate business activity?"--even many of those who called themselves liberals answered in the negative (a positive response was given by 49 percent of the liberals, 36 percent of the "moderates" and 27 percent of the conservatives). At the same time, those who called themselves conservatives expressed far from "conservative" views on some measures. For example, when respondents were asked whether the government should guarantee blacks equality in employment and housing, a positive answer was given by 79 percent of the liberals, 73 percent of the "moderates" and 67 percent of the conservatives.

General recognition of the injustice of the socioeconomic system is apparent. This is attested to by the responses to the following poll statements: "The rich get richer and the poor get poorer"--77 percent agreed in 1977 (45 percent in 1966); "Privileged groups get more from the government than the average citizen" (76 percent agreed); "The tax laws help the rich, and not the average citizen" (73 percent agreed); "Most of the people in elected positions are in politics to gain personal advantages" (65 percent agreed), and so forth.

The widespread sense of alienation from the socioeconomic system is accompanied by growing mistrust in the fundamental institutions of bourgeois society. Soon after the Watergate scandal, only 11 percent and 9 percent expressed a "high degree of trust" in the executive and legislative branches respectively. A great deal of time has gone by, but only 30 percent of the population now trusts these authorities.

In reference to the mood of the workers, General Secretary G. Hall of the Communist Party of the United States of America writes: "There is obvious anger, at times a sense of shattered hopes and confusion, but not a shift to the right." Noting the wave of mass demonstrations by the unemployed and by fighters for civil rights and the grand scales of the strike movement, G. Hall concludes: "Since all of this occurred within a period of a few months, it is clear that the shift is not to the right. These actions signal the beginning of a mounting enthusiasm for mass struggle."

The process of erosion in the public's trust in bourgeois institutions has also affected the two bourgeois parties. Here the basic tendency has been a decline in the number of Republicans over the last 30 years (from approximately 35 percent to 20-23 percent) and a rise in the number of "independent," who do not affiliate themselves with either party (from 20

percent to 30), with little change in the number of Democrats (45-48 percent).

This is also attested to by voter support for the candidates of the other party. This was noticed in the 1976 election and is anticipated in 1980. There has been a departure from the tradition of voting according to party affiliation; votes now depend more on the candidate's position on major issues.

Clear evidence of voter dissatisfaction with the existing two-party system can be seen in the increasing support for the idea of a third party. A Gallup study conducted in the summer of 1979 showed that 37 percent were in favor of its creation, while 48 percent disapproved.

An indication of voter dissatisfaction with the candidates of both bourgeois parties can be seen in the indifference to election results and the failure to vote. In the last election, around 47 percent of the voting public did not take part in electing the nation's President. The main reasons given for this were the following: "I did not like either candidate," "I have no interest in politics" and "It was too much trouble to register."

Foreign policy issues will occupy a significant place in the current campaign.

The negotiation of a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt aroused a great deal of interest in the United States from the very beginning. The personal involvement of the American President in these talks in the capacity of a mediator lent them a special air of drama. When the President announced at a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives in September 1978 that a peace had been negotiated, his popularity rose. According to public opinion polls, 56 percent of all respondents felt Carter was doing a good job after the decisive meeting of the three leaders (only 39 percent expressed this view prior to the meeting). After a few months had passed, however, many Americans realized that a separate bargain could not bring peace to the Middle East. According to a Gallup poll, at the end of March only 28 percent believed that "the agreement will result in lasting peace between Egypt and Israel"; 58 percent disagreed. The positive evaluation of the President's performance declined to 34 percent at the end of March, largely as a result of the change in public attitudes toward this agreement.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with China met with the approval of the Americans. The Chinese aggression against Vietnam, however, led to a definite cooling of attitudes toward the PRC: 47 percent of all respondents (as against 38 percent) felt that "China acted treacherously by first establishing good relations with the United States and then beginning a dangerous war in Vietnam." Therefore, even relations with China cannot serve the administration as a strong trump card in the coming election.

Given the present state of Soviet-American relations, the SALT II treaty will figure prominently in the Washington Administration's "service record" in the coming campaign.

The overwhelming majority of Americans invariably supported the SALT II negotiations. For the last 3 years, this support has steadily held at 75 percent. A poll of February 1979 was typical: 72 percent supported the signing of a treaty, and only 16 percent were against it. An overwhelming majority of 85 percent, as against 11 percent, felt that "now that the United States and Russia are capable of destroying one another with atomic weapons, it is vitally necessary for both countries to reach an agreement on nuclear arms limitation." Respondents also expressed the desire, however, for military corroboration of the fact that the treaty would aid in protecting U.S. security. According to the data of this poll, 65 percent of the respondents, as against 22 percent, agreed with the following statement: "If our military leaders and the heads of the Defense Department said that the SALT II treaty with the Russians is a good deal for us, the Senate should ratify this agreement." As we know, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the Department of Defense approved of the treaty, but some senators are still in no hurry to support it. Their position diverges from the prevailing opinion in the nation. The struggle between the supporters and opponents of the SALT II treaty is still gaining in intensity. The results of this struggle will indisputably affect the course of the campaign.

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TRENDS IN THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 71-80

[Article by N. I. Kistanov and R. A. Mishukova]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSC: 1803

THE SALT II DEBATE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 81-84

[Article by P. T. Podlesnyy]

[Text] The first stage of the discussion in the American Senate of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT II), signed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter at a meeting in Vienna, took place in two Senate committees--the Committee on Foreign Relations (from 9 July through 2 August) and the Committee on the Armed Services (from 23 July through 2 August). The discussion was resumed at the beginning of September, after the summer recess. The Senate Committee on Intelligence will also submit its conclusions on this treaty. In accordance with existing U.S. legislation, when the hearings are concluded, the Committee on Foreign Relations will recommend that the Senate approve or disapprove the ratification of the SALT II treaty. The Committee on the Armed Services, on the other hand, does not have the power to make such recommendations and will only submit a summary of its hearings to the Senate. After this, the treaty will be discussed by the entire Senate and will be voted on at the end of November.

When he opened the hearings, Chairman F. Church of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations requested his colleagues to approach the issuance of a verdict on the SALT II treaty as responsibly as possible. "The implications of SALT," he said, "are quite tangible. The committee's decision could affect the way in which billions of American tax dollars are spent. It is even more important that our decision in regard to the treaty could seriously contribute to the success or failure of more encompassing efforts to stabilize Soviet-American relations."¹

The discussion of an agreement of such importance to both nations and to lasting world peace aroused tremendous interest in the United States and other countries. Suffice it to say that around 30 authoritative representatives of the administration and American political, military and scientific circles testified during the 4 weeks of hearings in both

Senate committees, stating their views on the significance of SALT II for U.S. security and the future development of Soviet-American relations. An examination of these views indicates that there is a fairly complex alignment of forces, either favoring the ratification of the treaty or against it, in the American Senate and in U.S. political circles in general.

The opponents of SALT II are mainly trying to prove that this treaty is "unfair" to the American side, that the United States was "too soft during the negotiations" and so forth. This was precisely the stand taken at the hearings by the heads of the Committee on the Present Danger, P. Nitze and W. Rostow, retired military men E. Roney, E. Zumwalt, T. Moorer and others, and Senators H. Jackson, J. Tower and B. Goldwater.

For example, P. Nitze said that "peace without SALT might be better than peace with SALT, since this would force America to seriously strive to always stay ahead of the Russians." Rostow expressed himself quite frankly also, stressing that he would applaud the rejection of SALT II by the Senate if this step were to be accompanied by a "new offensive line" in U.S. foreign and military policy. The opponents of the SALT II treaty are demanding the addition of certain amendments that would actually signify a revision of many central provisions of the agreement and its protocol. An example of this can be seen in the "amendments" (for example, the one proposed by Republican Senator J. Garn from Utah and P. Nitze) which would presuppose the inclusion of a Soviet bomber, called "Backfire" in the United States, in the strategic arms level agreed upon, the authorization of the United States to deploy land- and sea-based winged missiles with a range of 1,500 miles, and so forth. Senator G. Hart (Democrat, Colorado) has admitted that the opponents of SALT II "hope to bring about the failure of the treaty by introducing amendments."

The SALT II debate is demonstrating that there are still some individuals in the United States who will not openly oppose the treaty--or, what is more likely, feel it would be unwise to reject it--but are nonetheless trying to make the ratification of the treaty conditional upon the further buildup of U.S. military strength and changes in Soviet policy in certain parts of the world. This view was expressed in similar statements by former Supreme Ally Commander of NATO Forces in Europe A. Haig and former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, as well as H. Sonnenfeldt, State Department adviser under the Nixon and Ford administrations.

"The refusal to ratify a treaty drawn up at the end of 7 years of negotiation," Kissinger said at the hearings, "would undermine confidence throughout the world in our ability to know what is good for us and to achieve harmony between different branches of government." He also recommended that the Senate approve the treaty only after the administration has submitted a program for the further buildup of U.S. military potential to Congress, and before the end of the current session, and stipulated that this program should envisage the accelerated development of the MX and Trident-2 strategic systems and systems of tactical nuclear weapons,

reinforce the U.S. military presence in several parts of the world and accelerate the modernization of the American Navy.²

The acceptance of this condition would actually signify an increase of 7-8 billion dollars a year in the U.S. defense budget. The authors of these ideas are obviously trying to use the debate as a pretext for a new round in the arms race. Besides this, some of the advocates of "connecting" the ratification of SALT II with a more intense arms race are obviously motivated by temporary political factors related to the new election campaign in the United States and totally unrelated to detente and the curbing of the arms race.

The supporters of the treaty believe that the significance of this document should be assessed on its own merits, and not in connection with other, unrelated issues. These views were expressed by Senators E. Kennedy, G. Hart, F. Church, J. Culver, J. Biden and others, as well as prominent American political figures J. Smith, P. Warnke and A. Johnson, who all headed the American SALT delegation at different times (the first two were also directors of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).

Smith, in particular, discussed a number of ways in which the rejection of the treaty could have a negative effect on U.S. relations with NATO allies. According to Smith, given the present instability of relations with allies, "the rejection of this treaty would endanger economic and political cooperation and the coordination of military policy. The prestige, influence and leading role of the United States in the world would suffer greatly." He advised against the introduction of amendments to the treaty and called for its ratification and the quickest possible commencement of talks "on the extensive reduction of armed forces."³

"The treaty," stressed, in particular, Senator E. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts), "will strengthen the security of the United States and its allies, reduce the danger of nuclear war and begin the process of establishing genuine control over nuclear armaments."⁴ Former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, prominent figure in the Democratic Party A. Harriman, declared that the SALT II treaty would serve as a basis for greater stability in relations between the USSR and the United States. "There are many areas," he said, "in which we are vitally interested and on which the ratification of the SALT II treaty will have a positive effect."

Nevertheless, some supporters of the treaty want to include several "reservations" or "explications" in the Senate resolution of consent to the ratification. These would not require any change in the text of the treaty, but they would set forth the Senate's interpretation of some of its provisions. For example, Chairman F. Church of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Democrat, Idaho) and J. Javits, a member of this committee (Republican, New York), declared their intention to introduce several "reservations" or "explications" which, in particular, would stipulate that nothing in the treaty or the protocol to the treaty would

affect the existing forms of cooperation between the United States and its allies or interfere with the development of this kind of cooperation in the "modernization" of NATO weapons, and that the protocol to the treaty (in whole or in part) can only be renewed by two-thirds of a Senate quorum. Similar or identical proposals in regard to "reservations" were made by other senators, particularly C. Percy G. Hart and J. Biden, as well as Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd. Obviously, these proposals reflected the attempts of their initiators to "reconcile" Senate support of the SALT II treaty with U.S. plans to deploy new weapons systems.

It should also be noted that there was some criticism of the treaty by the "liberal" wing of the Senate and representatives of the American scientific community, who, so to speak, lost sight of reality and possibility by accusing both Washington and Moscow of a reluctance to immediately agree to the more comprehensive limitation of strategic weapons. This opinion was expressed by R. Barnet, former director of the Washington Institute for Policy Studies, Chairman J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists, and Senators G. McGovern, W. Proxmire, M. Hatfield and A. Stevenson.

The supporters of arms race de-escalation, however, should have been aware that, in the first place, this issue--as Washington's reaction to concrete Soviet proposals demonstrated--will depend primarily on the United States and, in the second place, that the SALT II treaty cannot solve all problems of strategic arms limitation at once, much less the arms race as a whole. There is no question, however, that it will serve as an obstacle in the most dangerous sphere--the nuclear missile sphere. As P. Warnke stressed in his speech, he would also have preferred that the treaty envisage "stricter limits on nuclear weapons," but "it turned out to be impossible to conclude a more far-reaching treaty at this time."

Leading administration figures also submitted convincing arguments in support of the treaty. They noted that the Senate's failure to approve the treaty would have a negative effect on Soviet-American relations as a whole, would lead to an additional increase in U.S. military spending and the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, would arouse a negative response from the United States' allies, and would cause the world public to regard the United States as an enemy of detente and arms limitation.

If the SALT II treaty is not ratified, said U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, the new round in the arms race will cost the United States at least another 30 billion dollars. He stressed that the treaty would guarantee greater stability and that "its fulfillment will be subject to control."⁵

Secretary of State C. Vance said that the enactment of the SALT II treaty will "clear the way for further arms limitation talks." He stated that it would be unrealistic to hope to modify the treaty in favor of the United States at this time by means of amendments and stipulations, and asked the senators to "refrain from emotional outbursts that can only

obscure the real issues." Vance stressed that the Senate's decision will have a direct and important effect on the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Without SALT," he said, "we will face the prospect of unlimited rivalry and seriously increased tension in American-Soviet relations." In connection with this, he confirmed the administration's desire to "move ahead in those areas of American-Soviet relations where cooperation can benefit both sides, particularly with respect to lightening the burden and alleviating the danger arising from the existence of nuclear weapons." Vance also remarked that "the failure of SALT II can cast a dark...shadow on the entire range of East-West relations."⁶

Director J. Seignius of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency discussed the SALT issue in relation to other disarmament problems. Although the ratification of the SALT II treaty will not necessarily lead to progress in other arms limitation talks, he said, its failure will almost certainly cause irreversible harm. Moreover, this would undermine efforts to reach an agreement in such areas as nuclear non-proliferation, the total and universal banning of nuclear tests, the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe and the banning of "antisatellite" weapons.

In a written message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, read 11 July by its chairman, Air Force General D. Jones, the SALT II treaty was called a step which "is in the national interest of the United States and deserves the support" of the Senate.

When the hearings on the SALT II treaty were resumed on 6 September in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the opponents of detente and arms race curtailment made a more vigorous effort to sabotage or complicate its ratification. They submitted new excuses for their attacks on the treaty. In particular, they tried to "associate" the question of treaty approval with the artificially exaggerated problem of the "Soviet combat units" in Cuba, as was done, for example, by Senator J. Garn when he spoke to the committee on 19 September.

Criticism of the treaty and demands for the more intensive "modernization of American strategic forces" for the purpose of "re-establishing American superiority" were voiced by Congressmen W. Fish and R. Bauman, the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb E. Teller, the former head of one of the most conservative organizations in the United States--the "American Legion"--J. Carey, former Director F. Ikle of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others.

Recent events also testify that the actions taken by the opponents of improved Soviet-American relations have left their mark, are poisoning the political atmosphere in the United States over SALT II and are urging the nation toward escalation of the arms race.

Statements in support of the treaty and its ratification were made during the second stage of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations by many prominent social, political and religious spokesmen and representatives of the U.S. business and scientific communities, particularly

Control Data Vice-President R. Schmidt, president of the Committee for East-West Accord; co-Chairman G. Scoville of New Directions (he stressed that if the treaty should be rejected, real security would be lessened for the United States and the nation would be less able to deal with current crucial economic and political problems); and Harvard University Professor S. Hoffman (he noted the totally unsound and "unproductive" nature of attempts to "associate" the treaty with other issues). Ratification of the treaty was advocated by Stanford University Professor W. Panofsky (it "is in the vital interest of the United States" and would make it possible to move "to a qualitatively higher level of negotiations within the SALT III framework"); and D. Pease, J. Seiberling and P. Simon, representing Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, who also objected to the attempts being made by some circles in the United States to make the ratification of the treaty conditional upon the administration's promise to increase the Pentagon budget each year. Support for the treaty was expressed by Congressmen J. Bingham, T. Downey and R. Carr.

Nonetheless, the SALT II treaty is still the object of fierce intrapolitical struggle in the United States. In addition, the administration's conduct is revealing a clear and steady tendency to give in to the pressure exerted by the forces that are making consent to ratify the treaty conditional upon increased U.S. military spending.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The SALT II Treaty," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pt I, Washington, 1979, pp 82-83.
2. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 August 1979.
3. "The SALT II Treaty," pt II, pp 11-12.
4. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 July 1979.
5. "The SALT II Treaty," pt I, p 99.
6. Ibid., p 93.

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WORLD POLITICAL SCIENCE CONGRESS IN MOSCOW

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pp 85-90

[Interviews of Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, Herbert Aptheker, Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt by V. A. Voyna]

[Text] The 11th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, held in Moscow this August, brought 1,600 scientists from 58 countries together and was the largest gathering in history of social scientists from states with different social structures.

Our correspondent V. A. Voyna asked a few who attended the congress to answer the questions of this magazine's editors: How would you evaluate the results of the 11th Congress of the International Political Science Association? What are your views on international cooperation by scientists working in this field? What role do you believe the political sciences play in the world today?

Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, prominent Soviet philosopher and sociologist, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and member of several foreign academies

'The Great Responsibility of Scientists'

In our day, the need for international cooperation by scientists is particularly great. This need is dictated by the fact that it is now more necessary than ever before to unite the efforts of all people for the attainment of a single goal--the preservation and consolidation of peace and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. It is on this that the exercise of the primary human right depends--the right to live. Scientists can do a great deal in this area. Modern science can and should play a significant role in determining the fate of mankind; the authoritative voice of the scientist, which is listened to by the broadest segments of the public, including social scientists who are engaged in the direct study

of the processes of mankind's social development, is becoming an important factor in the progress toward this goal. The responsibility of the scientist is particularly great at present, now that mankind is living in an era of transition--an era marked by the combined effects of massive social revolution and technological revolution.

The Moscow world congress of the International Political Science Association was of particular significance in the establishment of this kind of cooperation.

It was an anniversary congress, marking the 30th year of the association's existence, and it is noteworthy that one of the main topics of discussion at the congress was "The Policy of Peace." We are particularly pleased that this topic was discussed at an anniversary congress, and even more pleased that this took place in Moscow, the originating site of productive initiatives in favor of universal peace and security. At the congress, this topic was examined from various vantage points, from the most diverse ideological and political positions. In particular, the development of political and legal safeguards of world peace and international security and the search for common principles and a common "technology" of international cooperation were discussed.

A further shift in the international climate away from cold war and toward mutually beneficial cooperation will necessitate that the tradition of political thinking in terms of confrontation be overcome. Scientists must strive to replace hostile stereotypes with concepts that will accurately describe and actively promote the acceleration and intensification of positive process in international life. We attach particular significance in this activity to the all-out opposition of propaganda theories and ideas that justify the arms race in one way or another and prevent the consolidation of businesslike and mutually beneficial relations between countries.

The very fact that the policy of peace was discussed at the congress of the International Political Science Association proved that this policy conforms to widespread political and scientific interests in the scientific community. It is not surprising that our discussions revealed an entire spectrum of differing and sometimes contradictory views on this matter. The political and theoretical positions of the participants were naturally dissimilar. The diversity of today's world was reflected at the congress.

But something else was remarkable: The need for detente in today's world was not denied by anyone, at least not openly. The search for more effective ways of achieving world peace and security was discussed. Some views on this matter were, in our opinion, more realistic, pointing out reliable and direct avenues to peace. Other approaches, we feel, were not completely in line with the reality of international relations and lost sight of the need for the effective resolution of world problems. On the whole, however, we believe that there was a strong urge to compare scientific views and to achieve mutual understanding with experts with a

different outlook and political position, and precisely from the vantage point of the vital need for peace. Here, it seems to me, we discerned, and in some cases quite clearly, some common views on the chief objectives of political science in this field.

All other important topics in the congress program were also indissolubly connected with the problem of peace. Would it be possible, for example, to discuss the policy of peace without taking the role of the developing states into consideration? The political problems of the developing states are of great theoretical interest, not to mention the fact that they must be interpreted for practical needs. The same can be said of the problems of underdevelopment, demography, ecology, energy and others that are generally called global issues; they will unconditionally demand concerted effort on the part of all mankind, lasting peace and international cooperation.

It is extremely noteworthy that discussion of the problems of the young liberated states and developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America was given a prominent place in the work of the congress. This was absolutely correct, because the substantial economic and political reforms that are taking place in many of these countries and are aimed at the consolidation of independence, the reconstruction of underdeveloped social structures and struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and imperialist dictates are fundamentally changing the appearance of today's world and the entire system of international relations. At the congress, we witnessed the further development and reinforcement of a qualitatively new field of political science, connected with the study of these problems, and a particularly important role here was played by scientists from the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

The significance of the special sessions on Marxist-Leninist methodology in the social sciences deserves special mention. This is why I am particularly pleased to report the interest displayed by congress participants who attended the discussion group on "Lenin as a Political Thinker" and sessions on the development of Marxist political analysis and the topic "Marx and Weber."

Today the future of mankind depends more than ever before on the determination of people to defend the cause of peace. This naturally imposes great obligations on states, political parties, their leaders and all of those who lay the groundwork for the course of politics and largely determine the fate of today's world--that is, scientists engaged in the study of political problems.

There is not a single serious political phenomenon today that can be successfully studied without the collective efforts of sociologists, philosophers, historians, economists, jurists, psychologists and experts in other spheres of social knowledge. This is natural, and this tendency toward integration, which was vividly demonstrated at the congress, also prevails in our social sciences.

The subject matter of the political sciences, in our opinion, is the interrelation of large human communities and their related forms of organization and human life (as a reminder, I will note that according to V. I. Lenin's definition, politics represent the relations between classes, nations and states). Naturally, political studies take in not only the interrelations of these large human communities, but also the civic status of individuals and their political associations within these communities. How can the organization and functioning of the political system and its elements be optimized, how can political sophistication be developed for the easier and quicker involvement of individuals in the management of public affairs, how can the realization of their legal interests be promoted and how can these interests be harmoniously combined?

The theoretical thinking of Soviet scientists is aimed at the resolution of these important problems. This is why the exchange of opinions by the most prominent representatives of political science, held in Moscow, was extremely useful and a source of mutual enrichment for all who attended the 11th World Congress of the International Political Science Association. The Moscow congress, representing a stage in the development of political science, will give rise to new formulations of scientific problems for a long time and will stimulate the further advancement of this branch of the social sciences. In his welcoming message to congress participants, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev noted the great role of science, including political science, in the historical fate of mankind, and pointed out science's responsibility for the future. We can definitely say that the constructive spirit of the congress completely corresponded to this great mission of political science.

Herbert Aptheker, prominent American scientist and director of the American Institute of Marxist Studies

'An Extremely Educative Experience!'

The fate of mankind will be tremendously dependent on politics.

Although the individual's range of interests is extremely varied (it includes the family, children, artistic enjoyment and strictly personal inclinations), his existence will ultimately depend on the nature of the state in which he lives, the nature of this state's relations with other countries and the condition of the international community of states as a whole. It is completely obvious that politics and the study of politics by scientific methods are exceptionally important, particularly in our age of technological revolution, an era of such tremendous increase in the power of modern weapons; today the very existence of the human race depends on the intelligent settlement of political disagreements. This is the reason for the exceptional significance of political science, which has become one of the most important fields of science.

In light of the above, it is easy to evaluate the significance of the 11th World Conference of the International Political Science Association. It is not surprising that the international forum of political scientists in Moscow had tremendous repercussions. It was the first gathering attended by so many political scientists from so many countries on all continents of the world. These countries represent virtually all existing forms of social organization (with the exception, naturally, of overtly fascist and racist regimes, such as in Chile or South Africa), which in itself is a noteworthy achievement. If we also consider that the political scientists from so many states of such different social structures gathered in Moscow, in the nation of the world's first socialist state, the historical significance of this meeting can be evaluated in full. After all, this event was a graphic illustration of an extremely important ideal--the peaceful coexistence of fundamentally different systems. The political scientists were able to find a common language, the language of science, despite all existing differences.

Naturally, the congress did not in any sense signify that the ideological struggle between the different social systems had died down. The scientists who came to Moscow argued with one another, they freely expressed their views, which were frequently divergent, they naturally submitted the most varied viewpoints for discussion, and while some changed their views under the influence of conclusive arguments, others did not. But the main feature of the congress was that no one imposed his views on anyone else, which is how discussions should always take place in the international arena. The congress provided an example of how the most urgent and complex issues, marked by greatly diverging views, can be argued in a civilized and even, I would say, refined manner. It was an extremely educative experience! Something of this kind must be instituted in the international arena: Considering the devastating power of modern weapons of mass destruction, it is impermissible to resort to force or to violence for the settlement of disputes. Each nation should decide its fate in accordance with its own wishes.

We political scientists are obligated to contribute, by means of intelligent discussion and joint scientific work, to the achievement of peace on earth and to strive for the universal triumph of the spirit of goodwill that reigned at our Moscow meeting.

Karl Deutsch, president of the International Political Science Association (1976-1979) and professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Yale University and Harvard University

'Fruitful Cooperation by Political Scientists'

First I will restrict myself to the historical boundaries of one nation--the United States of America--in my response to the editors' question.

The 200 years of this state's development would have been unthinkable without the contribution made by political scientists. Men like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the founders of the state and the authors of

its constitution, had an excellent knowledge of the political theories of their time and were rightly regarded as outstanding representatives of this science. I will list a few other names. In our century, a president of the American Political Science Association, Woodrow Wilson, was elected President of the United States. When John Kennedy was at Harvard University, he majored in political science. American Vice-President Hubert Humphrey was a professor of political science. Such prominent diplomats and closest advisers of the last and current presidents as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Marshall Shulman also taught political science before they moved up to jobs in public administration. This list could be continued.

As for the role of political scientists in society today, we scientists are just like all other citizens, but in contrast to the overwhelming majority of others, we must know more about politics, pay more attention to current events and formulate our views as a result of the study and summarization of huge quantities of information. Sometimes our view is one that will only become general opinion at some time in the future, a view that will be taken up by the average citizen of tomorrow. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that ordinary individuals are sometimes wiser than politicians and scientists. But after all, people need information and a sober assessment of events, and we have a huge responsibility in this respect. Furthermore, the influence of political scientists is not limited to the formation of public opinion, but is also quite considerable in the decision-making process.

For example, the fact that at least eight out of every ten political scientists in the United States regarded the Vietnam war as a tragic mistake played a significant role in stopping this war (the first war the United States had to stop because of public pressure). I personally felt this way about it from the very beginning, as soon as it started. In April 1965, I signed the famous message from 65 scientists to the American scientific community, demanding an end to the war in Vietnam because it was not in the U.S. interest. Five years later, when I was the president of the American Political Science Association, I wrote a letter, which was published in the NEW YORK TIMES, demanding that the war be ended. The appeal was also signed by seven former presidents of the association.

Naturally, political scientists have various aims and views, including conservative ones, but on the whole we adhere to liberal convictions. Most of us opposed, and still oppose, fascism and the suppression of civil rights and freedoms, whether by the Somoza regime in Nicaragua or by the Pinochet regime in Chile or in other countries. We are in favor of detente and stronger friendship and mutual understanding between countries with different social structures. We certainly support the limitation of strategic weapons and the SALT II treaty signed in Vienna by the leaders of the United States and USSR. As for relations between our two great powers, we feel it is more important today than ever before that each side avoid any action that might intimidate the other side or diminish mutual trust.

Returning once again to my own experience, I will cite another example to illustrate the way in which political scientists influence the decisions made on important international issues of the day.

In the 1960's, I headed a group of experts assigned by the State Department to investigate the possibility of creating so-called multinational nuclear forces and equipping West Germany with nuclear weapons. We experts unequivocally said that this idea was not promising. The idea has been dead for a long time now and no one ever gives it any serious thought today, but at that time this decision could have become a reality. There is no need to exaggerate the significance of our efforts at that time, but we did play some part in burying these plans.

Now I can talk about the Moscow world congress of the International Political Science Association. It was tremendously successful. First of all, I should say that the congress confirmed the productivity of cooperation by political scientists from countries with different social structures. I would even say that our meeting was a turning point in the establishment and reinforcement of international cooperation by political scientists: It was only at this current congress that such a large group of scientists from the socialist and developing countries took part in the work of the International Political Science Association. I am certain that this co-operation will be developed successfully from now on.

The success of our gathering would have been unthinkable without the marvelous work performed by the Soviet organizers of the congress. In particular, some of the questions raised were of an extremely delicate nature, such as the question of congress participation by scientists from countries with which the USSR does not have diplomatic relations. The organizers of the meeting assured us that all of these difficulties would be overcome, and this promise was unconditionally kept: All of the political scientists who decided to come were not only permitted to participate fully in the work of the congress, but were even given an opportunity after the congress to join a number of travel groups for a fascinating tour of the Soviet Union and learn about the life of your people.

This is why we were particularly happy that the 11th congress of the International Political Science Association was held in the USSR, in Moscow. The establishment of healthy contacts between our scientists and the scientists of your country, other socialist countries and the developing states will be necessary and productive. This has given all of us not only an opportunity to exchange views, but also to be intellectually enriched. We will leave with a feeling of the warmest affection for your people.

Richard Merritt, member of the executive committee of the International Political Science Association and professor at the University of Illinois

'What People Think About Today...'

When we discuss the role of the political scientist today and the significance of the work of scientists in this field, we must bear the following in mind. Our world is being torn apart by increasingly complex and intense

conflicts, which practically can only be reasonably resolved by political means. Naturally, the current universal "political orientation" has given rise throughout the world to an increasing demand for specialists who can understand these conflicts and find the appropriate ways of settling them on the basis of scientific knowledge, and who are capable of developing the necessary scientific methods. Scientists have already achieved a great deal in this field: We have learned to examine political processes in sufficient depth, we have developed the necessary instruments for recognition and analysis and we are now able to describe historical events (past or present) with the aid of quantitative assessment methods and by employing and constructing extremely complex mathematical and lexical models; these models help us to forecast the future development of events and processes. Therefore, the responsibilities of the political scientists consist in investigation, the acquisition of the necessary information and ideas, the dissemination of this information and these ideas to theoreticians in the academic community and to practicing politicians and, finally, the education of students, who must learn to work with the existing methodology and develop new ideas and methods of investigation.

This explains the significance of political science as a science.

Now I will discuss the results of the international congress held in Moscow.

This congress presented a unique opportunity for scientists from nations with different social structures and different social aims to meet and discuss current problems. This chance to learn what people are thinking about today and how they feel about the cardinal issues of our time probably could not have been offered by any other scientific congress convened by any other scientific association. The Moscow meeting was significant not only because it was the largest international conference in all the years since political science became a science, but also, and primarily, because it was held for the first time in the capital of a socialist state; scientists from the West, the East and the developing countries were able to learn, in detail, all current views on issues of universal concern in the world today.

It is in this that I see the historic significance of the Moscow political science congress. Its participants were able to broaden the horizons of scientific thinking and simultaneously supplement their own knowledge of concepts. And the kind of cooperation between scientists that took place during the congress will most probably be useful to us in the future and will become an excellent basis for future meetings and practical work to establish scientific fact. In this sense, the congress was an excellent stimulus and it set the tone for success at the next international gathering, which will be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1982.

UNITED STATES-SOUTHEAST ASIA: 'NEW' APPROACH?

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 91-93

[Article by I. N. Shcherbakov]

[Text] After Beijing's military and political failure in Vietnam, Washington policy placed more emphasis on the buildup of American military strength in this area and more emphasis on anticommunism.

Washington is taking steps to increase the military potential of some ASEAN countries,¹ including the Philippines and Thailand. Thailand has been promised, according to a report in NEWSWEEK, an additional 6 million dollars for the purchase of U.S. weapons and the right to use American military equipment, worth 11.3 million, that has been left there. In addition, plans are being drawn up for the creation of a fifth American fleet, with the Indian Ocean zone included in its sphere of activity. The administration's emphasis on the reinforcement of U.S. military and strategic positions in Southeast Asia, its refusal to normalize relations with the SRV and its economic and commercial boycott of this country are being depicted as a new approach to countries in this area, allegedly dictated by the U.S. interests.

Debates over the "new" U.S. approach to Southeast Asia have been going on in American scientific literature and the press for more than a year. The entire spectrum of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia was subjected to serious analysis in several articles published even before the exacerbation of the situation in Indochina and the launching of Chinese aggression against the SRV. The authors of some articles advise Washington to adhere to a more flexible line and to not rely on force as the deciding factor.

Professor B. Gordon, for example, in an article published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, calls the lack of balance in the military and political-economic components of American foreign policy the main reason for the decline of U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. "Until recently," he remarks, "the U.S. presence in the Pacific was felt in many spheres: politics, trade, investments, education, culture and defense. Now the role of the United States

is perceptibly declining in the majority of these spheres."² Only military assistance, the author points out, is still being given primary consideration. The American researcher also notes that the United States, despite all officially declared desires for "military disengagement," is still maintaining its military presence in this zone on a high level. This, in Gordon's opinion, is seriously disrupting the balance of American foreign policy and weakening U.S. economic positions in Southeast Asia.

Gordon is particularly disturbed by the possibility that Southeast Asia is becoming the main object of Japanese trade and economic expansion (his conclusions are based on the following facts: Japanese private investments in Southeast Asia totaled 4.5 billion dollars between 1951 and 1977, the volume of Japanese trade with just the ASEAN countries was equivalent to 14 billion dollars in 1976, and so forth).³

In turn, the increasingly imbalanced nature of American policy in this area is causing the United States' allies, especially Japan, to lose confidence in the future role of the United States in Southeast Asia.

Gordon's disclosure of the "vulnerable spots" in U.S. policy in Southeast Asia as a whole is made to point out the need to restore its "balance" and heighten its effectiveness. In his opinion, the search for a new approach to these objectives should take two directions--the reinforcement of the American-Japanese partnership and the closer coordination of the economic and military elements of U.S. policy in the region.

When American experts analyze this policy, they give considerable attention to U.S. relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The same B. Gordon, for example, in the abovementioned article, favors a policy of "ignoring" the SRV and insists that the question of the normalization of relations with Vietnam is already "not very important." The emphasis here is on attempts to discredit SRV policy in Southeast Asia. He asserts, for example, that the SRV "has no interest in starting a new era in relations with its neighbors."

The incongruity of this thesis is particularly noticeable when viewed against the background of SRV Premier Pham Van Dong's successful visit to the ASEAN countries in the fall of 1978, during the course of which Vietnam's interest in mutually beneficial regional cooperation with the ASEAN countries was underscored.

Gordon's views are not shared by all representatives of the American scientific establishment. In particular, F. Weinstein, head of a Stanford University program for the study of American-Japanese relations, expressed his disagreement with Gordon's position in the same magazine--FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Weinstein believes that "there is a serious need to normalize relations with Vietnam and to offer it limited forms of assistance."⁴ According to the

author, Washington's position in regard to Vietnam is considerably affected by the lack of a precise conceptual basis in U.S. policy in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, and an inability to take new realities in the region into account after the failure in Vietnam. But the main reason for the ineffectiveness of this policy, according to this author, is the absence of a truly new U.S. approach to the countries of Southeast Asia. In his view, "realistic adaptation to the new era will require a new concept of security that goes beyond the present emphasis on U.S. commitments and military alliances and places more emphasis on economic and diplomatic interrelations."

In this context, relations with Vietnam acquire particular importance. According to Weinstein's prediction, a "multilateral system of alliances" should be anticipated in this region, characterized, in his opinion, by "interlocking relations, which will bind communist and noncommunist countries together on various issues."⁵ Strictly speaking, this thesis is nothing other than a belated recognition of a process that has already begun in the development of relations between the socialist countries of Indochina and ASEAN. The American author stresses that the existence of mutual understanding between the ASEAN countries and the Indochinese states will serve as a basic guarantee of "the best possible security prospects in Southeast Asia."⁶

It should be noted that a recognition of the constructive nature of socialist Vietnam's foreign policy with respect to cooperation with the ASEAN countries is an important part of F. Weinstein's position. After analyzing tendencies and moods in government and public circles in the ASEAN countries, the author concludes that "Vietnam's attitudes toward its neighbors are peaceful to the highest degree." Weinstein cites numerous facts to refute Gordon's thesis of the allegedly "unconstructive" nature of Vietnamese policy in the region. Moreover, "the opinion that closer relations with Vietnam are important for safeguarding security and stability throughout Southeast Asia," Weinstein remarks, "is more than the 'idee fixe' of Japan and some Washington officials. It is the opinion of the majority of ASEAN leaders."⁷

The need for a new U.S. approach to the countries of Southeast Asia and a realistic assessment of the situation in this region is also acknowledged by S. Simon, dean of the University of Arizona Political Science Department. In a number of magazine articles, he refutes the traditional thesis of American propaganda that the SRV is allegedly threatening countries in this region and expresses the opinion that the prevailing tendency here is the increasing desire for peaceful cooperation and the de-emphasizing of the military-political aspects of ASEAN activity. This, in his opinion, will necessitate substantial adjustments in the Southeast policy of Washington in line with these trends.⁸

Washington's actual conduct in Southeast Asia, however, proves that it still has no intention of making constructive changes in its foreign policy line.

FOOTNOTES

1. ASEAN--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the members of which are the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. For a more detailed discussion, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 10, 1978--Editor's note.
2. B. Gordon, "Japan, the United States and Southeast Asia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1978, p 581.
3. Ibid., p 583.
4. F. Weinstein, "U.S.-Vietnam Relations and the Security of Southeast Asia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1978, p 843.
5. Ibid., p 844.
6. Ibid., p 846.
7. Ibid., p 851.
8. See, for example, S. Simon, "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation," ORBIS, summer 1978, p 418.

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CSO: 1803

'THE SENATOR FROM BOEING'...AND FROM THE MAFIA?

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 93-94

[Article by V. M. Gevorgyan]

[Text] The 23 April 1979 issue of SPOTLIGHT, an American magazine, contained information attesting to an old and close relationship between the American Mafia and one of the most vigorous revivers of the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and a zealous "fighter for human rights" anywhere but in the United States, the notorious "Senator from Boeing," Henry Jackson, who represents the interests of the military-industrial complex and the Zionists in the Senate.

According to the magazine, this dishonorable organization went a long way toward financing Jackson's re-election to the Senate--at least in 1976. An investigation of the sources of Jackson's campaign financing at that time showed that large campaign contributions were made by a certain Art Marshall, a man named Herbert Russo and the publisher of a newspaper in Las Vegas, the "gambling capital" of the United States, Hank Greenspan. All three are closely connected with the gambling business.

Furthermore, Jackson used his position in the Senate to help a certain J. Malone evade prosecution. Malone, who once served as an adviser to the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence (the chairman at that time was the selfsame Jackson), made an attempt to delete the names of such famous Mafiosi as prominent Mafia member Meyer Lansky, "father" of one of the Mafia "families" Santo Trafficante and union racketeer Anthony Scotto, from the materials of the subcommittee investigating organized crime. Henry Jackson quickly covered up the Malone affair by declaring that the accusations against him were slanderous.

Jackson continued to give Malone paternal protection later, when he became chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. He immediately appointed Malone special counsel to the committee.

At one time, reporters from the NBC Television Broadcasting Corporation also took an interest in Malone's shady dealings. In Florida, they interviewed local municipal officials Lloyd House and John Weymayer, who had already informed SPOTLIGHT magazine of the intrigues of Jackson's protege. The reporters dredged up additional information and even interviewed Malone himself. Soon afterward, NBC broadcasted this program, but... no mention was made of Malone or Jackson.

What happened? According to SPOTLIGHT, someone obligingly warned Jackson about the coming broadcast. The senator was terrified at first, but he later flew into a savage frenzy. He called NBC president Fred Silverman and threatened to use all of his influence to disrupt the normal operations of the network. He unashamedly even accused NBC of engaging in a McCarthy-type "witch hunt." As a result, some pieces of footage disappeared from the program: As for example, a still of Jackson with the abovementioned Anthony Scotto.

Who is this Scotto? He is a Brooklyn union boss and the vice president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union of the East Coast. It was known as early as 1969 that he was a member of the "family" headed by Gambino, which controls the Brooklyn and Staten Island docks. Scotto is married to a relative of famous—now departed—gangster Albert Anastasia, who was called the "lord high executioner." At the beginning of this year, the grand jury accused Scotto of taking bribes, racketeering and tax evasion. According to SPOTLIGHT, Scotto accepted a bribe of \$300,000 from a group of businessmen in 1978.

A man named Gary Baudich testified that Scotto, in turn, had turned over \$400,000 to one of Meyer Lansky's assistants for services rendered. The abovementioned Malone "did not feel it was necessary" to subpoena Scotto. What is more, Malone even tried to force Baudich to delete this testimony from his statement to the subcommittee.

Another close friend of Senator Jackson, Sam Friedman, is also closely connected with the Mafia. He is the owner of the Diplomat Hotel in Miami (Florida). According to SPOTLIGHT, the Diplomat has long been a haven for "high-level" Mafia members. At one time, it was even the home of Joey Gallo, one of the heads of the New York Mafia who was killed several years ago in one of the bloody battles between the gangs.

The information published in SPOTLIGHT removes all doubt that the "fighter for justice" and for the "national interest of America," Senator Henry Jackson, has not shied away in the least from "business" ties with the Mafia, has eagerly accepted political support from its bosses and has done everything within his power to protect the Mafiosi when the authorities try to conduct criminal investigations.

This is an interesting footnote to the portrait of the "typical American politician," as Senator Henry Jackson loves to be seen by Americans, is it not?

THE EXECUTION OF CHARLES HORMAN; AN AMERICAN SACRIFICE

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 95-105**

[Second installment of Russian translation of sections from the book "The Execution of Charles Horman; an American Sacrifice" by Thomas Hauser, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc., New York, 1978]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

MODELING OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 106-113

[Article by Yu. A. Ushanov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

BOOK REVIEWS

Post-Mao PRC Economy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 114-116

[Review by A. A. Nagornyy and A. B. Parkanskiy of the book "Chinese Economy Post-Mao," vol 1, "Policy and Performance," Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, XXVI plus 880 pages]

[Text] The normalization of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing was preceded by lively debates by U.S. scholars and politicians over various aspects of American policy toward the PRC. One of the main directions taken by these debates was the attempt of politicians to look into China's future, thoroughly assess its current economic and strategic potential and determine the prospects for its development.

The most significant U.S. achievement in the forecasting of China's economic prospects was a special study compiled by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. In addition, 37 experts from the United States, Great Britain, Canada and Sweden also took part in compiling the work. The report was published in November 1978 and, consequently, did not reflect certain changes that took place in China's approach to economic construction and foreign economic ties after the normalization of relations with Washington. Nonetheless, a few important conclusions can be drawn from a study of this document. Firstly, the report reflected the recognition of the PRC's potential for economic progress by American ruling circles, and this heightened Washington's interest in the accomplishment of Beijing's planned programs. Secondly, the report would seem to contain certain warnings for Beijing in its praise or lack of praise for particular measures taken in Beijing in connection with domestic development, as these measures will ultimately be directly related to the Chinese leaders' foreign policy strategy.

The book being reviewed is only the first volume of the study (the second volume, on the national budget of the PRC as of the end of 1978, has not been published as yet). The coordinator of this study and author of the

foreword is J. Hardt, renowned expert on socialist affairs and senior research associate of the congressional research service. General problems in the functioning of the PRC's economic system and the current situation in the most important sectors of this system are comprehensively examined, in detail and from various vantage points, in five sections of the book.

It must be said that the American experts have made an attempt to discern the actual state of the PRC economy at a time when virtually no regular statistics are published in this country, while data pertaining to economic planning are of a fragmentary nature. The insufficiency of statistical material is sometimes one of the reasons for differences in evaluations of even the most general economic indicators. The authors even admit that the final results might be far from the truth.

Taking the indicators of the late 1950's as a basis, with consideration for the few available official statistics and various types of fluctuation, the authors of these articles attempt to define the state of the Chinese economy in 1976-1977, and then to judge the practicability of the planned "Program of the Four Modernizations." For this purpose, official control figures (annual growth of 10 percent in industry and 4-5 percent in agriculture) are extrapolated to 1985 and the end of the century. This is followed by an analysis of methods and means of attaining this level of development.

In 1976, the book states, the United States, the EEC, the USSR, Japan and the PRC accounted for 70 percent of the world GNP. The PRC's share of this total GNP was only 6.7 percent. The PRC leadership intends to increase China's share of the total GNP to 7.9-9.2 percent by 1985 and to 9.6-14 percent by 2000. In other words, in the year 2000, China will still be in last place in terms of GNP value, but the Chinese GNP will already constitute more than half of the U.S. GNP and more than 70 percent of the Japanese GNP (p 203).

The implementation of economic plans of this kind, however, is being blocked by such fundamental obstacles as the state of agriculture under conditions of perceptible demographic stress and the insufficient development of power engineering facilities. The correction of this situation will require huge capital investments and the almost total re-equipping of machine-building branches of industry.

Excessive population growth, the authors believe, will also constitute an extremely serious problem. Even a drop in the birth rate (to 1.3-1.9 percent) might not solve the problem if the planned level of production is not properly provided for in agriculture. The achievement of zero population growth--the best possible alternative for China--will be impossible, according to the authors, given the present system of administrative birth control. Under these conditions, the growth of agricultural production will only stay slightly ahead of population growth, as the population will total 1.2-1.5 billion by the end of the 20th century (pp 468-470).

China, the authors point out, has considerable energy resources. In 1977 the PRC was in ninth place in world electrical energy production: The nation was producing around 136 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, or 6.7 percent of the U.S. output. Some data indicate that 192 electric power stations were operating in China in 1977, 126 thermal and 66 hydro-electric. The total capacity of existing electric power stations is estimated at 40,500 milliwatts [sic]. The achievement of the planned annual growth rate of 10 percent in industrial output will require energy capacities totaling 108,000 milliwatts [sic] by 1985. Despite the adequate level of development in the production of power engineering equipment, this branch will not be able to fill the nation's needs, and China will have to make overseas purchases of power equipment worth about 300 million dollars between 1978 and 1985 (pp 404-405). Besides this, the great distances between rivers with high hydraulic energy potential and the economic centers of national zones will seriously complicate their effective use (pp 17-18). As for petroleum, gas and bituminous coal, their working will require excessively high capital investments.

Machine building represents the "foundation of Chinese military and industrial development; it is made up of a great variety of industrial branches--from ball bearing production to ship building and the manufacture of locomotives, power engineering equipment and so forth" (p 285). Soviet shipments made between 1953 and 1957 constituted the basis for the development of this sector. In accordance with agreements concluded in 1958 and 1959 with the USSR and other socialist countries, machine-building plant shipments were to be doubled, but the "Great Leap Forward," which was launched in 1958, undermined the development of Chinese machine building. The general situation in this branch did not improve until 1966; moreover, according to the authors, this improvement was due to more expensive purchases of equipment and technology in Japan and other Western countries.

The "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1969) and the subsequent internal political struggle resulted in disparities in the development of Chinese machine building, but it nonetheless increased its production output during that period under the pressure of the slogan about "preparation for war."

The PRC is also encountering problems stemming from the shortage of qualified personnel in almost all branches of the national economy.

Therefore, the completion of these programs is questioned in the study. Moreover, the authors conclude that future economic development in China will not reduce the gap between the PRC and the developed industrial nations, particularly in the fields of industrial and military technology, labor productivity and standard of living. The Chinese economy will not be able to maintain a high rate of development over the long range, although it is possible, according to these authors, that the more or less high indicators of 1964-1974 may be equal for a short time after the economic confusion of 1975-1977.

The possibility of overcoming these economic difficulties will depend on several important conditions. Above all, the "pragmatic" economic policy of the Beijing leadership, with its Western orientation, according to the authors, and the establishment of closer commercial ties between China and Japan, the United States and other Western industrial states will contribute to the completion of these programs. The conclusions presented in the book include the frank statement that, "for the time being, the improvement of economic relations might be the most appealing method of improving Sino-American relations" (p XXV). Without excluding the possibility of expanded shipments of weapons to China, the authors indicate that, over the long range, "the Western influence will most probably be greatest in the satisfaction of China's economic needs. Imports of grain and agricultural technology from the West could be a crucially important long-range factor, although only of secondary immediate significance" (Ibid.).

Secondly, according to the authors, the existence of stable internal political conditions in the nation is the main prerequisite for the successful attainment of economic goals, since effective long-range planning would be unthinkable without this.

Thirdly, the authors regard the limitation of expenditures on more costly military programs as an essential condition.

The result is an extremely simple formula. Positive, from the standpoint of the authors, Chinese development will only be possible if the internal political situation in the PRC is stable and PRC reliance on the Western countries is simultaneously intensified. In addition, this will also necessitate the extensive attraction of foreign capital into China, as well as Beijing's cancellation of the more costly strategic programs that might threaten the United States and Europe in the future. In short, the authors propose that comprehensive efforts be made to attach China to the West. For this purpose, the United States and its allies are advised to assume considerable political and economic obligations to guarantee China's defense and the modernization of its armed forces (pp 78-79). The authors apparently believe that Beijing can be solidly involved in the network of economic and military cooperation and, consequently, that its politics can be manipulated. But economic difficulties did not interfere at all with the Chinese leadership's initiation of treacherous aggression against the SRV. Obviously, the Beijing leaders, guided by nationalist aims, are not likely to feel bound by any kind of promise. The aggression of the PRC against Vietnam clearly demonstrated that Beijing has no intention of taking world public opinion into account, and it will be even less likely to do this when it gains economic and military strength, and this could endanger the United States. It must be said that although Maoist domestic policy inflicted huge losses on the Chinese economy, it was precisely in those difficult years that Beijing carried out its nuclear programs. It is hardly likely to discard them under more favorable economic conditions, at least not as long as great-power nationalist aims prevail in Beijing.

Religion in America

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 116-119

[Review by I. Ye. Zadorozhnyuk of the book "Religion in American Society. The Effective Presence" by J. Wilson, New York, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1978, XVI plus 492 pages]

[Text] Solid studies of the historical roots of American religious tradition have been published in the United States in recent years. An important place among fundamental studies of this kind is occupied by the subject of this review, a book written by Duke University Professor John Wilson, expert on the sociology of religion. The author has analyzed the change in religious beliefs in American society, the influence of religion on economic, political and other social institutions in the United States, the crisis of traditional beliefs and the role of new ones in the overall American ideological structure and, finally, the tendencies toward secularization--that is, the ultimate decline of religious influence in the West as whole. The phenomena examined by the author are interesting, and not only to specialists in this field, as religion in the United States is spreading its influence to all spheres of public life: from politics to the family, from ideology to the motivation of the behavior of members of small religious groups. On the basis of the findings of numerous inquiries into the sociological aspects of religion, the author describes the origins, development and propagation of various forms of religion, including forms that are not generally discussed in academic religious studies, such as "civic religion" or the so-called "youth religions." These two forms of religion deserve further mention, particularly since the author of the book being reviewed gives them considerable attention.

"Civic religion," in the United States is more frequently written about by journalists and politicians than by religious historians. "Civic religion," Wilson writes, "is a non-denominational faith. It is engendered by public life and is reflected in everyday passions, values and ideas about the virtues, morals and traditions of society. It exists in concrete form in the 'shrines' of Gettysburg and Arlington and in such 'holy' days as Memorial Day, Thanksgiving, the Fourth of July, Washington's Birthday and Lincoln's Birthday" (p 177). This is a religious-political cult of the republic, which sanctions political, social, military and other actions, is trusted upon young Americans in their schools and sanctifies many facets of the American way of life. An example of the use of "civic religion" by politicians can be seen in the inauguration speeches of the presidents. Appeals for national unity under God are made at the beginning and end of these speeches, and not the god of a specific faith or even Christ, but an abstract divinity. The "sacred" origins of freedom, equality and justice, faith in the divine nature of American democracy and America's "lofty mission" are important elements of the political and ideological rhetoric that is brought to bear on the minds of voters. Other elements of this "religion," according to Wilson, are

sermons about the necessity of hard work, a self-sufficient pragmatism, a moralistic attitude toward politics and, above all, a belief in the responsibility of each individual for his own destiny.

This set of beliefs, from "piety on the Potomac" to the "sacred legends" about shoeshine boys who become millionaires, is supplemented by certain rituals, including a pledge of allegiance to the national flag, in which the words "one nation under God" are invariably prominent, slogans like "God Bless America" and so forth. Many politicians and clergymen, Wilson states, imply that religious conviction is a sign of civic responsibility and that church members are loyal to the political system. Religion, in their opinion, is the principal moral basis of social unity.

Beliefs and rituals of this kind aid in defining the relationship between church and state, which, according to the "Bill of Rights," are formally separate. Wilson examines the relationship between church and state from the standpoint of the influence they exert on one another. He notes that the state encourages the activities of religious groups in some cases and prosecutes them in others--as in the case, for example of the Black Muslims. The connection between the church and the state is also reflected in the fact that church property is not subject to taxation and that the government pays the salaries of clergymen in the army and in prisons. Some religions (Congregationalist, Presbyterian and Methodist) are obviously connected with the political establishment.¹ As Wilson underscores, "this connection is most vividly reflected in the correlation drawn between 'anti-Americanism' and 'atheistic communism' and in the prejudices which urge active resistance to the participation of atheists in the political process" (p 200).

In turn, many churches use the state as a means of reinforcing their own position. For example, some Protestant religions receive support from the government in their missionary and educational work. Wilson concludes that "formal separation of church and state does not signify a real separation" (p 211).

As for the "youth religions," their birth and development, in Wilson's opinion, illustrate the process of religious ferment in relatively small and "unstable" population groups and amorphous social movements. The author feels that they are indicators of deep-seated social processes and evidence of a crisis in the traditional values of the American way of life. For example, the followers of the "Jesus movement," which began in the western United States in 1967, make statements like the following: "America is on the road to hell! The events described in the apocalypse and the Acts of the Apostles are a fairly accurate description of America today." This new religious current, which resulted from the evangelization of the hippie movement, preaches that social evils stem from personal guilt and that this "dying world" can only be saved if each individual turns to Christ. The "Krishna Consciousness" group is just as "critical" of the West for "wallowing in materialism." The "ideal family" of Sun Myung Moon is mainly being joined by young Americans who have severed all

social ties. These and a number of other "youth cults" aspire to the creation of a "new religious consciousness" that is supposed to change America.²

In his examination of religious differences, the author concludes that "religion in the United States is not as pluralistic as it appears to be at first glance" (p 282) and corroborates this statement with statistical data. For example, the ten main churches in America account for more than 70 percent of the 131 million U.S. church members, and 90 percent of all churchgoers in the American South are Baptists or Methodists. Nonetheless, various conflicts do exist between religious currents and within them. These are primarily conflicts of an ethnic and racial nature. They are reflected in the formation of various nativist, racist, anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic movements under the auspices of Protestantism (the "Know-Nothing" party of the mid-19th century, the Anti-Saloon League of the late 19th century, the Ku Klux Klan and others) and in the opposition of desegregation by some groups.

In this sociological study of religion, Wilson takes the position of M. Weber--a fashionable position in U.S. sociology. With certain reservations, he admits that religion plays a conservative role in political conflicts. In his opinion, this role essentially consists in the "reassessment of values" phenomenon, by which spiritual goals are substituted for actual objectives. This gives rise to declarations of the irrelevancy of politics in comparison to matters of faith, the emphasis on the elevation of religious status instead of social status, the attempt to mitigate the class conflict by means of stronger intraconfessional unity, the justification of the status quo and a stronger belief in the futility of politics. At the same time, he writes, "some churches frequently become involved in movements for social reform. Most of them try to reconcile the working class to the capitalist system by mitigating the consequences of social evils. "From the Marxist standpoint," Wilson goes on, "this kind of reformist movement is, in the fullest sense of the word, the opiate of the people, as it creates the illusion of change where it does not exist" (p 360). Religion often imposes middle-class values on the working class, and working class organizations are not supported by radical reformists who oppose the labor unions. Some clergymen (mainly the so-called "new generation" of clergy) are now more aware of the need for intensive social activity by the church. They are demanding that religion be "secularized and de-mythologized," they adhere to the "God is dead" theology, they condemn the other-worldly and individualistic elements of Christianity and are demanding that its values be implemented in this world. It is for this purpose that the ideas of the new "situational ethics" are being worked out; they cast doubts on the traditional, legalistic and static system of morality as a means of alienation and oppression. These clergymen are particularly active in missions, on campuses and in various agencies.

These young liberal clergymen, however, only account for slightly more than 10 percent of the total clergy, and they naturally cannot determine the policies of the main religious currents (p 386).

Finally, the author analyzes the processes by which religious beliefs are discredited and religions lose their social influence. In the attempt to stay on top, religion, as Wilson puts it, is "changing its position," which is attested to, for example, by the reinforcement of "civic religion," on the one hand, and the birth of various types of "youth cults" and sects, "sensitivity training groups" and so forth, on the other. This kind of re-orientation of religion explains why such a high percentage of Americans believe in God (94-95 percent). The percentage of churchgoers is particularly high in the United States in comparison to other capitalist countries. For example, 37 percent of all adults attended weekly church services in 1940, but the number had risen to 47 percent by 1961 (it is true that it had decreased to 40 percent by 1975 in connection with the disillusionment in all social institutions, including the church).

Nonetheless, these figures do not attest to heightened religious conviction in America. As Wilson points out, "church attendance is often associated with the stronger role of the middle classes, their social conformity and acceptance of the values of the American way of life" (p 401).

The process of secularization is penetrating deeper and deeper into all spheres of American life. Religion is now less institutionalized, less social, public and visible, and the prestige of the clergyman is declining. Religion is being crowded out of the family, the labor sphere, politics, morality, education and even philanthropy. This process is becoming particularly pronounced in the West in connection with the declining influence of religion in the working class; moreover, working class leaders are criticizing the church more for its social conservatism than for its ideas.

The author argues that the high percentage of churchgoers and the financial power of the church in the United States do not reflect real religious conviction on the part of Americans. Their practice of religion is more of a formal nature, membership in a church is a sign of respectability and affiliation with a specific community, a "sign of Americanism," religious associations are serving more and more as "sales agencies" and the U.S. citizen is guided very little in his life by the rules of religion.

FOOTNOTES

1. The author presents data on the religious composition of the 95th Congress, attesting to the prevalence of the Protestant elite here, just as among the state governors. For example, Presbyterians, who constitute 3 percent of all believers in the United States, hold 11 percent of the seats in Congress and 14 percent of the state governorships, the United Methodists (7 percent) hold 14 and 2, respectively; the Episcopalians (2.2 percent) hold 11 and 8; the members of the United Church of Christ (1.4 percent) hold 4 and 6; and Unitarians (0.1 percent) hold 2 and 4. On the other hand, Lutherans, who represent 6.4 percent of all believers, hold only 2 percent of the seats

in Congress and 6 percent of the governorships; members of the Eastern Orthodox Church (3 percent) hold 0.7 and 2, respectively, and Catholics (37.3 percent) hold 24 and 30. As for the rest, the Jews, who represent 4.6 percent, hold 5 percent of the seats in Congress and 4 percent of the governorships; Disciples of Christ (1 percent) hold 0.9 and 2, respectively, and Mormons (1.7 percent) hold 2 and 2 (p 306).

2. American sectarianism is the other side of the coin of "civic religion," apologizing for the values of the bourgeois way of life. It is analyzed in the article by D. Ye. Furman entitled "The Jonestown Tragedy and the American Sects" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1979).

Biography of Amon Carter

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79 pp 119-120

[Review by D. Ya. Bratslavskiy of the book "Amon. The Life of Amon Carter, Sr. of Texas" by J. Flemmons, Austin (Texas), Jenkins Publishing Company, 1978, 520 pages]

[Text] This book by American journalist Jerry Flemmons deals with the life and career of one of the "kings of the press" in the United States--Amon Carter, who died in 1955. The author writes about how great this publisher's political influence was on U.S. domestic and foreign policy-making under the Roosevelt Administration.

"A hard-headed conservative businessman" (p 68), A. Carter completely measured up to the political "standards" of his native state of Texas. He was one of the belligerent conservatives who regarded the South as a political stronghold in the struggle against the liberals. Calling for resolute struggle against the "Eastern liberals," he tried to appear to his fellow Texans as a patriotic Texan guided primarily by the ideals and interests of his state (p 66).

Amon Carter, according to the author, was a born businessman, a man with exceptional intuition but an absolute lack of principles, prepared to "sell his city, his district, his state and, naturally, himself" (p 141).

The magnate's chief offspring was the STAR-TELEGRAM newspaper, founded by him in 1913 with two friends (who he later ruined). As a result of the manipulations of Carter, who bought up most of the provincial newspapers in the South, this newspaper became the leading press organ of the regional business community within a single decade. Texas oil and financial bosses promoted the rise of the STAR-TELEGRAM. It was precisely with their assistance that the owner of the newspaper was able to survive a fierce competitive struggle with William Hearst and his press empire.

Amon Carter was not only the owner of this newspaper and large radio and television stations in the South, he later also became an oil magnate. Carter had close contacts with the Du Ponts, the Mellons, the Kuhn-Loeb, the presidents of U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Standard Oil of New York, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Ford Motor, and others.

The author describes Carter's numerous meetings with President F. D. Roosevelt, who had to take the Texan's views into account. As a result of this White House support, West Texas regularly received substantial financial resources in the form of federal assistance, and the "fighter for the interests of Texas" slyly deposited much of this money in his own pocket (p 470). In turn, A. Carter was one of the influential members of the Democratic Party National Finance Committee, and his contributions to Democratic campaign funds were so sizable and his influence on the President was so substantial that F. Roosevelt even offered him the post of secretary of defense in his administration. Carter refused the offer because, as the author comments, he "had enough real power without becoming a cabinet member" (p 470). As the author points out, Lyndon Johnson was also obligated to A. Carter for his election as U.S. senator from the state of Texas in 1948.

In this book, we find a vivid portrait of an unscrupulous monopolist, who used his power and influence to propagandize the ideology of "American exclusivity," as well as "American democracy," which essentially signified the unlimited right of Texas bigwigs to climb into the pockets of the taxpayers and the government.

Workings of U.S. Economic Cycle

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
p 120

[Review by Yu. I. Bobrakov of the book "Mekhanizm ekonomicheskogo tsikla v SShA," edited by A. V. Anikin and R. M. Antov, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 470 pages]

[Text] This work, written by a group of researchers from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is a comprehensive study of a most complex phenomenon--the economic mechanism of the capitalist cycle.

The three sections of the book contain a thorough analysis of the specific and distinctive features of the postwar economic cycle in the United States, a discussion of its effect on the financial status of the population and a description of the interaction of the U.S. cycle with the cyclical development of the world capitalist economy.

The study is based on an exceptional abundance of facts and statistics and focuses on the 1970's--that is, the most recent past, when cyclical processes acquired new features as a result of the interaction of cyclical crises with structural crises and when the crises themselves and recovery from them were complicated by chronic inflation.

Neither bourgeois economic theory nor the state-monopolistic practice of economic regulation was prepared for these peculiarities of the crises of the 1970's. The U.S. Government, just as the governments of other leading capitalist countries, set in motion the entire arsenal of measures, worked out in accordance with the theory and practice of economic regulations, but, as demonstrated by economic reality, particularly the next economic crisis, these "tested" state-monopolistic anticyclical measures were incapable of effectively counteracting the problems engendered by the contemporary cycle.

Considerable and totally justifiable attention is also given to an analysis of the capitalist cycle's effects on the status of the working class, the economic struggle of the American proletariat in the 1970's, the structure and duration of unemployment, personal consumption and the structure of personal savings.

Several important new problems are thoroughly analyzed. These include the "interaction" of the world industrial cycle with the U.S. national cycle, the mechanism of the transference of cyclical crises and the role of capital and manpower migration in the international cycle mechanism.

All sections of the book contain logical criticism of contemporary bourgeois theories and disclosures of attempts by bourgeois economists and sociologists to repudiate the Marxist-Leninist theory of cycles and crises and represent state-monopolistic anticrisis policy as something capable of "blunting" the edge of the cyclical movements of capitalist economics.

This fundamental scholarly work is the latest in a series of studies of the capitalist cycle, conducted by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations over a period of many years. It would be of great interest and educative value to the scientific community and the general public.

American Continental Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
p 121

[Review by Yu. K. Krasnov of the book "SShA i Yevropa: obshchiye problemy amerikanskoy kontinental'noy politiki. Kriticheskiy analiz burzhuanoy istoriografii SShA" (The United States and Europe: General Problems in American Continental Policy. Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Historiography in the United States) by S. A. Appatov, Moscow, Mysl', 1979, 238 pages]

[Text] The author of this work has attempted to write a comprehensive study of postwar American bourgeois historiography on international relations and U.S. foreign policy, and its various goals, currents and movements in relation to their evaluations of U.S. postwar European policy. The chronological framework of the study takes in American bourgeois

historiography of the 1960-1975 period. A critical analysis of hundreds of works by American bourgeois researchers allows S. I. Appatov to delve deeply into the fanciful constructions of bourgeois ideological and political theories, analyze the theoretical foundation on which contemporary bourgeois historiography is based and considerably supplement existing Soviet historical, economic, sociological and other studies of U.S. foreign policy.

In contrast to other Soviet researchers of this topic, S. I. Appatov analyzes American bourgeois historical studies of the United States' European policy with a view to elucidating the more general problems and concepts connected with this policy: "Atlantic partnership" and "Western European unity" (pp 37-129), as well as the problem of collective security on the continent (pp 129-204).

The author devotes particular attention to an analysis of bourgeois arguments in regard to international detente.

The author arrives at the general conclusion that the process of differentiation is now more pronounced in American historical and political science. The most deep-seated causes of this can be found in the increasingly acute crises of bourgeois historical methodology. Certain advances in historiography in the direction of a recognition of the actual balance of power in Europe have not brought about a change in the narrow outlook of bourgeois authors or the injurious methods they use to study the historical process.

Conference on American Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
p 121

[Report by T. A. Bychkova on American interpretations of U.S. foreign policy (based on materials of a Tomsk State University regional science conference)]

[Text] A regional science conference on the methodology of history, historiography and source studies was held at Tomsk State University. The subsection on the "Historiography of U.S. Foreign Policy" was attended by experts on American affairs from Moscow, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Kemerovo, Novokuznetsk, Tyumen' and other cities. The following reports were heard: "American Historians of the Neo-Liberal Movement on U.S. Policy Toward Germany after World War I" (candidate of historical sciences N. S. Indukayeva, Tomsk), "American Historians of the Conservative Movement on U.S. Policy Toward China, 1945-1950" (candidate of historical sciences S. V. Vol'fson, Tomsk), "The Falsification of Soviet-Baltic Relations by Contemporary American Authors" (candidate of historical sciences O. F. Rubtsov, Yaroslavl'), "The Rio de Janeiro Pact in the Works of U.S. Statesmen and Politicians" (candidate of historical sciences V. I.

Varyushchenko, Novosibirsk), "The Oregon Question as Elucidated by American and Canadian Authors" (Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. G. Varnakov, Kemerovo), "The Classification of Schools and Movements in Postwar American Bourgeois Historical Studies of International Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Candidate of Historical Sciences S. I. Appatov, Odessa), "Contemporary American Bourgeois Authors on the Essence of the Radical Movement in American Historiography" (Candidate of Historical Sciences M. Ya. Pelipas', Tomsk), "Some Methodological Problems of Contemporary American Bourgeois Historiography" (Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Ye. Kunina, Moscow) and others. In all, 17 reports and speeches were presented.

Many questions were discussed at the conference; some of them were only raised and will require further examination. Participants said that the practice of convening historiographic conferences of experts on American affairs should be continued and called for more thorough investigation of the connection between American foreign policy and social processes occurring in the United States.

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 79
pp 122-127

[Article by I. Ya. Kobrinskaya]

[Text] The profound changes that have taken place in the international arena since the end of World War II have substantially modified the foreign policy decision-making mechanism in the United States. This mechanism has become much more complex and government agencies have begun to involve experts and scientific advisers in the political process in connection with a broad spectrum of problems, from armament questions to the problem of combating hunger. As a result of this, a multitude (according to various estimates, as many as several thousands)¹ scientific research centers were established at the end of the 1940's, throughout the 1950's and, in particular, in the 1960's. These centers work on contracts with government agencies and departments, primarily the Pentagon and the State Department.

Organizations dealing with problems in the long-range and medium-range planning and forecasting of American foreign policy, as well as domestic, economic and military policy, fall into several categories, differing in terms of their funding and research methods.

The so-called "think tanks"² (the RAND Corporation could serve as a "model" establishment of this kind), with rare exceptions, work on contracts with the National Security Council, State Department, Pentagon and other government institutions and are funded by them.

The research centers of American universities (such as, for example, Columbia University's School of International Relations and War and Peace Research Institute, the Hudson Institute, Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University, the Brookings Institution, etc.) are funded by the government, but they are also supported by private individuals and foundations. In addition to performing their own research work, these establishments also fill government orders and, in one form or another, influence the planning of American foreign political, foreign economic and military strategy.

A special category consists of American businessmen's associations, including the Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Industrialists, which defend and implement the interests of individual economic groups or branches of industry.³ Finally, in addition to the categories listed above, there is the type of organization called "nongovernmental" by American researchers. These are essentially private organizations, serving the U.S. ruling elite directly. The Atlantic Council of the United States, the Committee for Economic Development, the "Trilateral Commission" and other "independent" organizations of this type are supported by philanthropic foundations and private individuals, and some of their income is also derived from membership dues and publishing activity. The research activity of these institutes is closely combined with political activity, and their range of interests is extremely broad. It is precisely to this category that the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) belongs.

The Council on Foreign Relations was formed long before the "expert boom" of the 1950's and 1960's, but it stayed in the background for many years. It is interesting that the organization became famous at precisely the time when some American political figures had begun to talk about its "demise." According to Z. Brzezinski, former director of this council, "if you were a member of the council 15 or so years ago..., you were sure that the discussions here would become policy, either immediately or in the future. Today these are only interesting conversations."⁴ Many facts testify, however, that the council has no intention of giving up any of its influence.

The history of the council begins in 1918, when a new "dinner club" was organized in New York. Its members, rich New Yorkers with an interest in international affairs, attended dinners at the club because it gave them an opportunity to hear "what prominent foreign guests had to say."⁵ The CFR was officially established as an organization in August 1921. It was headed by leading bankers and attorneys. Elihu Root, one of the heralds of U.S. imperialist expansion, consultant to many of the largest American corporations and banks of that time, first president of the Carnegie Endowment and prominent figure in the Republican Party, was elected honorary president. The president of the council was John W. Davis, Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1924; the vice president was Paul D. Cravath, founder of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, one of the largest and most prestigious law firms on Wall Street; Edwin F. Gay, economic historian, the first dean of the Harvard Business School and the former editor of the NEW YORK EVENING POST, was the first secretary and treasurer of the CFR. This started the tradition by which the governing body of the organization has always been made up of leaders of the business community and prominent members of the ruling elite.

In slightly over half a century, past and present members of the CFR have included such renowned political figures as Henry Stimson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Walter Mondale, Paul Warnke,

Paul Nitze and Charles Yost. Almost all of the directors of the CIA since 1947 have been permanent members of the CFR, including A. Dulles, J. McCone, R. Helms, W. Colby and J. Bush.

Another tradition also deserves mention: In contrast to other research centers advising the government, which have become the "preserve" of one of the two leading U.S. parties (for example, the Brookings Institution is called the "seat of the Democratic Government in exile) and the Aspen Institute, where former U.S. President Gerald Ford is now working, is called the "seat of the Republican Government in exile"), the activities of the CFR have always been of a "bipartisan" nature. Finally, the officers of the CFR have always occupied parallel key positions in other leading institutions connected with policy-making: "In American institutions whose interests lie in the sphere of foreign policy, most of the members of the administration are also members of the Council on Foreign Relations."⁶

In 1978, the members of the New York branch of the CFR⁷ included 535 representatives of the business community, 356 prominent individuals from academic circles, 284 government officials, 276 employees of other non-governmental organizations, 180 attorneys, 171 journalists and other mass media workers; in all, there were 1,878 members.⁸

The main goals of the council have not undergone qualitative changes either. In 1922, it was the council's intention to "organize a permanent advisory body on the international aspects of political, economic and financial problems facing America.... In short, this is a group of individuals interested in the spread of information about international relations and, in particular, in intelligent American foreign policy-making."⁹

The report of the CFR for 1977-1978 set forth the following goals: "Creation of a new basis for the resolution of international problems; assistance in constructive extra-party American foreign policy-making; provision of continuity in leadership for policy implementation; information and recruitment of new people for council membership, as well as audience expansion by means of publications and other methods."¹⁰

The organizational principle of council activity is similar in many ways to the structure of other non-governmental research organizations. Several discussion and research groups, working on specific problems, function within the CFR framework. When research programs are completed, these task forces regroup and begin working on new problems.

The first serious program taken on by the council in accordance with its task of "guiding American public opinion" on foreign policy matters was the publication of a magazine, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, which is still one of the most prestigious periodicals in the field of international relations.

Before the war, the research activity of the council was primarily confined to basic economic problems. The fact that businessmen, governmental officials, journalists and representatives of the military establishment took

part in the council's work along with scholars attached particular significance to council studies and recommendations. "Usually, more than 20 men met and discussed a problem approximately monthly for a year or more. Their conclusions about the direction of American foreign policy were... communicated to government officials, formally or informally."¹¹

In spite of the spirit of isolationism that prevailed in the United States in the 1920's and 1930's, the Council on Foreign Relations advocated an expansionist foreign policy from the very beginning of its existence. The reasons for this are obvious: As American researchers L. Shoup and W. Minter point out, "the council, dominated by corporate leaders, saw expansion of American trade and investment...as the solution to domestic problems. It thought in terms of preservation of the status quo at home, and this involved overseas expansion."¹²

Questions of domestic and foreign policy, as well as economic matters, were already being investigated in close relationship in the council's earliest publications. "In our day, it is already difficult to draw a line between foreign policy and domestic policy issues.... It is equally difficult to separate economic considerations from political ones,"¹³ one of its documents stated.

The CFR took an active part in the debates of the late 1920's and early 1930's, during the "Great Depression," on the possibility of American "self-sufficiency." The group studying this problem, under the supervision of future U.S. Secretary of State J. F. Dulles (other members of the group were Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, Budget Director Lewis Douglas and secretary of state Economic Adviser Herbert Feis), opposed this theory, firmly stressing the need to expand American economic ties. American researchers have noted the increasing influence of the council in foreign policy decision-making during President F. D. Roosevelt's term in office.

The principal CFR program of the 1939-1952 period was the "War and Peace Studies Project." This group was formed at the initiative of U.S. Secretary of State C. Hull and his Undersecretary F. Welles. The heads of the "War and Peace Studies Project" were also on the State Department's advisory committee on postwar foreign policy-making. As L. Shoup and W. Minter point out, "at least 5 cabinet-level departments and 14 separate government agencies, bureaus and offices were interlocked with the project."¹⁴

The second world war and the subsequent period of cold war totally undermined the position of "isolationists" in the United States. Questions of American Government foreign policy took the fore. Under these conditions, the CFR's ideas about the creation of a single worldwide political and economic system with the United States at its head received widespread recognition and development. The group worked out the bases of U.S. global strategy, which included the definition of such key concepts and policy directions as the U.S. "national interest," the "Grand Area" and

the "new world order." The term national interest presupposed protection of the interests of big American capital in any part of the world and, as a minimum, free access to markets and raw materials in the nations of the former British Empire, the Far East and the entire Western hemisphere.¹⁵ The term "Grand Area" took in the entire Western hemisphere, Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries, Western Europe and Japan; it virtually coincided, as L. Shoup and W. Minter stress, with the concept of the "Free World."¹⁶ On the basis of the "national interest" and "Grand Area" concepts, the council worked out a strategy for a "new world order," which lay at the basis of all council studies, recommendations and publications and determined the nature of its influence on foreign policy decision-making and, to a considerable degree, on the essence of these decisions until almost the beginning of the 1970's.

In a slightly modified form, the CFR's global concept was also reflected in the strategy of "interdependence," which the council worked out during the 1970's as part of the "1980's Project," in an attempt to implement the idea of the "new world order" under current conditions. The council was actively involved in U.S. policy-making in regard to Western Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin America.

The council's views on Soviet-American relations deserves special attention.

The CFR played an important role in the elaboration of the "containment" doctrine. Its author, council member George Kennan, set forth the basic premises of this doctrine in his report to the CFR in January 1947. That summer, his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" was published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (at that time, Kennan was the head of the Department of State's Policy Planning Committee), signed with the pseudonym "Mr X."

The studies conducted by the council in the 1950's and 1960's and the resulting recommendations to the government played an important part in increasing the U.S. defense budget, building up nuclear potential and spreading the myth of the "Soviet military threat." In recent years, however, council recommendations have undergone considerable changes and now proceed from the need to seek reasonable compromises. Questions of Soviet-American relations are still of primary importance in council activities. Various aspects of these relations were the topic at six meetings and seminars in 1978, which were conducted jointly with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Representatives of various university centers, the National Security Council, the CIA and the Pentagon and union leaders took part in the discussions.

The council's position in regard to China has also been shaped by the "new world order" doctrine. As early as the 1960's, CFR recommendations were already pointing out the need to normalize relations with Beijing. The authors of the work on CFR activity call the changes in the United States' China policy one of the council's "successes."¹⁷

Another major aspect of council activity is the task of influencing corporate policy. In particular, the CFR organizes semiannual seminars on foreign policy for young businessmen. Besides this, direct consultations are offered to American corporations, which "make foreign policy in the same way as the American Government."¹⁸ In turn, corporate members of the council include Chase Manhattan, General Electric, General Motors, Ford Motor, Continental Can, Gulf Oil and other gigantic corporations, particularly those with overseas investments.¹⁹ The seminars serve the CFR as a source of financial support: In 1978, the council received 562,000 dollars from corporations to finance these seminars; in 1979 the figure is expected to reach 700,000.²⁰ But the main purpose of the seminars is the implementation of CFR ideas in the conduct of leading monopolies.

Incidentally, the practice of holding such seminars is not the exclusive prerogative of the CFR. It is also typical of other organizations of this type, such as the Brookings Institution, for example.

Although the organization of various research projects and seminars puts the council in the same category as other research centers, its functions, as we mentioned above, are much more extensive. This unique "club" of the ruling elite pursues the goal of creating and reinforcing upper echelon public opinion in the United States on matters of foreign policy. This is primarily achieved through personal ties--the interlocking of CFR leadership with the boards of directors of the largest banks and corporations (especially transnational), with the administrative link in government institutions, leading university centers, private foundations and mass media corporations and with the leadership of the AFL-CIO. The "service records" of several current council members can be cited as examples.

The chairman of the CFR Board of Directors is David Rockefeller. He is the head of the widely renowned elitist "Trilateral Commission" and the chairman of Chase Manhattan, a bank that is the "most influential in the world from the political standpoint."²¹ David Rockefeller leads the Rockefeller empire, which controls the capitalist world's largest corporation, Exxon, as well as Mobil, Standard Oil of Indiana, Standard Oil of California and others. He is a member of the board of directors and trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Museum of Modern Art, Harvard University and the University of Chicago, the director of Rockefeller Center and so forth.

Council leader John McCloy, partner in the New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, was previously Chase Manhattan's chairman of the board. His "service record" includes the following positions: U.S. high commissioner in Germany (1949-1952), chairman of the Coordinating Committee on the Cuban Crisis (1962), special adviser to the President on disarmament (1961-1963), member of the board of directors of Allied Chemical, American Telephone and Telegraph, Metropolitan Life Insurance and Westinghouse Electric and trustee of the Ford Foundation and Amherst College.

The editor of the CFR's journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS is William Bundy. He is a partner in the Washington law firm of Covington and Burling. Bundy first served as assistant director of the CIA and later as undersecretary of defense (1961-1964), assistant U.S. secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1964-1966) and trustee of the Committee for Economic Development and Yale University.

Another CFR leader is Douglas Dillon, chairman of the board of the New York investment firm, Dillon, Reade and Co., member of the board of directors of two other financial concerns, director of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Brookings Institution and the Metropolitan Museum and secretary of the treasury in 1961-1965.

Former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, just recently the head of the American SALT delegation, Paul Warnke, is a partner in the Washington law firm of Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain and Finney. He was assistant secretary of defense in 1967-1969.

Cyrus Vance, now the U.S. secretary of state, has been a member of the council on foreign relations for a long time. He is a partner in the New York law firm Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett, a member of the board of directors of Pan American World Airways, the American Life Insurance Company, IBM, the American Red Cross, the University of Chicago and the Rockefeller Foundation. He was formerly assistant secretary of defense and head of the American delegation at the Paris peace talks on Vietnam.

An important role in council activities was played by Harold Brown, renowned nuclear physicist, secretary of the Air Force in the Johnson Administration, later president of the California Institute of Technology and now U.S. secretary of defense, as well as former Democratic Senator from Minnesota Walter Mondale, now vice-president of the United States.

Michael Blumenthal, secretary of the treasury until recently, is also a council member. He is a former president of the Bendix Corporation and trustee of Princeton University.

Finally, there is Zbigniew Brzezinski, now the President's national security adviser.

For American analysts of the political process, it is no secret that "big policy" is actually made not in the White House, but in a few "non-governmental" organizations like the CFR (and the CFR is one of the leaders in this field). These are the coordinating centers of the American ruling elite, the influence of which does not depend on isolated election victories or other political twists of fate, but on the real power of the members of this elite--power stemming from their economic strength. These members make the final decision on who will (or will not) be president, who will make up the new cabinet, etc. The source of their power is money and their "control over major corporations and financial institutions."²² It

is precisely this that gives rise to what Thomas Dye, prominent American researcher of the ruling elite and the workings and its political influence, calls "oligarchic tendencies" in the policy-making process.²³

In Dye's outline of the oligarchic model of policy-making, the central coordinating role is played by policy-planning organizations. They form the viewpoint of the ruling elite--corporate, financial and governmental--for the purpose of elaborating political recommendations that will subsequently be reflected in the actions of "official" politicians. "The organizations of the ruling elite are concerned almost exclusively with long-range policy planning.... These organizations...provide the government with an ideal recruiting base, as they supply it with highly experienced specialists in international relations, people who are also capable of developing a 'foreign policy philosophy.'"²⁴

The idea of creating organizations like the CFR was first brought up in Great Britain at the beginning of the 20th century by members of the English "Round Table."²⁵ Throughout its existence, the council has had contacts with institutes of this kind in other capitalist countries. It has taken an active part in conferences of the world's most prominent industrialists and financial magnates and leading politicians--the so-called Bilderberg meetings. For the planning of a "new world order," in D. Rockefeller's words, the CFR wants to bring the "best brains in the world" together. As the American researchers aptly remark: "Rather, these are mainly the most affluent brains" from North America, Western Europe and Japan.²⁶

According to American political scientists, the "high point" of all the activity of the council and the Trilateral Commission was the election of J. Carter to the presidency in 1976: His "rise" began much earlier, as "he had already become a member of the CFR 4 years earlier on the recommendation of David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Zbrzezinski."²⁸ In 1973, Carter, who was then still the governor of Georgia, also became a member of the Trilateral Commission.

All of this testifies that a study of the activities of the Council on Foreign Relations and other leading policy-planning organizations and an analysis of the mechanism of their influence and their membership roles make it possible to discern the strategic lines that are now gaining strength in American foreign policy, identify "new names" in the U.S. political arena and predict the central issues of internal political debates in the United States over international relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. See P. Dickson, "Think Tanks," New York, 1971, p 27.
2. Ibid. See, also, I. L. Sheydina, "SSHА: 'fabriki mysli' na sluzhbe strategii" [The United States: "Think Tanks" at the Service of Strategy], Moscow, 1973.

3. For more detail, see N. A. Sakharov, "American Business Associations," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1977.
4. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 25 March 1977, p 39.
5. H. Heaton, "A Scholar in Action: Edwin F. Gay," Cambridge (Mass.), 1952, p 203.
6. AMERICAN OPINION, May 1978, p 71.
7. The Council on Foreign Relations has 37 branches in major American cities.
8. "Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report 1977-1978," New York, 1978, p 77.
9. "Council on Foreign Relations. By-laws with List of Officers and Members," New York, 1922, p 1.
10. "Council on Foreign Relations. Annual Report 1977-1978," p 5.
11. L. Shoup and W. Minter, "Imperial Brain Trust. The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy," New York-London, 1977, p 21.
12. Ibid., p 23.
13. "Survey of American Foreign Relations," published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New Haven, 1928, pp 20-21.
14. L. Shoup and W. Minter, Op. cit., p 122.
15. Ibid., p 128.
16. Ibid., p 138.
17. Ibid., p 211.
18. AMERICAN OPINION, May 1978, p 71.
19. Ibid.
20. "Council on Foreign Relations. Annual Report 1977-1978," p 95.
21. AMERICAN OPINION, May 1978, p 71.
22. THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, vol 40, 2 May 1978, p 310.
23. For more detail, see the abovementioned article in THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, vol 40, 2 May 1978, as well as T. Dye and H. Zeigler, "The Irony of Democracy. An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics,"

Belmont (Calif.), 1970; T. Dye, "Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership in the United States," Engelwood Cliffs, 1976.

24. AUSSENPOLITIK, vol 29, No 2, 1978, p 178.
25. The "Round Table" groups were founded in 1908 by Lord Milner; they were financed by the Rhodes Trust (L. Shoup and W. Minter, Op. cit., p 12).
26. Ibid., p 262.
27. For more detail, see N. D. Turkatenko, "The Sources and Goals of the 'Trilateral Strategy,'" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1977.
28. L. Shoup and W. Minter, Op. cit., p 275.

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